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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a study of the Ottoman attempts to control its frontiers and the frontier 
populations by basing upon the experience of the native army (Asakir-i Hamidiye) 
organized by Ismail Hakkı Pasha, who was a governor of Yemen province, between 
1800 and 1882. This thesis positions Yemen into the context of the literature 
produced for the frontier regions; and tries to investigate the dynamics of the 
institutions and practices pursued in Yemen that differentiated from the financial, 
military and judicial institutions of the Tanzimat-era. This thesis puts forth that the 
Ottoman Empire was not a passive audience of imperial competitions of the 
nineteenth century, but engaged into the imperial struggles by undertaking 
aggressive measures with an imperialist mind and strategy. Herein, with the opening 
of the Suez Canal in 1869, the Ottoman ruling elites detected the Red Sea as a 
strategic region too. Therefore, the Ottomans reoccupied the highlands of Yemen 
and San’a; and this study delves into the governing strategies enforced in the 
province immediately after the reoccupation that contradicted with the Tanzimat 
reforms. At the same time this study discusses the similarities and distinctness of the 
different governing strategies sought for the frontiers with the colonial governing 
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techniques by taking into consideration the references of contemporary Ottoman 
ruling elites. In particular, using Asakir-i Hamidiye as a case study, this study probes 
why a native army was organized, and examines its similarities and distinctness with 
the colonial native armies by comparing it with other frontier militia forces as well. 
The debate on Asakir-i Hamidiye is based on a research at Başbakanlık Osmanlı 
Arşivi, and a survey on the provincial newspaper. 
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BİR OSMANLI HUDUT BÖLGESİ OLARAK YEMEN VE YERLİ ORDU 
KURMA TEŞEBBÜSÜ: ASAKİR-İ HAMİDİYE 
 
Önder Eren Akgül 
Tarih, Y. Lisans, 2014 
Tez Danışmanı: Selçuk Akşin Somel 
Anahtar Sözcükler: Emperyalizm, Kolonyalizm, Osmanlı emperyalizmi, Osmanlı 
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Özet 
Bu çalışma, 1880 ile 1882 yılları arasında Yemen valisi İsmail Hakkı Paşa’nın 
tarafından kurulan Asakir-i Hamidiye adlı yerel ordu deneyiminden yola çıkarak, 
Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun hudut bölgelerini ve buralarda yaşayan nüfusu kontrol 
altına alma çabalarını sorunsallaştırmaktadır. Bu tez Yemen’i hudut bölgelerine dair 
yapılan çalışmalar bağlamında değerlendiriyor ve Yemen’de Tanzimat döneminin 
finansal, askeri ve adli kurumlarından farklı kurumların tesisine neden olan 
dinamikleri incelemektedir. Bu çalışmada ortaya konulduğu üzere Osmanlı 
İmparatorluğu 19. yüzyıl boyunca dünyada süregiden emperyal çatışmaların pasif 
bir izleyicisi olmamış, aksine agresif önlemler ve emperyalist bir akıl ve stratejiyle 
bu çatışmalara müdahil olmuştur. Buradan hareketle 1869 yılında Süveş Kanalı’nın 
açılmasıyla birlikte, Kızıl Deniz Osmanlı yönetici elitleri tarafından da bir stratejik 
bölge olarak algılanmıştır. Bu sebeple Yemen’in dağlık bölgeleri ile San’a şehrini 
yeniden işgal eden Osmanlıların ardından da Yemen coğrafyası ve nüfusunu kontrol 
etmek için merkez bölgelerde uygulanan Tanzimat reformları ile çelişebilecek çeşitli 
yönetim stratejileri geliştirdiği bu çalışmada tartışılmaktadır. Bu çalışma aynı 
zamanda hudut bölgelerinde uygulanan farklı yönetim stratejilerinin kolonyal idare 
teknikleri ile benzerlikleri ve farklılıklarını, dönemin yönetici elitlerinin 
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referanslarını göz önünde bulundurarak tartışmaktadır. Bir vaka çalışması olarak, 
Asakir-i Hamidiye adlı yerel ahaliden teşkil edilen ordu, ne amaçla kurulduğu ve 
kolonyal yerli ordular ile olan benzerlikleri ve farklılıkları diğer hudut 
bölgelerindeki yerel milis kuvvetleri ile karşılaştırılarak tartışılmaktadır. Asakir-i 
Hamidiye’ye dair olan tartışma Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi’nde yapılan araştırmaya 
ve dönemim vilayet gazetesinin taranmasına dayanmaktadır. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This study will locate Yemen into the context of Ottoman frontiers with a 
comparative perspective and try to explore the characteristics of frontier rule in the 
nineteenth century by focusing on the attempt to build a native army, namely, Asakir-i 
Hamidiye, between 1880 and 1882. In fact, mainly two questions shape the study. 
Basing upon the that Ismail Hakkı Pasha initiated to organize a native army rather than 
enforcing compulsory military service for Yemeni men, this study tries to answer why 
the Ottoman governors required different governing strategies in the frontiers like 
Yemen, rather than introducing fundamental financial, military and judicial institutions 
of the Tanzimat. Especially the increasing imperialist competition around the frontier 
and the concrete presence of various imperial powers provoked the Ottomans to 
establish their authority as well as to win the obedience of local populations. Therefore, 
the Ottomans aimed to provide tranquil frontiers, where they would exercise their 
sovereignty and would protect the Empire against the outside imperialist 
encroachments. Within this context, Ottoman imperial governors sought any possible 
governing strategies to fulfill these tasks. This study aims to comprehend the dynamics 
which led the governing strategies differentiate from the Tanzimat policies.  
Secondly, this study deals with a question of whether the peculiar governing 
strategies in the frontiers like Yemen could be interpreted as colonial governing 
strategies. Ismail Hakkı Pasha, the governor of Yemen between 1879 and 1882, 
presented the organization of Asakir-i Hamidiye as an example to the Indian Army 
serving for the British Empire in India. As in the example of establishing Asakir-i 
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Hamidiye, the Ottoman governors who were serving in the frontiers had started to apply 
to the colonial governing strategies as their references in the turn of the nineteenth 
century. In this sense, instead of taking the Tanzimat institutions as a model to pursue 
and to enforce in the frontiers, the governors were inspired from the colonial institutions 
and started to own a colonial repertoire. The usage of this repertoire as well as the 
colonial references would reveal a difference between the heartlands of the Empire and 
its frontiers in terms of governing strategies which were pursued. Yet, this study also 
questions colonial exclusionary policies of differentiation in the Ottoman imperial 
practices set up in the frontiers, and will examine the Asakir-i Hamidiye with this 
question as well. In other words, the nature of these imperial practices in the frontiers 
would be examined in the sense that whether they were projected for the integrationist 
aims or could be understood as the examples colonial exclusionary practices.  
One of the assumptions of the study is that the imperial struggles triggered the 
Ottomans to control the Yemen and its population in order to defend the Empire. While 
the Portuguese threat instigated the Ottomans to set up an authority in Yemen in the 
sixteenth century, the British ambitions in the Red Sea starting in the early nineteenth 
century, and its occupation of Aden in 1838 reminded the Ottomans their old claim of 
sovereignty; and the Ottomans (re)occupied the Yemeni Tihame (west coasts) in 1849. 
Furthermore, with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, which escalated the 
imperialist competition on the both shores of the Red Sea, the Ottomans found a ground 
to easily dispatch the military force; and (re)occupied the Yemeni highlands and San’a 
in 1871.  
Both the 1849 and 1871 occupations reveal the Ottoman response to the Western 
imperial encroachments and the engagement of the Ottomans to the imperial 
competition. Yet, this engagement was not limited with the example of Yemen. The 
reoccupation of the Yemeni Tihame and the highlands of Yemen can be positioned into 
a grand strategy of the Ottomans against the imperialist encroachments. Thus, the first 
chapter of this study discusses this grand strategy. The first chapter has mainly two 
parts. In the first part, I will be discussing the Ottoman response to the rising 
imperialism of the nineteenth century. Based upon the Ottoman attempts to expand its 
frontiers from Kurdistan, to the North Africa, I will show that the Ottomans had 
responded to the Western imperialist encroachments with an aggressive imperialist 
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mind. The Ottomans re(conquered) the lands on which they had an authority  once in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth century; but this authority became limited, nominal or 
absent in the following centuries. A survey on these reoccupations and military 
expeditions for controlling the lands will challenge a tendency in the Ottoman 
historiography, which positions the Ottoman Empire as a passive audience of 
imperialist encroachments and imperial competitions. The first chapter indicates that the 
Ottoman governing elites were not the passive audience of intimidations to the Ottoman 
Empire and its domains. The Ottomans also sought to expand their sovereignty in the 
context of imperial competition for the sake of the Empire. The Ottoman reconquest, 
expansion and attempts to position sovereignty and legitimacy over the frontiers of the 
Empire in the course of the nineteenth century reveal the imperialist desires of the 
Ottoman authorities.   
The second part of the first chapter deals with the Ottoman frontier rule, and tries 
to depict a framework to understand the dynamics of the frontiers as well as the 
Ottoman governing strategies in these regions. After depicting the challenges of the 
frontiers, I will show how the Ottoman governors responded to these challenges. In this 
sense this part shows that in order to claim their sovereignty in the reconquered 
frontiers, the Ottomans undertook vigorous policies to transform the frontiers. Yet, 
being aware of the difficulties of introducing the Tanzimat policies and institutions in 
these frontiers because of the local challenges, Ottoman governors considered any 
possible strategies –even those signifying a deviation from the Tanzimat– which would 
provide loyalty of the subjects. Finally, the first chapter compares the governing 
strategies in these frontiers with the colonial governing strategies as the Ottoman 
governors took colonial governing strategies as possible to enforce in the frontiers.  
In the second chapter, I will survey a longue-durée historical background of 
Yemen, which would be an introducing part to understand the Ottoman rule in Yemen. I 
will discuss how the imperial struggles alerted the Ottomans to take control of Yemen 
both in the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. Secondly, I will depict a framework 
which includes the local challenges and Ottoman imperial strategies to keep the 
possession of Yemen in the first two decades of Ottoman rule. In this sense, the 
emphasis would be on the Ottoman governing strategies against the challenges of the 
presence of Aden Residency, and the difficulties of introducing Ottoman financial, 
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military and judicial institutions of Tanzimat. Finally, the chapter deals with the 
colonialism debate in the context of Yemen.  
The third chapter takes the establishment of a native army, Asakir-i Hamidiye, in 
the reign of Ismail Hakkı Pasha as a case study. Based upon an archival research in the 
Prime Ministry Archives in Istanbul and a survey in the provincial newspaper, The 
San’a Gazetesi, the third chapter discusses the establishment of the native army as a part 
of Islahat (reform) projects of Ismail Hakkı Pasha. In the first part of the chapter, I will 
discuss the main concerns of Ismail Hakkı Pasha and the characteristics of his regime in 
Yemen. I argue that the fear of the vali that the population would shift towards the 
British in the south made him to apply integrationist strategies. Ismail Hakkı Pasha  
aimed to integrate the population to the imperial system; hence sought governing 
practices, which would be adoptable to the local customs and practices In the lack of 
conscription in the province, I will show that Ismail Hakkı Pasha sought a strategy to 
accustom the Yemenis to the imperial military institutions. In this sense he initiated the 
formation of a native army. The rest of the third chapter will focus on this army. Here, 
the Asakir-i Hamidiye will be examined as a case to comprehend the Ottoman 
governing strategies in the frontiers. I will show the differences of Asakir-i Hamidiye 
from militia forces organized in other frontiers in terms of its organization, training and 
order. In this sense, the reference of Ismail Hakkı Pasha to the Indian army will be 
examined.   
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CHAPTER I 
OTTOMAN IMPERIAL EXPANSION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: 
TANZİMAT IN THE FRONTIERS 
 
 
 
The Ottoman army entered the Great War on September 29, 1914 by joining the 
alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungarian Empire. Although, it is very common in 
Ottoman-Turkish historiography that the decision put the Ottoman Empire into the war 
was taken by Enver Pasha, an Ottoman statesman who was highly influential between 
1908 and 1918 as one of the three prominent leaders of the Committee of Union and 
Progress (CUP), who made benefits available to the German interests, Mustafa Aksakal 
brings a highly different interpretation to the discussion of why the Ottoman ruling 
cadres decided to enter the war. By reminding that the Ottomans were also sharing the 
common idea that the war would have a short duration and they hoped to conclude a 
peaceful settlement, Mustafa Aksakal argues that the Ottoman statesmen hoped that the 
end of the war would result in a relatively secure international order in which the 
Ottomans would bolster the Empire without fear of external threat.1 This interpretation 
is significant in the sense that the Ottoman ruling elites were still thinking with an 
imperial mind. 
On the eve of the Great War, Ottoman ruling elites were anxious about the 
Empire's diminished power vis-à-vis European imperialism. Although the loss of the 
Libyan provinces to the Italians and the Balkan Wars had further put the Empire in 
trouble, the high-ranking cadres of the CUP were still seeking for methods of resistance 
                                                
1 Mustafa Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and 
The First World War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 93. 
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to the Western imperialist encroachments and to keep the Empire in power. Though 
there is a vast literature regarding the continuity between the reign of the CUP and 
Mustafa Kemal's Republic in terms of nation-state formation and articulation of Turkish 
nationalism as an 'official ideology', this literature underestimates the fact that the CUP 
cadres were born to the imperial structure and lived in the empire.2 Having thus been 
preoccupied by the Empire's concerns, they were dealing with the ways to keep the 
imperial structure alive rather than to build a national state. In this sense, instead of 
being the passive audiences of European imperialist encroachments, this concern led 
these ruling elites to apply aggressive measures too – as in the case of entering the War 
by initiating a military attack on Russia.3 
Since the expansion became the first and foremost mean of the all kinds of 
empires – from ancient empires to the colonial overseas empires of the long nineteenth 
century – the Great War had emerged as an opportunity for the Ottoman elites to restore 
Ottoman sovereignty on its lost territories, and to further expand it in order to resurrect 
the Empire. However the consequences of the War could not satisfy these ambitions for 
the Ottomans. Yet, the emphasis here I want to make is not to demonstrate the failure of 
the Ottoman imperial anticipations, but to remind that even in 1914, the Ottoman ruling 
cadres were still acting with imperial ambitions, using imperial repertoires and 
appealing to imperialist political strategies. Instead of being peculiar to the CUP cadres 
in the context of war opportunities, these ambitions and reasoning constituted the main 
repertoire of the Ottoman governing elites through the long nineteenth century as I will 
discuss in this chapter.  
                                                
2 Regarding Arab provinces, Hasan Kayalı demonstrates that instead of 
implementing concrete Turkish nationalist agenda, the CUP regime was still 
equipped with Ottomanism and Islamist discourse seeking for the integration of Arab 
population to the imperial rule. See. Hasan Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks: 
Ottomanism, Arabism and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997), 116-143. 
3 Also, The Ottoman involvement in Libya after the Italian invasion was a good case 
to demonstrate the aggressive imperial aims of the Ottoman ruling cadres. Although 
it was invaded by the Italians in 1911, the CUP regime did not abandon its claim on 
Libya until the fall of the Empire, and aided the local resistance in order to reassert 
the Ottoman rule to Libya. For the involvement of the Ottomans to Libya after the 
Italian invasion, see. Rachel Simon, Libya between Ottomanism and Nationalism: 
The Ottoman Involvement in Libya During the War with Italy, 1911-1919, (Berlin: 
Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1987), 111-332.  
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The Ottoman governing elites were not the passive audiences of European 
imperialism and of its intimidation to the Ottoman Empire and its domains. The 
Ottomans also sought to expand its sovereignty in the context of imperial competition in 
order to resist Western imperialism. The Ottoman reconquest, expansion and attempts to 
position its sovereignty and legitimacy over its frontiers in the course of the nineteenth 
century reveal an image of the Ottomans as having imperialist desires; and this picture 
paves the way for a reevaluation of the Tanzimat-era.4 
 
1. The Conventional Approaches: Ottoman Empire as a Passive 
Audience 
 
Walter Benjamin reminds in his seventh Thesis on History that “to historians who 
wish to relive an era, Fustel de Coulanges recommends that they blot out everything 
they know about the later course of history.5  One of the greatest problems of history 
writing is that a historian knows the end of the story. This knowledge overshadows the 
whole story and forestalls the construction of alternative paths. This is especially valid 
for the nineteenth century Ottoman history writing. Since the Empire collapsed at the 
end of the Great War, historians have been tracing the paths of the fall, and at least there 
is a consensus that the Empire was on the road toward cataclysm. Against this 
teleological approach, the Ottoman historiography has witnessed certain path-breaking 
and stimulating works in the last three decades which reinterpret the Ottoman 
'modernization' in the long nineteenth century and position the nineteenth century 
Empire into a comparative global history.6 However, the previous portrayals of the 
                                                
4 By the word Tanzimat, instead of referring to the Gulhane Decree read by Mustafa 
Reşit Pasha in 1839, I use it for the structural and spatial transformation and 
reorganization of the Ottoman Empire in the course of long nineteenth century. 
5 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History”, in Walter Benjamin, 
Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans.Harry Zohn, (New York: Shocken Books, 
1969), 256.  
6 For example, see. İlber Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı, (İstanbul: Hil 
Yayın, 1983); Şükrü Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Halil İnalcık, Donald Quataert (ed), 
An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1914, (Cambridge: 
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Empire as the 'sick man of Europe', or a 'semi-colony' of the great powers still obscure 
especially the comprehension of how the Ottomans responded to Western imperialism, 
and to its intrusions. The one common idea these depictions of the Empire – the 'sick 
man of Europe' or a 'semi-colony' of the great powers- share is that the Ottoman Empire 
and its governing elites were just passive audiences of the nineteenth century imperial 
competition and  silent denunciators to the European encroachments to its territories, 
and of European interventions to its politics. As a matter of fact, these depictions pose 
the 'delay in the fall' as the outcome of the great powers' – especially British- interests in 
keeping the territorial integrity of the Empire.  
 
1.1. The Empire as ‘The Sick Man of Europe’: 
On January 9, 1853, Tsar Nicolas I of the Russian Empire described the Ottoman 
Empire as the 'Sick Man of Europe', and emphasized the peaceful partition of the 
Empire between the Great Britain and Russia in the near feature.7 From that day to this, 
the phrase “Sick Man of Europe” has become popular in depicting the (geo)political and 
economic conditions of the Empire in the nineteenth century. Not just among European 
political, intellectual and orientalist circles, but also on the Ottoman side the phrase had 
been used to describe the Empire. Here, I will not discuss the usage of this phrase 
within the long nineteenth century context, but rather want to mention as to how the 
phrase dominated the comprehension of the Ottoman response to rising Western 
imperialism. The phrase mainly refers to the 'backwardness' of the Ottoman Empire 
which resulted from its economic and military weakness vis-à-vis European powers. 
The conventional approach summarizes the circumstances of the 'Sick Man of 
Europe as below: Starting from the eighteenth century, the Ottomans could not keep 
pace with the European industrial and military advancement, which facilitated the 
                                                                                                                                    
Cambridge University Press, 1997); Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: 
Ideology and The Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909, (New 
York: I.B. Tauris, 2011); Ussama Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, 
History, and Violence in Nineteenth Century-Ottoman Lebanon, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2000); Thomas Kuehn, Empire, Islam, and Politics of 
Difference, Ottoman Rule in Yemen, 1849-1919, (Leiden: Brill, 2011). 
7 Şükrü Hanioğlu, A Brief History, 79. 
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European colonial domination over the world. The imperial power was shaking, because 
the imperial center was not able to appease the centrifugal tendencies of the provinces, 
its military machine was too archaic to confront the European powers, the economy was 
weak as it was vulnerable to Western exploitation; hence she was in decline.8 In this 
context, from the end of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-1774 (the emergence of 
'Eastern Question') onwards European powers engaged into the Ottoman domains and 
intervened in its internal affairs in order to consolidate their own interests. The Great 
Powers – Great Britain, France and Russia –pressurized the Ottoman government 
directly or indirectly by supporting local rebellions. While competing for the expansion 
among each other; they used the Ottomans as a pawn to secure their diplomatic and 
commercial interests.9 Yet, since the international balance of power would not lead to a 
peaceful partition of the Empire, they tried to keep the 'sick man' in a 'vegetative state' 
but not allow it to die. 
Within this context, the Ottomans responded to the Empire's sickness through 
several reform attempts which mainly intended to introduce European administrative, 
military and educational institutions to the territories of the Empire. Especially, starting 
with the reign of Mahmud II (1808-1839), the Ottomans initiated a centralization 
program, which has been often evaluated as a Western sort of modern state formation. 
However, these attempts could not recuperate the sickness of the Empire due to the 
exploitation of its resources by the rapacious imperialist powers, leading to the 
exacerbation of the economy, and because of the European/Russian-backed nationalist 
demands of the non-Muslim populations.10 
 
                                                
8 For a very typical analysis, see. Charles Swallow, The Sick Man of Europe: 
Ottoman Empire to Turkish Republic 1789-1923, (London: Ernest Benn, 1973), 5-
105. 
9 Robert Mantran, “Şark Meselesinin Başlangıçları, 1774-1839”, in Osmanlı 
İmparatorluğu Tarihi II: XIX. Yüzyılın Başlangıcından Yıkılışa, ed. Robert Mantran, 
trans. Server Tanilli, (İstanbul: Adam Yayınları, 2000), 45. 
10 See. Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and 
Modern Turkey, Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 
1808-1975, vol.2, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). This is one of the 
leading books reflects the conventional historiography which succinctly 
comprehends the late Ottoman Empire from the declinist paradigm.  
10 
 
1.2. The Empire as a ‘Semi-Colony’: 
These depictions were also complemented with the idea that the Ottoman Empire 
became a semi-colony of the Western imperialist powers and lost its independence. The 
state of being a semi-colony had been formalized with some conventions as well. For 
instance, according to Sina Akşin, the London Straits Convention (July 13, 1841) 
prevented the danger of the Empire becoming a Russian satellite, which was anticipated 
by the Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi of 1833; however as the Paris Congress of 1856 was 
signed, this meant for the Ottomans to become reduced to the level of a joint 
protectorate of the European powers. And Sina Akşin concludes that as the empire 
proved not to be able to cope with rebellions such as Tepedelenli, Mora and Kavalalı, it 
would have to accept this semi-dependent status.11 
The works dealing with the position of the Ottoman Empire in the capitalist world 
system further enforced the thesis of the Empire being a semi-colony.12 Especially, 
starting from the 1970s, historians and sociologists from the World System school 
started to postulate the nineteenth century Empire and its modernization as a process of 
its integration to the capitalist world economy. According to these scholars, integration 
of the Empire to the capitalist world market in the nineteenth century resulted in the 
reduction of the Empire to a 'peripheral' position in the world-economy that required a 
transformation of agrarian production, economy and social relations in accordance to 
the demands of the European markets. Furthermore, the Tanzimat was understood as 
“formalization of the peripheral status of the Ottoman Empire in the world economy by 
providing a legal framework in which the state could attempt simply to secure its 
portion of the surplus in a system on which it had now itself become dependent.”13 
                                                
11 Sina Akşin, “1839'da Osmanlı Ülkesi'nde İdeolojik Ortam ve Osmanlı Devleti'nin 
Uluslararası Durumu” in Tanzimat: Değişim Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, ed. 
Halil İnalcık and Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür 
Yayınları, 2008), 142. 
12 For instance, Stefanos Yerasimos comprehends the nineteenth century as a process 
of economic colonization of the Empire by the Western imperialist powers – mainly 
Great Britain. See. Stefanos Yerasimos, Azgelişmişlik Sürecinde Türkiye II, 
Tanzimat'tan 1. Dünya Savaşına, trans. Babür Kuzucu, (İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 
1977) 599-600. 
13 Immanuel Wallerstein et all., “The Incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the 
World-economy”, in The Ottoman Empire and World Economy, ed. Huri İslamoğlu-
İnan, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 93. 
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The Empire further became dependent due to excessive loans from European 
markets as well as with the imposition of the European finance capital via railway 
projects in the second half of the nineteenth century. Thus, the peripheral status of the 
Empire limited the state to be a self-responsive agent like it operated in the 'classical 
age' between 15th and 17th centuries.14 Now, instead of operating with its own political 
and geo-political interests, the Ottoman state had to request the guarantee of its 
existence from the core states of the capitalist world system. Yet, since the 'peripheral' 
status of the Empire had also put its territorial integrity into jeopardy and challenged its 
sovereignty as well, it opened the path of downfall of the Ottoman government.15 
 
2. Revival of Ottoman Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century 
 
The factual accuracy of these arguments in terms of the weakness of the Ottoman 
finances, including those internal and external troubles the Empire did face, cannot be 
rejected, yet a problem exists concerning the impact of these portrayals on 
historiography. All these arguments and depictions are complementary to the claim that 
the Ottomans in the nineteenth century could only exist by courtesy of the international 
balance of power, which required the territorial integrity of the Empire. The British 
ambitions to not allow expansion of Russia to the East Mediterranean by protecting 
Ottoman unity provided the survival of the Empire. Still, there is accuracy in this 
argument. As noted by Engin Deniz Akarlı, British strategy was based on the protection 
and 'strengthening' of the Ottoman Empire as a buffer against Russia in the Eastern 
Mediterranean from 1838 onwards.16 Having been a buffer, Ottoman domains would 
have constituted both a barricade against Russian expansion and an easy passage for the 
                                                
14 For a disussion on the transformation of the Empire within the capitalist world 
economy, see. Immanuel Wallerstein et all., “The Incorporation of the Ottoman 
Empire”, 89-97. 
15 Reşat Kasaba, The Ottoman Empire and The World Economy: The Nineteenth 
Century, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), 49. 
16 Engin Deniz Akarlı, “The Problems of External Pressures, Power Struggles and 
Budgetary Deficits in Ottoman Politics under Abdulhamid II, 1876-1909”, (PhD 
diss., Princeton University, 1976), 12. 
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British Empire to its Asian colonies. Yet, this conventional analysis – although it is true 
to a certain extent- posits the Ottomans as merely a passive audience of the nineteenth 
century imperialist competition and a silent agent. However, my point is that the 
Ottomans were far from being a passive audience of the imperial competition; they 
applied aggressive measures in order both to resist European expansion in Africa, and in 
Arabia; and also to maintain their own interests in the process of imperial competition 
and colonial partition. This chapter mainly deals with secondary literature on Ottoman 
frontiers which will pave the way for us toward a reevaluation of the Ottoman strategies 
and ambitions against the imperialist encroachment from 1830s to the 1880s. 
As demonstrated by Mostafa Minawi, the Ottomans too engaged in the partition 
of Africa after the Conference of Berlin (1884-85). According to Minawi, instead of 
relying on silent diplomacy, the Ottoman government followed a competitive 
expansionist strategy along the Saharan frontiers of the Ottoman Libya and made its 
own claim of sovereignty in these lands.17 This expansionist strategy was not peculiar 
neither to the reign of Abdulhamid II nor to Africa.  From the 1830s onwards, the 
Ottoman reconquest of its old frontiers around where imperialist competitions 
intensified provides us a rather different story as it exposes the aggression and 
imperialist tendencies among the Ottoman ruling circles as a response to the European 
encroachments. Instead of watching the European imperialist actions passively, the 
Ottomans produced their own imperialist claims mainly based on expanding imperial 
sovereignty. A similar argument was made for the Chinese Empire under the Qing 
Dynasty. Although there has been a tendency to describe Qing China as a semi-colony 
of Western imperial powers, Tong Lam states that the Qing regime actively applied a 
geopolitical logic of colonialism to consolidate itself in order to resist further colonial 
intrusions and also to secure its own colonial enterprises that had been initiated long 
before the arrival of the industrial West.18 
                                                
17 Mostafa Minawi, “Lines in the Sand: The Ottoman Empire's Policies of Expansion 
and Consolidation on its African and Arabian Frontiers, 1882-1902”, (PhD diss., 
New York University, 2011). 
18 Tong Lam, “Policing the Imperial Nation: Sovereignty, International Law, and the 
Civilizing Mission in Late Qing China”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 
52:4 (2010): 884. 
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Starting in the 1830s, by military campaigns, the Ottomans reasserted themselves 
in certain North African, Arabian and mostly-Kurdish populated territories of the 
Middle East. Especially, the Ottoman reconquest of the territories around the Red Sea 
and the Persian Gulf demonstrates that the British presence provoked the Ottomans to 
expand towards these frontiers. Thus, the Ottomans were actually not the passive agents 
who just waited patiently for their fate to be sealed by the Great Powers – mainly 
British – but used imperialist repertoire and strategies by further expanding imperial 
frontiers. In this sense, the Tanzimat had a different meaning for the frontiers that I 
prefer to name as the revival of Ottoman imperialism which aimed to introduce old 
claims of Ottoman imperial sovereignty to these territories and to attempt to build an 
imperial authority and legitimacy. 
The reign of Mahmud II had witnessed serious internal political crisis and external 
threats. Starting in the late seventeenth century the Ottoman imperial power was 
challenged with the wars with Habsburgs and Russians; from the late eighteenth century 
onwards this challenge resulted in territorial losses in the northern and eastern Black 
Sea regions particularly as a consequence of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1774. It 
also witnessed the French invasion of Egypt in 1798 which was stopped by Cezzar 
Ahmed Pasha in Akka. However, after becoming the governor of Egypt in 1805, 
Mehmed Ali Pasha gradually established an autonomous rule. Furthermore, the Serbian 
revolt of 1807 led to an autonomous Principality of Serbia, while the Greek uprising of 
1821 resulted in the formation of an independent Greek state in 1830. Mahmud II faced 
with the climax of Wahhabi movement as well as the aggression of Mehmet Ali Pasha's 
army in 1831-33. On the other hand France occupied Algeria in 1830. All these troubles 
helped to produce the conventional historiographical approach to define the nineteenth 
century as a period of decline. This argument was also supported by the Ottoman 
inability to deal with these problems and the consequent loss of territories throughout 
the century.  However, as claimed by Peacock this period was different from the 
previous one because of two factors: the attempts of modernization and the expansion of 
the empire.19 
                                                
19 A. C. S. Peacock, “Introduction: The Ottoman Empire and Its Frontiers”, in The 
Frontiers of the Ottoman World, ed. A.C.S Peacock, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press), 9. 
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A superficial survey on the frontiers – especially Arab and Kurdish –  indicates 
the Ottoman expansion and consolidation after approximately two centuries of absence 
in these neglected remote areas. Alarmed by the threat of European intervention as in 
the case of the French invasion to Algeria, the Ottomans reconquered Libya in 1835. 
Starting in the 1830s, the Ottoman central government had attempted to integrate 
Kurdistan to the imperial center. Furthermore, imperial government initiated several 
military expeditions against Kurdish principalities in Cezire, and in the region of 
Malatya-Fırat between 1835 and 1839.20 Yet most crucial step was the military 
expedition of 1847 against the Bedirhan Principality.  After the 1847 expedition against 
the Bedirhan Principality, the Ottomans used various strategies to set themselves as a 
sovereign power of Kurdistan.  The formation of British protectorate in Aden kindled 
the Ottomans to set their authority to the coastal Yemen in 1849. In eastern Arabia, the 
Ottomans revived their claims over al-Hasa and sought successfully to bring Kuwait 
and Qatar under their sovereignty. European competition over the Red Sea after the 
opening of the Suez, which also enabled the easy dispatchment of the troops for the 
Ottomans, reminded the Ottomans of their own claim in the highlands of Yemen, and in 
1872 they reoccupied San'a. In North Africa, the Ottomans continued to recognize 
Mehmed Ali's descendants as hereditary governors of Egypt on the sultan's behalf.21 
These examples show that instead of retreating from imperial claims when faced with 
the European imperial aggression, Ottomans chose to expand their claim of territorial 
sovereignty and reenact their 'classical' imperialist vigor. Not just the territories where 
the Ottomans once had administration, but also regions such as Oman, whose rulers had 
established alliances with European powers through international treaties, also became 
the target of the Ottomans to impose their sovereignty.22 
In this respect, the conventional periodization of Ottoman history cannot be 
applied to the abovementioned developments in these frontier regions. Following Oktay 
Özel, if we keep our scope to the Arab provinces, the term “Classical Age” of the 
Ottoman Empire seems to apply more to the nineteenth, rather than the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries.  In his critique to the usage of the term “Classical Age” for the 
                                                
20 H. Von Moltke, Türkiye Mektupları, trans. Kemal Vehbi Gül, (İstanbul: Varlık 
Yayınları, 1967), 85-173. 
21 Peacock, “Introduction”, 10-11 
22 Şükrü Hanioğlu, A Brief History, 13. 
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Ottoman history, Özel suggests that it would more accurately reflect the nineteenth 
century when the Ottomans started to actively look to these lands and tried to transform 
them by the interventions of their own institutions.23 Furthermore, as stated by Peacock, 
the Ottomans also endeavored for the growth of their influence abroad in Africa and 
south-east Asia, especially among the Muslim rulers. For instance during the reign of 
Abdulhamid II,  Ottoman governors of Hijaz and also specially appointed Ottoman 
officials tried to maintain close relations with the sultans of Zanzibar regarding the 
European encroachment in Eastern Africa and German expansion in the region.24 
Similarly, starting from 1873, the Ottomans had built close contacts with the Aceh 
Sultanate against Dutch colonial encroachments, and in the reign of Abdulhamid these 
relations were intensified.25  
The Tanzimat process included an expansion towards Muslim frontiers, both in 
order to effectively control these regions, and to activate the loyalty of Muslim subjects 
against external imperialist threats. Although there is a vast literature about the 
politicization of Islam in the reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1908) as a means to win an 
active support of the Muslim subjects towards keeping the Empire functioning and to 
enforce the legitimacy of the Sultan26, it can be argued that from the 1830s onwards, in 
order to resist European imperial encroachments, the Empire endeavored to expand its 
authority over the Muslim populations and maintain their active loyalty. Regarding this, 
the emphasis made by Frederick Anscombe is noteworthy. According to Anscombe, the 
Empire had troubles with its Muslim subjects both in the Balkans and in the Middle 
East in the first decades of the nineteenth century, which undermined the imperial 
legitimacy in the eyes of its Muslim subjects. In the Balkans, local Muslims of Bosnia 
                                                
23 Oktay Özel, “Modern Osmanlı Tarih Yazımında 'Klasik Dönem' ” in Dün Sancısı: 
Türkiye'de Geçmiş Algısı ve Akademik Tarihçilik by Oktay Özel, (İstanbul: Kitap 
Yayınevi, 2009), 111. 
24 Hatice Uğur, Osmanlı Afrikası'nda Bir Sultanlık: Zengibar, (İstanbul: Küre 
Yayınları, 2005), 62-72. 
25 İsmail Hakkı Göksoy, Güneydoğu Asya’da Osmanlı Türk Tesirleri, (Isparta: 
Fakülte Kitapevi, 2004), 75-93. 
26 Kemal Karpat, The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, 
and Community in the Late Ottoman State, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
136-207. ; Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and The 
Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 
2011), 44-67. 
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and Albania, perceiving that the Empire lacked concern for them and sensing Mahmud 
II's regime as an oppressive rule, were in a state of rebellion and protest.27 Also, both 
Wahhabi threat to the Holy cities and Mehmed Ali Pasha's success to restore sultan's 
control, taking back Hijaz and suppressing this threat twice (1811-18, and 1836-39) 
further shattered imperial legitimacy.28 Thus, Anscombe indicates that “instead of 
aiming to appease Christian subjects or foreign powers by appealing an agenda of 
Europeanization, reforms were shaped by, and for Muslim interests: healing divisions 
within the community of believers, reconciling their enduring goals and consolidating 
their energies upon defense against external threats.”29 
Despite the financial weakness and political disorder  which deepened the 
legitimacy crisis of the Empire in the second half of the nineteenth century, the 
Ottomans did not retreat from their imperial claims and sought to secure the acceptance 
of the state as a great power within the international system.30 Since the Ottomans 
attempted to define themselves as an 'equal player' especially after the Peace Treaty of 
Paris (1856)31, they produced similar imperialist claims in the regions such as Eastern 
and Southern Arabia as well as Africa. The Ottomans did not accept any challenge to 
their sovereignty and in such cases they sought to take aggressive measures or 
undertook extreme diplomatic pressures on the Great Powers. For example, when the 
Ottomans perceived British influence as a threat to their sovereignty in Iraq which 
might in turn endanger the Ottoman presence in the Gulf Region, imperial governors 
took some measures to barricade this influence in the 1880s. Especially those counted 
by Gökhan Çetinsaya include the abolition of the British postal service between 
Baghdat and Damascus and its replacement by an Ottoman postal service; the 
registration of British citizens and British protected persons in Baghdat and the 
                                                
27 Frederick F. Anscombe, “Islam and the Age of Ottoman Reform”, Past and 
Present, 208 (2010): 171. 
28 Ibid, 179. 
29 Ibid, 160. 
30 Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains, 166. 
31 Ussama Makdisi, “Rethinking Ottoman Imperialism: Modernity, Violence, and the 
Cultural Logic of Ottoman Reform." in The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial 
Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire, ed. Jens Hanssen and Thomas Philipp, 
(Würzburg: Ergon in Kommission, 2002), 31. 
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encouragement of an Ottoman rival to the Lynch steamship company on Tigris32; such 
measures demonstrated an anti-colonial resistance of the Ottomans, however with an 
imperialist mind.  
 
3. Ottoman Expansion Before the Oppening of The Suez Canal 
 
As I mentioned above, the Ottomans responded to European imperialist 
encroachments by expanding imperial sovereignty to the remote areas in North Africa, 
Arabian peninsula, and Kurdistan in the course of the nineteenth century. Although 
these lands were originally conquered by the Ottomans in the sixteenth century, they 
had been practically abandoned by the Empire in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. Ottoman domination ended in Yemen in 1635; after the naval defeat in 
Lepanto (1571), direct Ottoman rule collapsed in Tunisia, Algeria and Tripoli – these 
were provinces which could be ruled only through sea connections; and Mamluk 
authority rose in Egypt and Basra.33 When the Ottomans after centuries faced with 
critical internal legitimacy challenges and serious external threats by European imperial 
competition, they remembered their old claims on those lands and endeavored to 
reassert the Ottoman authority and legitimacy in these regions. However, local rulers 
had well established their authorities in those territories for approximately two hundred 
years, the Ottomans engaged in aggressive measures such as military expeditions and 
suppression of local reactions against the reconquest of these areas. 
We can distinguish nineteenth century Ottoman reconquests in terms of two 
periods: before the opening of the Suez canal in 1869 and after it. The opening of the 
Suez Canal had further made the Ottomans focus their attention on the Red Sea and the 
Arabian Peninsula. The opening of the Suez Canal accelerated the colonial competition 
                                                
32 Gökhan Çetinsaya, “Challanges of a Frontier Region: The Case of Ottoman Iraq in 
the Nineteenth Century”, in The Frontiers of the Ottoman World, ed. A.C.S Peacock, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), 286. 
33 Selçuk Akşin Somel, “Arap Eyaletleri ve Günümüz Arap Devletleri: Tarihsel Bir 
Perspektiften Genel Bir Bakış”, Yeni Türkiye, 1 (1995): 598; and also see. Jane 
Hathaway and Karl K. Barbir, The Arab Lands under Ottoman Rule, 1516-1800, 
(Harlow: Longman, 2008), 67-76. 
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around the Red Sea between Britain, France and Italy since it dramatically reduced the 
distance from the Western ports to the East and especially the road to India for the 
British. As remarked by Colette Dubois, the colonial competition triggered by the 
opening of the Suez Canal coincided with the increasing dominance of steamships 
which revolutionized maritime transportation, while the building of railroads 
revolutionized land transportation.34 All these developments helped imperial powers to 
engage much more in imperial competition and in devoting harsh measures. These 
factors also increased the risk of loss of Ottoman influence in the Red Sea as well as in 
the Arabian Sea; thus the Ottomans responded by undertaking resolute measures too, as 
in the case of military expeditions to control the fringe territories of the Arabian 
Peninsula starting from the 1870s. Furthermore, as we understand from a letter sent 
from the Sublime Port to Yemen in 1871, the Ottomans, too, tried to benefit from new 
transportation possibilities. The opening of the Suez Canal was utilized as a means of 
easy access to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, hence the amelioration of the Ottoman 
Basra flotilla and the foundation of ports and fortresses along the costs of the Red sea 
paved the way for the Ottomans to strengthen and exhibit their power and prestige in 
Arabia.35 In addition, the Ottomans intensified their attempts, in comparison to the 
previous period, to develop several strategies to control and rule the local populations.  
 
3.1. Reconquest of Libya: 
After Napoleon's temporal invasion of Egypt in 1798, North Africa once more 
entered the Ottoman imperial agenda. In 1830, France once again appeared in North 
Africa and this time they succeeded in invading Algeria. Both the growing power of 
Mehmed Ali in Egypt and the French invasion of Algeria alerted the Ottomans about 
North Africa and reminded the neglected terrains of Libya, which was under the 
authority of Qaramanlis at the time.  
                                                
34 Colette Dubois, “The Red Sea Ports During the Revolution in Transportation, 
1800-1914” in Modernity and Culture: From the Mediterranean to the Indian 
Ocean, ed. Leila Tarazi Fawaz and C. A. Bayly, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2002), 59. 
35 For the letter, Zekeriya Kurşun, Basra Körfezi'nde Osmanlı-İngiliz Çekişmesi: 
Katar’da Osmanlılar, 1871-1916, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2004), 44-5. 
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Starting from 1820s the Qaramanli authority was enervated by the French 
attempts to end Barbary corsair's activities which were the main wealth source of the 
Qaramanlis in Libya. Furthermore, starting in 1830s a civil war started between the 
heirs of Yusuf Qaramanli who ruled Tripolit from 1795 and 1832. Both the English and 
the French consuls intervened the civil war and supported and aided one side against the 
other; that further led the political unity to disintegrate. By 1834 the Sublime Porte had 
become more distressed as the European powers' interventions and lack of political 
unity made Libya prone to British or French invasion. Sublime Porte decided that only 
an Ottoman intervention could protect Libya from invasion of the foreign powers.   
In May 1835, Ottoman naval vessels came to Tripoli to aid in quelling the 
rebellion. The troop commander, Mustafa Necib Pasha, entered Tripoli on May 28 as 
the new governor. The reign of the Qaramanli dynasty was ended, and for the next 
seventy-six years the Ottomans were to rule directly.36 However, as B. G. Martin says, 
the return of the Ottomans to Libya was the start of a 25 years period of repression and 
internal warfare on a scale not seen in Libya since the rise of the Qaramanlis.37 Not only 
in Tripoli, but also those who had become tired of Turkish domination during the last 
years of Qaramanlis rule had developed a strong anti-Turkish opposition, particularly in 
the hinterland. The rebellious situation lasted approximately 25 years against Ottoman 
presence especially in the hinterlands. Since the abandonment of Libya would endanger 
the Ottoman sovereignty in North Africa and its ability to control Egypt, the Ottoman 
governors sent to Libya did not flinch from using violence against the rebellious 
elements of the province. 
 
3.2. Return of Control over Hijaz: 
Since its first conquest in 1517 by Sultan Selim I, the Hijaz region used to be a 
privileged province for the Ottoman rulers, since the Holy cities of Islam were part of it. 
                                                
36 For the rood to Ottoman reconquest, see. Lisa Anderson, “Nineteenth-Century 
Reform in Ottoman Libya”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 16 (1984): 
325-8. 
37 B. G. Martin, “Ghuma bin Khalifa, a Libyan Rebel, 1795-1858”, in. Studies on 
Ottoman Diplomatic History V, ed. Sinan Kuneralp, (İstanbul: ISIS Press), 57. 
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Also, the Hijaz included roads which were important for pilgrims. Hence providing 
security in Hijaz for the pilgrimage was an issue of Ottoman imperial legitimacy, 
especially for its Muslim subjects.38 Thus, the occupation of the Holy cities by the 
Wahhabis seriously shattered the Ottoman imperial legitimacy. Also, British presence in 
Aden in 1838 forced the Ottomans to reset their imperial rule and legitimacy in the 
region while also restoring imperial rule along the Yemeni coastin the late 1840s.39 All 
these developments forced the Ottomans to pay greater concern about the imperial rule 
in Hijaz. As William Ochsenwald remarks, although Mehmed Ali Pasha crushed the 
Wahhabi rule and regained the Hijaz for the Sultan, the Egyptians, like the Wahhabis, 
failed to set new institutions. Furthermore, the social diversity of local towns, general 
opposition to all religious innovations, an ambition to benefit from the Ottoman 
treasury, and concern on security of pilgrimage affairs paved the way for the Ottoman-
Hashimite power, which was made possible and welcomed by the locals. However, the 
Ottomans could only change the balance of power by sending 2000 troops in 1841.40 
 
3.3. Reconquest of Kurdistan: 
In comparison to the Arab frontiers, the Empire's eastern frontiers were included 
earlier to the agenda of the Tanzimat reforms to establish central rule and to inject its 
administrative, financial and judicial institutions. Cities such as Erzurum, Diyarbakır 
and Harput were added to the Tanzimat agenda in 1844-45.41 However, the imperial 
state also faced in those regions a series of rebellions led by local Kurdish principalities, 
especially in Van and Hakkari. After the conquest of Diyarbakır and other eastern 
provinces in the early sixteenth century, Kurdish principalities had enjoyed a certain 
level of autonomy. They had consolidated power while collecting taxes from the 
                                                
38 For its significance in the Empire's legitimacy-making, see. Suraiya Faroqhi, 
Pilgrims and Sultans: The Haji under the Ottomans, (New York: I. B. Tauris), 6. 
39 For the reconquest of Yemen, see. Chapter II. 
40 William Ochsenwald, Religion, Society, and State in Arabia: The Hijaz under the 
Ottoman Control, (Ohio: Ohio State University Press), 132. 
41 Musa Çadırcı, Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu Kentlerinin Sosyal ve Ekonomik 
Yapısı, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu), 181. 
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members of their principalities and providing order in the regions.42 For the eastern 
provinces of the Empire, the Tanzimat signalled a constant struggle of the Ottoman state 
to directly penetrate into the region by trying to overthrow the established order. To 
accomplish these, however, the imperial state had to overthrow the existing order which 
was based on the rule of autonomous principalities. However, it was not so easy for the 
imperial governments to provide that kind of order in the provinces due to the 
reluctance of local notables, who were accustomed to a significant level of autonomy as 
well as wealth. As a response to this unwillingness, the Ottoman imperial government 
resorted to military expeditions, as in the examples of 1845 against Han Mahmud in 
Van43 and of 1847 against the Bedirhan principality.44 Both Han Mahmud and Bedirhan 
strongly opposed the Tanzimat reforms, which they thought would deteriorate their 
authorities. The imperial state did not flinch from demonstrating its military superiority 
in order to bind these provinces directly to the imperial center and thereby mitigate the 
power of the local notables. In short, it was again the same; the consolidation of 
imperial control became possible only by a series of military expeditions.  
 
3.4. Assertion of Authority over  Southern Syria: 
The Ottomans had receded from the southern frontiers of Syria and left the region 
to its local tribal rulers for two centuries. Since the region was including the pilgrimage 
routes from Damascus to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, the governors of 
Damascus had been compelled to make payments to the strongest and most influential 
tribes of the region to provide secure passage of the caravans. When the Ottoman ruling 
elites attempted to expand their frontiers and consolidate their legitimacy starting from 
the mid 1830s, the region stood out to the Ottomans as it was a bridge to Arabia by 
which the Ottomans aspired to force their authority in the Najd and the Hijaz. 
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Furthermore, the fertile agrarian lands of Transjordan increased the appetite of Ottoman 
governors. Thus the Ottomans started to look for ways to establish control over this 
region. However, these policies could not be realized so easily. In May 1852, the 
Ottoman venture to introduce military conscription provoked a peasant rebellion in 
Ajlun. The Ottomans suppressed the rebellion by a military campaign and reasserted 
themselves in Ajlun. Although for 20 years the Ottoman presence remained very 
limited, the imperial governors coveted lands further south in the 1870s.45 
 
4. Ottoman Expansion After the Opening of the Suez Canal 
 
As I mentioned above, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 became a watershed 
for both the imperial competition in general, and for the Ottoman attempts to expand the 
frontiers. In order to secure former and new territories in the Red Sea and around the 
Persian Gulf against foreign encroachments, the Ottomans undertook huge military 
expeditions to reconquest the southern regions of Basra around the Arab Sea, and 
Yemeni highlands as well. 
 
4.1. Reconquest of Eastern Arabia: 
What provoked the Ottomans to expand the frontier towards eastern Arabia was 
the growing British presence in the region, and its (British India) political and 
commercial interests in the Arabian Sea. As demonstrated by Gökhan Çetinsaya, from 
the 1830s onwards the British had acquired the monopoly of European influence in the 
region; a large proportion of the trade of the Gulf was done with British India and 
British vessels dominated the Gulf merchant shipping.46 Furthermore, the laying of a 
telegraph line in the 1860s from India to Faw, in southern Iraq, demonstrated the British 
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zeal to penetrate into the Gulf.47 In order to increase their commercial superiority, the 
British had tried to maintain ties with the Arab sheiks in the region. By those ties and 
alliances with the Arap sheiks in the Gulf, the British patronized Maskat, Mukella, 
Oman and Bahreyn.48 In response to these encroachments, the Ottomans articulated 
vigorous attempts to expand their authority and legitimacy in the region. Throughout the 
1860s, the Ottomans initiated a bolstering of their naval presence in the Gulf.49 
However, the most intensified responses came with the governorship of Midhad Pasha 
in Baghdat between 1869 and 1872.50 The fundamental desire of Midhat Pasha was to 
prevent the British commercial and political penetration to the region. He first initiated 
to attach Kuwait to the administration of Basra by maintaining ties with the powerful 
sheik family of Al-Sabah in 1869.  The imperial government appointed Al-Sabah as a 
kaymakam and gave him a free hand in managing the internal affairs in return to his 
promise that Kuwait and Kuwaiti ships would fly the Ottoman flag. However, this was 
not only an issue regarding Kuwait, but an effort to reassert the Ottoman presence and 
authority in the Gulf region from Kuwait to Maskat, as a bulwark against British 
threat.51 
Control of eastern Arabia would enable the Ottomans to both support the 
campaigns to Yemen and Asir and provide an Ottoman penetration in all Arabia. 
Imperial order in Nejd would provide secure and direct land links between Iraq and 
Hijaz; and a presence in Hasa would pave the way for the Ottomans' immediate 
retaliation to any threat from the Wahhabis.52 With this strategic objective, Midhat 
Pasha undertook an aggressive policy against the growth of British influence, as 
Anscombe describes, “Wanting to unfurl the Ottoman flag over the Gulf region through 
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military deployment.”53Similar to the Libyan case, problems among the heirs of Faisal, 
the Wahhabi emir of Hasa, became an impetus for an Ottoman military campaign. 
Faisal's sons, Abdallah and Saud competed with each other for the succession to the 
emirate. While Abdallah was enthroned to the emirate in 1866, Sa'ud waged a war 
against his brother in 1870. Abdallah sought help from the sheik of Kuwait, who was 
under the suzerainty of the Ottoman sultan.54 Midhat Pasha immediately conceived this 
crisis as an opportunity and intervened. On 26 May 1871, an Ottoman force of 3000 
men, supported by 1500 Arabs, landed in Hasa at Ra's Tanura.55 After the deployment 
of the Ottoman troops, the Ottomans could succeed in asserting their power and Midhat 
Pasha established the Necd Mutassarıflığı including Hasa, Qatar, Nejd and Katif.56 
 
5. Another Scene of Ottoman Expansion via Egypt 
 
Another front of Ottoman expansion was effectuated via the Egyptian southward 
drive in the nineteenth century. Although Mehmed Ali Pasha's autonomous government 
in Egypt has been treated as one of the landmarks of the Ottoman decline, the imperial 
canter had not relinquished its prospect of sovereignty in Egypt. Egypt remained part of 
the Empire, as stated by Toledano, both politically and in terms of the culture of the 
ruling elite.57 In this sense Egypt was much more Ottoman in comparison to the 
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previous two centuries. The imperial decree of 1841 confirmed the hereditary rule of 
Mehmed Ali, but also guaranteed the Ottoman sovereignty over Egypt. Thus, the 
Ottomans were eager to keep this status until the British invasion of Egypt in 1882 and 
benefited from this autonomous rule for securing its frontiers.58 
The imperial center favored the Egyptian expansion in Africa as it perceived it as 
the expansion of the Ottoman sovereignty. When Mehmed Ali's expansionary desires 
towards Syria were thwarted, he turned his face to the south, and this time got support 
from the Ottomans. Both Mehmet Ali's campaigns in 1820-24 and his heirs' in 1849-77 
extended the Ottoman frontier some 2000 kilometers further deep into Africa and the 
Ottomans promoted these expansions for the sake of the Empire.59  
After the conquest of the Funj Sultanate in 1820-4, the imperial government 
declared an imperial decree stating the conquered lands of Nubia, Kordofan and Sinnar 
were to be ruled separately from Egypt for Mehmed Ali's lifetime which meant extra 
revenue for the Empire via separate tribute. Also, Massawa and Suakin were 
appropriated to Mehmed Ali on an annual lease in 1846. The Ottomans especially 
supported Khedive Ismail's expansionist ambitions which granted him the rule of most 
Ottoman territories on the African Red Sea in 1865.60 In order to prevent the British and 
Italian expansions in the eastern Africa, the Ottomans granted Massawa, Zeyla, Berbera 
and Suakin in 1865 with an imperial decree to Egyptian administration, again with an 
obligation of separate tribute to the Ottoman treasury.61  This paved the way for Ismail 
to further expand in Harar in 1877 and to attack Ethiopia as well. Additionally, the 
control of Somalia was granted to the Egyptian Khedivate, to provide security to the 
                                                
58 Also after 1882, the Ottoman Empire vigorously tried to keep its sovereign right in 
Egypt by diplomatic attempts, and until the Great War Egypt was nominally a land of 
the Empire, albeit just in paper. See. Süleyman Kızıltoprak, Mısırda İngiliz İşgali: 
Osmanlı'nın Diplomasi Savaşı 1882-1887, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 
2010). 
59 John Alexander, “Ottoman Frontier Policies in North-East Africa”, 1517-1914, in 
The Frontiers of the Ottoman World, ed. A.C.S Peacock, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 231. 
60 Ibid, 231-2. 
61 Cengiz Orhonlu, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Güney Siyaseti: Habeş Eyaleti, 
(Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1996), 158. 
26 
 
region in 1880, on the condition of not challenging Ottoman sovereignty.62  As stated by 
Alexander, when Ismail was forced to give up his rule, Egyptian expansion, which also 
carried the Ottoman suzerainty, came to its acme in the wide areas of the eastern 
Africa.63 
 
6. Ottoman Rule in the Frontiers: A Deviation from the Tanzimat? 
Eventually, the Ottomans extended their frontiers in the nineteenth century 
towards Africa and Arabia. However, it has been generally argued that these territories 
did not witness the Ottoman Tanzimat policies regarding the centralization of tax 
collection, conscription and also the introduction of modern administrative, financial, 
military and judicial institutions; an argument that concludes with the idea of an 
Ottoman failure in these frontiers. First of all, the Tanzimat itself was not a top-down 
and ubiquitous reform project which was implemented in every province of the Empire 
at the same time; instead it was shaped and re-shaped by the local dynamics. By looking 
how the local dynamics of Mount Lebanon configured the Tanzimat reforms, Ussama 
Makdisi suggests that the Tanzimat should not be understood as a coherent package of 
reform and argues that it was elaborated in its application as in its textual formulation.64 
Makdisi's suggestion can be extended for the entire empire; and the Tanzimat can be 
reviewed as a wider interaction between the imperial state and the local dynamics; 
hereby produced assorted and contingent reforms.65 This struggle defined the content 
and the depth of the reform projects.  
In fact, just in the 1870s the Ottoman imperial government was intent on 
consolidation of imperial authority in the frontiers, prompted by the rising imperial 
competition. The administrative, financial and judicial innovations were first 
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concentrated in the regions near Istanbul; thus Musa Çadırcı describes the 1864 Vilayet 
Nizamnamesi as a crucial point after which the reforms involved the entire empire – 
only Yemen and Hijaz were excluded due to distance.66 Yet, as Yonca Köksal 
demonstrated by comparing the reform process in Edirne and Ankara, there was 
variation in how reforms were applied, even in the core regions of the Empire, which 
resulted from various responses of local groups.67 
After the reconquest of its frontiers, the Ottomans claimed the possession of the 
land and their sovereignty in these territories. In the context of the nineteenth century 
imperial/colonial context, in order to claim sovereignty, an imperial power should be 
based on evident exercise of functions of government over said territory.68 Thus, in 
order to claim their sovereignty, the Ottomans undertook vigorous policies to transform 
the frontiers, starting with 1870s when the imperial competition accelerated around 
these areas in particular. Yet, the Ottomans were aware of the difficulties of introducing 
the Tanzimat policies and institutions in these frontiers because of the local challenges, 
thus they considered any possible strategies – even those signifying a deviation from the 
Tanzimat – which would provide the loyalty of the subjects. 
 In the minds of the Ottomans the loyalty of the local population to the imperial 
rule would ease the claim of sovereignty for the Ottomans, which would also strengthen 
the defense of the empire against the imperial encroachments of the Great powers. 
Hence, the from the Tanzimat policies and its institutions should not be treated as a 
failure of the Ottoman rule, but as the sign of Ottoman imperialist tenacity to control the 
frontier populations. In other words, the Ottoman governors did not produce a coherent 
and concrete Tanzimat agenda for these territories, but rather endeavored multifarious 
strategies to win the loyalty of the local population and integrate them to the imperial 
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defense.  In short, with Maurus Reinkowski's words, Ottoman policy in the frontiers 
was stuck in the dilemma between the exigency of realpolitik and the ambitious reform 
policy.69 
When the imperial governors realized that the frontiers could not be ruled as the 
imperial heartlands like Anatolia or Syria because of the peculiar local dynamics, they 
choose not to implement the rigid administrative, fiscal and military institutions and 
policies of the Tanzimat.70 As Anscombe compared the rule of Tepedelenli Ali in Epirus 
before the Tanzimat and the Ottoman rule in eastern Arabia in the late nineteenth 
century, there was a persistence of 'pre-modern' practices implemented in the frontiers 
as long as Istanbul's first and foremost interest was a secured frontier, which could be 
managed by promoting the provincial notables in their local interests and limiting the 
central interference in their affairs. Thus the military, administrative, legal and cultural 
standardization of the reform era was not in effect experienced in the frontiers.71 For 
instance, addressing Hijaz, Ochsenwald argues that the Ottoman restoration of power 
was in fact the reinstatement of an ancien regime based on shared power; most of the 
changes in the program of military modernization and reorganization of the civil 
government specifically excluded Arabia from their application.72 Furthermore, instead 
of a conscript army, many troops were recruited, trained and led in the casual fashion 
that had dominated the Ottoman army before the reforms of Selim III and Mahmud II at 
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the beginning of the nineteenth century.73 In Kurdistan, for example, as Janet Klein said 
regarding the phenomenon of the Hamidiye Alayları (Hamidiye Regiments), when the 
imperial governors were faced with the impossibility of effective governing, tax 
collection and conscription due to the impervious tribal opposition, they incorporated 
these 'hostile' elements – the Kurdish tribes – and sought to transform them from a local 
challenge to state authority into a military arm of the state, by establishing tribal 
regiments.74 Instead of demonstrating a failure of the Ottoman reform projects, all these 
examples show the Ottoman vigor to control the frontiers with flexible strategies, which 
mainly derived from the peculiar dynamics of these regions. I will now go into details 
of the dynamics of the frontiers which shaped the Ottoman imperial strategies and then 
continue with the main characteristics of the latter. 
 
7. Challenges of the Frontiers 
 
The aspiration to establish imperial authority on the outlying provinces was very 
much dependent on the intricacies of their geopolitical position, as well as the internal 
dynamics of their local population. Eugene Rogan counted three main factors which 
determined the dynamics of a frontier, namely the power of the local elites, the level of 
European encroachment and the local attitude towards the Ottoman rule. These factors 
also specified the Ottoman strategies of governance, assertion of legitimacy and the 
claim of sovereignty there.75 Thus the Ottoman imperial rule in the frontiers took a 
contingent character, instead of being determined from the beginning and by Istanbul. 
Due to the contingent encounters, it was cumbersome to receive and comply to the 
agenda from Istanbul, hence the governors tried to find possible ways of controlling the 
region and establishing a legitimate rule within the context of frontier power relations, 
which extend both to the local and international arenas. For instance, as stated by 
Eugene Rogan for Transjordan, where the European presence and Great power strategic 
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interest were minimum, the Ottoman state enjoyed a relatively free hand in local rule 
and the reforms would appear to have solid foundations for a viable administration.76  
The presence of foreign imperial powers around the frontiers did not only 
challenge the Ottoman  rule, but also paved the way for the local population to posit one 
imperial power against another; thereby increasing the vulnerability of the Ottoman 
rule. In their article about the North American borderlands, Adelman and Aron say that 
Indian and mestizo peoples still found chances to negotiate favorable terms of trade 
with competing colonial regimes; that opportunity ended with the fixation of borders in 
which property rights, citizenship and population movement became the purview of 
state monopoly.77 Since the Ottoman frontiers were susceptible to this fluidity as well, 
the securement of the loyalty of the local population against another imperial power 
became a hard but primary task for the Ottoman governors. Anscombe's example of the 
Arab sheiks' maneuvers to achieve their own benefits demonstrates the agency of the 
local powers in shaping the policy-making. According to Anscombe, Arab sheiks were 
the real source of change in the Gulf. These leaders sought freedom of action as in the 
pre-1870 period, however they also aimed to benefit from a powerful guarantor for the 
influence of their dynasty in their domains. 78 Evidently, the local elites in the frontiers 
were not the allegedly passive audience of change introduced by the imperialist 
competition in the course of the nineteenth century; they pursued their own interests 
within this change and were able to shape it. As Hala Fattah and Candan Badem stated, 
from the perspective of the regional players in the Arabian Peninsula, sheiks, rulers and 
merchants, one of the issue was whether to shift their loyalties from the Ottoman 
Empire to the British Raj or remain within the Porte's realm.79 
Regardless of the fact that the fluidity prepared the ground for a space for the 
local notables to juggle their loyalties, the Ottoman response was based on the 
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integration of these provincial power brokers to the Ottoman rule against both external 
threats and local challenges. The Ottoman policy towards the notables included two 
dimensions at the same time. On the one hand, the imperial government was applying a 
policy of punishment of the local leaders, who were impervious to Ottoman loyalty, by 
sending them to exile or suppressing their authorities by military campaigns. However, 
this alone could not be sufficient to subvert the local dissent and establish control since 
the power structure of the state was weak in the newly reconquered frontiers. Thus, on 
the other hand, they sought alliances from local powers, too, by awarding them with 
appointments to the ranks of government, land distribution or tax exemptions. 
 Since securing Ottoman sovereignty against the external imperial powers and the 
internal challenges was the primary objective of the imperial governors, they sought a 
local support from the notable circles.  A different track of Ottoman imperial rule, as 
Cem Emrence defined it, the Ottoman frontier governance combined efforts for 
increasing direct rule with negotiation and bargaining with the local leaders.80 In fact, 
this track of imperial rule was a necessity for the Ottoman state, as was the case for the 
colonial empires of the time, as well. As Frederick Cooper stated, “the limits faced by 
the colonizing powers with the seemingly greatest capacity to act and the fullest 
confidence in their own transformative power and coercive capacity colonial states 
needed the legitimacy and coercive capacity of local authority to collect taxes, round up 
labor and they needed local knowledge.”81 Similarly, Timothy Parson criticizes the 
image of the omnipotent colonial state and states that British imperialists could govern 
their non-European colonies only by recruiting Africans and Asians to the bureaucratic 
mechanisms and have them help administering the colonies, while they  endeavored to 
co-opt indigenous elites, as well.82 In the sense of resembling colonial cooptation 
methods, the Ottoman imperial rulers resided to their traditional ways of negotiation and 
bargaining with the powerful local groups, which once in the 15-17th centuries oriented 
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the expansion of empire.83 In this sense, we can also argue that the Ottomans reinvented 
the early methods of conquest and expansion of the Empire, as was described by Halil 
İnalcık, namely granting certain privileges like tax exemptions to the natives of the 
newly-conquered territories in return to their employment in the defense of the frontiers, 
while aiming for the gradual reconciliation of the local conditions to the Ottoman 
institutions.84 
The Ottomans tried to get the support of influential families, tribal and religious 
leaders to assert their legitimacy in the eyes of the local population. In this sense, 
Anscombe, by looking into the case of eastern Arabia, is right to argue that the 
Ottomans dealt primarily with leading individuals or groups rather than with all classes 
of the society. He gives the example of the Ottomans having relations almost 
exclusively with the families of Al Thani and Al Sabah in Qatar and in Kuwait, and in 
Hasa where there were no dominant families, the state built alliances with the traders, 
land owners and local sheiks to benefit from their power and local knowledge, while 
attempting to set imperial rule.85 For instance, the progress of the Ottoman imperial rule 
in Libya owed its success to its alliance with the Sanusi order, since its goals of 
education and commercial development coincided with the goals of Ottoman imperial 
governors.86 Moreover, the Ottomans benefited from the wide network of Sanusi order 
which brought the Ottoman legitimacy to the remote areas of Libya. As noted by Ali 
Abdüllatif Ahmida, the Sanusi order consolidated the Bedouin tribes through its 
institutions of education and its management of trade; thus fulfilling the function of the 
state.87 By granting tax exemptions and leaving them free in their internal affairs, the 
Ottoman legitimacy pervaded the local population.  
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As for the North American historians the notion of frontier includes a contact 
zone between the imperial rulers and 'indigenous' societies, Eugene Rogan stated that 
the 'indigenous' societies the Ottomans encountered in the frontiers from Kurdistan 
through Arabia to North Africa had one thing in common: the frontier was a contact 
zone between the state and tribal society.88 This interaction meant that the Ottoman 
imperial center and its governors first had to deal with and control the various lifestyles 
of the tribes. However, the frontier dynamics were not conditioned merely by the 
ambitions of the Ottomans. The military strength of the tribes, the political influence of 
their leaders, their position in the trade routes and their relations with the other 
imperialist powers were significant determiners of the efficiency of the Ottoman rule 
over the tribes as well as of the set of strategies of the Ottoman government. 
In fact, since the Ottomans recognized the tribal structure as the main element of 
the frontiers, the strategies of asserting Ottoman authority translated into an approach of 
conciliating and appeasing the tribes. In this sense, we can also conclude that the 
Ottomans themselves turned the tribes into political units, since the Ottoman imperial 
rulers applied the issues of tax collection, conscription and loyalty on the scale of tribes 
instead of an individual base. Furthermore, as I mentioned above, the Ottomans 
contacted with the tribal leaders, rather than whole ranks of the society. For instance, 
after the conquest of Hasa, Midhat Pasha recognized Sheik Nasir as head of their 
confederation and made him mutassarif of a new Muntafiq sancak.89 This is one – but 
typical – example that shows how the Ottomans recognized (and at the same time 
transformed) the tribes as political units.90 
One of the main challenges to the Ottoman authority was of a rather different 
character than the sedentary frontier tribes, namely the existence of the nomadic tribes. 
The settlement of the nomadic people and tribes had become one of the main targets of 
imperial governors for all time, since the seventeenth century, in order to easily control 
them, collect taxes, prevent their attacks against the settled cultivators and to open 
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empty lands to production.91 In addition, especially the long wars of the eighteenth 
century had deteriorated the economy of the peasants and resulted in big population 
movements in Anatolia and Rumelia; thus the state undertook an initiative to settle the 
people for good.92 However, the settlement of the nomadic tribes in the frontiers was 
also an imperative for the Ottoman governors as a means to barricade the fluidity that I 
mentioned above. 
In the context of the fluid borderlands, the imperial state was unable to control the 
commercial and political engagement of the nomadic tribes with other imperial powers. 
Thus the settlement became a peculiar target for the imperial governors in the frontiers. 
As Gökhan Çetinsaya remarked for the Ottoman-Iranian border, since the transhumant 
Kurdish tribes inhabited both sides of the Iraq-Iran frontier and did not recognize any 
border, cross-border mobility of the tribes' loyalty and the conflicting international 
efforts to establish patronage over them created a constant tension for the Empire.93 Due 
to the possible chance of new patronage from other imperial powers, it became a harder 
task for the imperial governors to secure the loyalty of the nomadic tribes. As for their 
commercial practice, smuggling became an uncontrollable and untaxed activity of the 
nomadic tribes, which caused a more alarming concern by the imperial governors to 
settle and regulate them.  
In sum we can define the Ottoman strategies of dealing with the tribal populations 
as a policy of 'carrot and stick'. As implied by Ebubekir Ceylan in the context of the 
Ottoman dealings with the Iraqi tribes: 
“The policies followed by Ottoman governors against the tribes can be 
summarized as carrot or stick game and they varied considerably from granting 
favours to certain tribes, creating inter-tribal frictions, recognizing a rival chieftain 
within a given tribe, the use of military force, incorporation of the tribal structures 
into the provincial political mechanism, and settlement of the tribal 
confederations. The stick, in other words, the use of military force came usually 
                                                
91 Cengiz Orhonlu, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Aşiretlerin İskanı, (İstanbul: Eren 
Yayıncılık, 1987), 39-48. 
92 Yusuf Halaçoğlu, XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun İskan Siyaseti ve 
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when all other methods of ‘politics of tribe’ failed.”94 
Another challenge to the Ottoman rule in the frontiers was the encounter with the 
peripheral populations.95 The penetration of imperial authority to the remote areas 
resulted in the Ottomans facing a population who had not encountered directly with the 
state bureaucracy before. In a way, for these peripheral populations the presence of the 
state in their terrains might have been perceived as a foreign invasion.96 Beyond the 
resistance of these peripheral populations to the Ottoman attempts of settlement, 
collection of taxes and conscription, in the cases of non-Sunni religious peripheral 
populations97 it was hard to build legitimacy upon the tenet of a Sunni-ortodox identity. 
Instead of just looking for inclusive mechanisms for these populations, the Ottomans 
appealed to coercive means, too, like conversion and outright suppression. Especially in 
the reign of Abdulhamid II, the imperial government articulated the Hanefi-Sunni 
interpretation of Islam as orthodox in its discourse to its Muslim subjects and aimed to 
indoctrinate this version of Islam in order to maintain their obedience. In other words, 
the Hanefi-Sunni interpretation of Islam had become the fundamental depiction of the 
Empire’s identity, especially in the Arab and Kurdish populated regions, and was 
articulated as an ‘official belief’ which operated as the cultural bond for their relations 
with their subjects.98 As a consequence, non-Sunni, heterodox or heretic subjects were 
not only excluded from this larger picture, but they were also considered to be the 
problem itself. The imperial government tried to maintain the loyalty of these subjects 
by endearing them to Hanefi-Sunni Islam with particular policies. The Alevi population 
of Dersim, Nusayris of Syria, Zaydis of Yemen, and Shi’s of Basra was the examples 
par excellence of this kind of sects, and their beliefs were perceived as the basis of their 
                                                
94 Ebubekir Ceylan, “Carrot or Stick? Ottoman Tribal Policy in Baghdat, 1831-
1876”, International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies 3 (2009), 173.  
95 I borrowed the term, 'peripheral population' from Selçuk Akşin Somel. According 
to Somel there are two kinds of peripheral populations in the Empire: religous and 
sociological. The former was the non-Sunni populations such as Jafari Shis, Zaydis, 
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Nüfus Grupları”, Toplum ve Bilim 83 (1999): 181-196. 
96 Ibid, 197. 
97 Especially the Zaydis in Yemen proved a great challenge to the Ottoman authority 
since they had their own judicial, educational institutions. I will discuss this in the 
second chaper.  
98 Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains, 66. 
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disloyalty. In order to solve this matter, imperial governors had to search for policies to 
‘correct their beliefs’ (tashih-i akaid); this became, in the words of Selim Deringil, a 
‘watchword term’ in the Hamidian regime.99 
 
8. Establishing a Security Regime in the Frontiers 
 
Since the Ottomans had perceived the frontier dynamics as possible challenges to 
the assertion of the Ottoman imperial rule, internal security became the primary 
objective for the imperial governors. John M. Willis's remark that the “frontiers were 
the space of security rather than law”100 is outstanding for the Ottoman context. In order 
to defend the Empire against the other imperial powers, the Ottomans thought that 
tranquility had to prevail the frontiers; hence the security became the first and foremost 
agenda of the imperial governors. In this sense I prefer to define the frontier rule as a 
'security regime'. For the Ottomans, once they could provide security and tranquility in 
the frontiers, their authority would be permanent and they would be able to collect taxes 
as well as conscript local population to the imperial army. Ahmed Cevdet Pasha's 
proposal for Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina reflects this Ottoman perception. 
According to Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, in order to provide prosperity to the local 
population and tax revenues to the treasury, first the state should maintain security by 
the construction of military buildings.101 Thus, what the Ottomans first did in the 
frontiers was usually fortification, introducing the troops and building barracks. Every 
new administrative center meant the expansion of the scope of state’s security means.  
For our scope, it is significant that the Ottomans had sought to integrate the local 
population to the security apparatuses, in an effort to look more legitimate in the eyes of 
the local society. The expeditions of the imperial army to suppress disturbances had 
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further incited local sentiment against the imperial army, which was perceived in effect 
as a 'colonizer force'. As a pre-emptive measure, the imperial governors appealed to 
local men for the filling of the ranks of these new security units. The recruitment 
strategies varied from region to region, but the most palpable populations, people settled 
from other regions, the members of allied tribes, were first preferred for these units' 
manpower.102 
 
9. Frontiers in the Reign of Abdülhamid II103 
 
Abdulhamid II started his career after the Ottoman expansion towards its frontiers, 
which had started from the 1830s, came to its climax. However, after the Russian War, 
with the Berlin Treaty of 1878, Abdulhamid II was forced to accept huge territorial 
losses in the Balkans which significantly changed the demographic structure of the 
Empire. 200.000 square kilometers, on which 5.5 million people lived, was lost.104 Both 
the loss of these territories and the inflow of Muslim refugees increased the Muslim 
proportion of the Empire to 73.3 percent, according to general censuses of 1881/2-93.105 
This demographic change had certain impacts on the imperial policies. After 1878, the 
consolidation of imperial power in Asian and Arab provinces had priority for 
Abdulhamid II; and since the Muslim population became the 'bedrock' for the Empire, 
Abdulhamid II had further reason to call upon Islamic discourses and practices. As 
stated by Engin Deniz Akarlı, the Sultan’s renewed concern for Islam mingled with the 
desire to redress the territorial losses, turned the government's attention to the Arab 
                                                
102 For instance in Hasa, the imperial government appointed the leader of Bani 
Khalid tribe as a regional governor. He founded a militia consisting from Bedouin 
Arabs, Kurds, Afghans, and Baluchis. See. Anscombe, “Continuities in Ottoman”, 
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gendarme force. See. Eugene Rogan, Frontiers of the State, 67. 
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104 Francois Georgeon, Sultan Abdülhamid, trans. Ali Berktay, (Istanbul: Homer, 
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provinces.106 Since the imperial competition escalated, Abdulhamid II embarked on a 
transformative agenda to consolidate imperial rule in the frontiers and an intensive 
effort to win the loyalty of the Muslim subjects living in the Arab and Kurdish frontiers.  
However, it was not only the loss of Balkan territories, but also the challenges 
rising from Muslim subjects that alarmed Abdulhamid II and prompted his vigorous 
efforts to transform the frontier population to loyal subjects of the Sultan. Especially 
Abdulhamid II's suspicion and fear of an Arab caliphate as well as an Arab Government 
had further provoked him to consolidate his efforts to promote his caliphate title and 
win a religious fidelity of the Muslim population in the Arab and Kurdish frontiers. 
Especially certain incidents of discontent in Hijaz instilled fear in Abdulhamid II. 
Abdulhamid II feared that British supported Emir Husain would establish an Arab 
government during his term office in 1877-1880 and that secret attempts were being 
orchestrated to have the Arabs transfer their allegiance to the emir of Mecca as the 
leader of all Muslims.107 
Thus, the Ottoman imperial attempt to consolidate the state's power and its 
prestige in the frontiers and to shape the loyalty of the Muslim population had been 
accelerated from the early 1880s during the reign of Abdulhamid II. The Arab provinces 
had been granted a privileged character due to the Islamic discourse and practices which 
sought to create a unifying identity as an imperial front in the context of international 
competition. Thus it would not be wrong to define the reign of Abdulhamid II as the 
reign of the intensified attempts to consolidate imperial rule in the Arab and Kurdish 
frontiers.  Especially the traumas of the Russian War and the disturbances in the Muslim 
territories had provoked Abdulhamid II for consolidating policies, instead of pursuing 
new ventures of expansion, which had characterised the previous period. 
Abdulhamid II had further sought to make alliances and appealed to inclusive 
methods with the Arab notables to set himself as a legitimate ruler in the eyes of the 
Muslim subjects. As noted by Jens Hanssen, after the closing of Parliament, 
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Abdulhamid II ceremonially promoted the Arab provinces whose notables he tried to 
integrate into his personalized rule by positioning them at the head list of the imperial 
ceremonies.108 In this sense, as argued by Engin Deniz Akarlı, instead of coercion, 
reconciliation dominated Abdulhamid II's rule in the Arab provinces, underlined by the 
emphasis on the Islamic foundation and the struggle to keep the Arab territories free 
from foreign intervention.109 
Apart from awarding notables and using similar strategies to integrate them , 
Abdulhamid II also used imperial capital to invite local notables and sheiks as his own 
guests and as advisers to his imperial policies regarding the remote territories of the 
Empire. Abdulhamid II both benefited from the knowledge of these local notables on 
the affairs of the remote areas, and could manage to keep them under his control.110 The 
vigorous efforts to create an actively loyal population through the spectrum of an 
Islamic ideology, however, could not always apply to the frontiers, as some of them 
were home to non-Sunni Muslims, as in the case of Zaydis' Yemen. Thus, as stated by 
Engin Deniz Akarlı, conflicting interpretations of Islam became a regular feature of the 
ongoing political struggle.111 
10. Towards an Ottoman Colonialism? 
The Ottoman historiography has witnessed a stimulating debate on colonialism, 
first provoked by two prominent Ottoman historians, Selim Deringil and Ussama 
Makdisi. According to Deringil, “[i]n the nineteenth century the [Ottoman] elite adopted 
the mindset of their enemies, and came to conceive of its periphery as a colonial 
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setting.”112 Ussama Makdisi also points out that while resisting Western political and 
colonial implications, the Ottomans recognized the logic of the time and progress of 
Western orientalism.113 These two arguments mainly set the Ottoman colonialism as a 
survival tactic against the Western imperial encroachments and put forth that the 
Ottoman ruling elites were sharing the nineteenth century colonial mind while dealing 
with the Arabs and Kurds. The Ottoman orientalism/colonialism thesis mainly argues 
that the imperial state and its representatives running in the Arab and Kurdish regions 
perceived the local population as backward and unrefined people who needed to be 
civilized by the introduction of the Ottoman institutions. The reports written by the 
provincial governors graphically reflect the Ottoman articulation of the mentality of a 
civilizing mission that was planned and executed for the populations of remote 
frontiers.114 
Especially the expansion of the Ottoman rule to the Arab and Kurdish frontiers in 
the nineteenth century paved the way for the Ottoman governors to encounter with the 
peripheral populations, whose lifestyles and beliefs had been perceived as 'uncivilized'. 
However, ‘civilizing’ in the language of Ottoman bureaucracy came to mean 
“correction of beliefs in accordance with Sunni faith, inspiration of loyalty to Caliph-
Sultan and thus the acknowledgment of Ottoman central power, and finally to teach 
Ottoman Turkish.”115 Thus, we can argue that the distinction between the civilized and 
uncivilized was narrowed down to a question of obedience; and in this sense civilizing 
mission meant to transform the peripheral populations to obedient subjects of the 
Empire.116 From this perspective, as argued by Şükrü Hanioğlu, the descriptions of 
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Druzes or Maronites in Mount Lebanon, of Kurds, of Albanian highlanders, or of Arab 
bedouins as warlike savages were rather the manifestation of Ottoman frustration at 
these groups' pertinacious refusal to give up local practices and accept central 
administration.117 
Although it is worthy to demonstrate that the Ottoman ruling elites articulated a 
similar discourse with their contemporary colonial rulers, missionaries and educators, 
still this affinity is not sufficient to describe the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire as a 
colonial one. In other words the notion of the empire being colonial cannot be traced 
just with textual analysis of the discourse used by the imperial governors while dealing 
with the peripheral populations.118 As Fatma Müge Göçek warned, this argument 
requires comparative studies  of Ottoman governors adopting a colonial attitude with 
                                                                                                                                    
  “For the government, the tribes living in Dersim can be parted into three groups, 
the first group lives in Mazgird district and neighborhood near the military cohorts, 
who give their taxes, and are loyal to government; the second group is less near the 
military cohorts than the first group and although they are mixed up with 
administrative officials, military cohorts and civilized people, they were not 
accustomed with them, therefore they have still savage attitudes, yet still they pay 
their taxes; the third group is very far from the government and military cohorts and 
up until now they have not come to the administrative center and paid their taxes.” 
 See. HasanHilmi. “MamüretülazizVali-iEsbakıEs-SeyyidHasanHilmi'ninLayihası,” 
in Dersim'deOsmanlıSiyaseti: İzale-iVahşet, Tashih-iİtikad, veTasfiye-iEzhan, 1880-
1913, ed. CihangirGündoğdu and VuralGenç, (İstanbul: KitapYayınevi, 2013), 64. 
117 Şükrü Hanioğlu, A Brief History, 88. 
118 Also we should keep in mind the relativity of the orientalist language, which thus 
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complexity, Broers indicates that while the “Italian intellectuals and politicians 
'orientalized' the Mezzogiorno (the South) after unification in the mid-nineteenth 
century, seeing it as a region apart, unable to integrate, in an earlier discourse, into 
the more advanced society of the North, The French took a strikingly similar view of 
many of those very parts of Italy which were later regarded as being in the vanguard 
of modernization.” See. Michael Broers, Cultural Imperialism in a European 
Context? Political Culture and Cultural Politics in Napoleonic Italy, Past & Present, 
170 (2001), 154. In the Ottoman context the local elites also applied to same 
'orientalist' discourse while describing the lower-class local people and propounded 
the 'civilizing mission'. For instance, as Isa Blumi noted, Şemseddin Sami, an 
Ottoman-Albanian intellectual, was proposing that the state inculcates Islam, 
modernity and civilization to reinforce loyalty to the regime among the previously 
ignored populations of Albania. See. Isa Blumi, Reinstateting , 110.  
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those serving the empire in less peripheral parts of the empire.119In my view, the issue 
of being a colonial empire should be explored beyond the level of discourse but should 
be traced instead in the legal and practical experiences of the Empire in the frontiers. 
However, in want of a consensus on when to define an empire as colonial, the issue 
becomes much more complex. While discussing anything about colonialism in the 
nineteenth century, the starting point should be that there was no monolithic colonial 
regime to serve as a model. In other words, according to the demographic, political and 
geographical features of the colonized populations and colonized spaces, one can 
witness several forms of colonial regimes in history. Moreover, in the face of political 
tensions, and resistance by the colonized subjects, contemporary colonial regimes might 
follow different tactical approaches. This variety is highlighted by the fact that imperial 
centers treated and administered their colonies within different realms in markedly 
different ways. For instance, the British Empire had administered its colonies in three 
distinct administrative categories: crown colonies, colonies with 'representative 
governments' and those with responsible governments – designating increasingly 
indirect forms of crown rule. Also the French Empire under the Third Republic had 
used several administrative settlements to organize its colonies. For instance, the 
Ministry of Colonies had ruled most of the territories, but Algeria was thought as part of 
France ruled by the Ministry of Interior, while Tunisia and Morocco were administered 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.120 However, one common thing among all colonial 
regimes was the legal, political and symbolic distinction and hierarchy between 
metropole and colony. 
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European colonial administrations justified the axiom that the colonial subjects 
should be governed differently from the metropolitan subjects.121 As Partha Chattarjee 
propounds for the Indians' rights and responsibilities under the British colonization, “the 
only civil society that the government could recognize was theirs; colonized subjects 
could never be its equal members. Freedom of opinion, which even they accepted as an 
essential element of responsible government, could apply only to the organs of the civil 
society; Indians were not fit subjects of responsible government.”122 The inequality 
between the colonizers and colonized was legalized, and colonized people were 
excluded from the legal frameworks and participation channels pursued for the 
metropole. As noted by Frederick Cooper, “maintaining the colonial regime required a 
coercive and administrative work to define hierarchies and police social boundaries.”123 
In this sense, race played a crucial role in the making of distinctive and exclusionary 
politics. According to David Spur, the colonial situation is characterized by “the 
domination imposed by a foreign minority ‘racially’ and culturally different, over a 
materially weaker indigenous majority in the name of a racial (or ethnic) and cultural 
superiority.”124 Regarding this it is hard to trace this kind of legal distinction in the 
Ottoman Empire.  
Ussama Makdisi argues that the Ottoman modernization process was based on 
racial distinction between a Turkish center and the Arab provinces.125 Furthermore, the 
ruling elites of the late nineteenth century had started to inculcate Turkishness as a 
fundamental identity in their worldviews. This can be observed in Cevdet Pasha, a 
highly influential statesman and historian in the late 19th century. Ordered by 
Abdulhamid II him to examine historical and political events between 1839 and 1876, 
he explicitly refers to Turks as the fundamental element (asli unsur) of the Empire in his 
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notes for the sultan.126 In a similar way, Osman Nuri Pasha, a provincial governor in the 
Arab provinces (who is quite representative of the provincial governors in the reign of 
Abdulhamid II), portrays Turkish and Anatolian soldiers stationed in Hijaz, Benghazi 
and Yemen as the fundamental elements of the Empire. In his proposals for policies to 
be taken regarding the Hijaz, he states, referring to the Arabs, that “even if it were 
possible today to blend all the Muslim tribes and nations together by causing them to 
lose their special characteristics through the application of rigorous policies, they would 
still be no more than the boughs and branches of the tree whose trunk would still be 
constituted by the Turks.”127 These are two examples – but not limited – that 
demonstrate how the Ottoman ruling elites imagined and constructed Turkishness as the 
fundamental identity of the Empire. Even so, imagining Turkishness as a fundamental 
element of the Empire did not result in the claim that the non-Turkish subjects should be 
governed differently from the Turks. Although the reproduction of cultural and racial 
distinctions between the European colonial powers and colonized subjects led to the 
permanency of 'politics of difference', as Edip Gölbaşı noted, the Ottoman authorities 
strived to close the cultural gap, and by appealing to conversion, education, settlement 
and conscription at least sought to create obedient subjects via an inclusive and 
collective identity. By doing so, the Ottomans desired to integrate 'uncivilized' 
populations to the imperial order rather than excluding them.128 In other words, 
although the Ottoman ruling elites appealed to exclusivist discourses while defining 
their peripheries as backward and uncivilized, they envisioned an eventual social and 
political integration of the peripheral population – even attempted it via the notable 
circles.129 
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Although the Ottomans did not form a legal framework which formalized a 
distinction between metropole and periphery, and sought an integrative policy, still a 
comparison between Ottoman rule in the frontiers and contemporary colonial governing 
practices would be engaging in its potential to describe how the empire functioned in 
the nineteenth century. Firstly, in the scramble of imperial/colonial competition, the 
Ottomans sought an expansionist policy and reclaimed their old frontiers. In fact, the 
Ottomans engaged into this imperialist race first by extending their frontiers and then 
trying to claim their sovereignty in these territories. While claiming sovereignty, the 
Ottomans, too, appealed to imperialist and colonial repertoires.130 Secondly, as I 
discussed above, the Ottoman imperial rule in the frontiers differed from the Tanzimat 
policies, which were best implemented in the imperial heartlands. Moreover, when 
faced with the peculiar dynamics of the frontiers, the Ottoman governors sought any 
possible strategies to control the population and maintain their obedience for the 
imperial defense, rather than attempting a rigid centralization policy. In this aspect, a 
probing of the resemblances of Ottoman policies in the frontiers with the colonial 
governing practices would be noteworthy. As I will discuss in the third chapter, Ismail 
Hakkı Paşa was inspired from the Sepoy army of British India and built a native army in 
Yemen between 1880-2. Since the frontiers were the scenes in which various governing 
and controlling strategies were displayed by different imperial powers, the interaction 
would be inevitable. Although this does not render the Ottoman Empire a colonial one, 
at least we can conclude that the Ottomans sought colonial administrative and military 
strategies in the frontiers in order to control the population. However, we should not 
forget that similar strategies designated in the first expansion of the Ottoman Empire 
between the 14th-17th centuries for the frontier defense, integration of the local 
population and alliance with the local notables had been used. Thus we can also 
interpret these strategies as the revival of Ottoman imperialist repertoires. 
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CHAPTER II 
 A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: OTTOMAN HISTORY OF YEMEN 
 
1. From a Fear to the Imperialist Passions 
When the news came in November 1870 that Asiri emir Muhammed Ibn Aiz 
rebelled and then broadened his uprising towards Yemeni Tihame (west coast of 
Yemen), the Ottoman high-ranking bureaucrats and generals were alarmed in 
Istanbul. The grand vizier Âli Pasha and Hüseyin Avni Pasha, who was the serasker 
(commander in chief) of the period, were the most anxious men among those. This 
time the issue was more convoluted than the previous cases of provincial unrest. In 
fact, Muhammed Ibn Aiz had rebelled in 1863 after a quarrel with the sharifs of Ebu 
Arish, and captured the castle of Cizan in Yemen before heading for Luhayya. The 
Ottomans had resolved the issue at that time by allowing the Egyptian khedive to 
send soldiers. After the march of the Egyptian soldiers, the sharif of Mecca, Şerif 
Abdullah and the governor general İzzet Pasha assured the obedience of ibn Aiz; 
and he was appointed as the kaymakam of Asir.131 This time however, Âli Pasha and 
Hüseyin Pasha did not prefer the methods of conciliation, or demanding the Khedive 
to send Egyptian soldiers to assuage the rebellion. Instead, they planned an imperial 
campaign. In fact, the decision to conduct an imperial campaign was not just linked 
to the Asiri rebellion. It reflects the renewed and pressing Ottoman interest in the 
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region, which emerged within the new international context after the opening of 
Suez Channel in 1869.  
The opening of the Suez Channel was a turning point in the ‘new imperialism’ 
and it positioned the Red Sea into a strategically essential point, since the British 
priority was to protect its Indian colony from the imperial competition. This required 
for the British to control the entire Indian Ocean, Red Sea, and crucial segments of 
the African coasts and their hinterlands.132 As I discussed in the first chapter, instead 
of being a passive audience of the imperial competition, the Ottomans had ventured 
to strengthen their position by expanding their frontiers. In order to resist the 
encroachments of the Western imperial powers, the Ottomans applied aggressive 
imperialist measures as in their decision to reoccupy the Yemeni highlands. In this 
aspect, the anxiety of Âli and Hüseyin Avni Pashas shifted to an imperialist passion.  
The presence of the British in Aden, and the increasing charm of the Red Sea 
for the imperial powers – particularly, for the British, French and Italians – had 
endangered the Ottoman control over the holy cities, Mecca and Medina, which was 
one of the main sources of imperial legitimacy over the Muslim populations of the 
Empire. In the minds of the Ottoman ruling elites, the danger around the holy cities 
would imperil the existence of the Empire. Thus, the Ottomans, in the context of 
rising imperialism, put the reconquest of southern Arabia and direct control over the 
region in their agenda. In other words, it was the emerging significance of the Red 
Sea for the imperial powers which reminded the Ottomans to protect the holy cities 
by securing direct control over Yemen as well as the entire Arabian Peninsula. 
Ahmed Muhtar Pasha succinctly explains why the Ottomans pursued an imperial 
campaign for Yemen. According to him, although it was an Ottoman duty to prevent 
Yemen from being acquired by other powers, since it was a neighboring region of 
the Holy cities, the Ottomans had not objected their absence from these lands before. 
The difference now was the opening of the Suez Canal, for it made the Red Sea a 
route to the Indian, Chinese and African coasts and hence brought it to prominence. 
From that point on, it became an evident possibility that Yemen would be targeted 
by the other powers; thus it became an indispensable task for the Ottomans to act 
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earlier than its rivals.133 In this aspect, the emphasis made by Ahmed Muhtar Pasha 
on the opening of Suez Canal in terms of the reminiscence of the Ottomans' role to 
protect the Holy cities is particularly telling. In this sense, historian Ahmed Râşid 
Pasha was much clearer in expressing the Ottoman engagement in the imperialist 
scramble. According to him, since India and many lands in Africa became British 
colonies, the Russians expanded their possessions towards Asia, and Aceh turned 
into a Dutch colony, the Ottomans required to control Yemen by undertaking an 
imperial campaign. He states the urgency of the action: if the Ottomans were two or 
three years late to take this decision, Yemeni lands would fall under the control of 
the foreign powers.134 Thus, although the later Ottoman accounts of the reoccupation 
of the Yemen made particular emphasis on the Ottoman role to protect the Holy 
cities,135 the issue should be understood in the larger context of the Ottoman drive in 
the escalation of the imperialist struggles. It was the fear of Ottoman ruling elites 
concerning the deterioration of the Ottoman presence in the region as a consequence 
of the encroachments of the Western imperial powers, which led them to undertake 
imperialist strategies. 
The rebellion of Muhammed Ibn Aiz made the precarious nature of the 
Ottoman power in the Arabian Peninsula rather visible. It showed that the fall of 
Hodeida would result in the collapse of the Ottoman authority in south-west 
Arabia.136 For the Ottoman ruling elites, this fragile status could not be sustained in 
the newly emerging imperial context in the Red Sea. The only solution that came to 
the minds of the Ottoman bureaucrats was to establish direct control in the region. In 
order to do this, the imperial campaign they envisioned aimed both to subjugate the 
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rebellion and afterwards occupy the Yemeni highlands. As emphasized by Robert 
Gavin, this was an entirely new orientation for the Ottoman policy toward Arabia.137 
Starting in the 1870s, the Ottomans took aggressive measures to prevent – 
particularly – British expansion in south Arabia. 
As pointed by Thomas Kuehn, the Ottoman government was not only 
concerned about European imperial competition, but also suspected that the Khedive 
Ismail had similar designs in south-west Arabia.138 Furthermore, like Ahmed Muhtar 
Pasha, some of the Ottoman state-led elites saw the Ibn Aiz rebellion as incited by 
Khedive Ismail.139 In this sense, the Ottomans thought that the imperial campaign 
and the control of Yemen and Asir would also provide them the opportunity to 
check Khedive’s influence in the region and prevent his intrigues.  
Finally, as in all imperialist invasions or occupations, the highlands of the 
Yemen were also targeted by the Ottomans as a source of manpower and income. 
And throughout the Ottoman reign in Yemen, the Ottomans used to complain for not 
having taken advantage of ‘this matchless wealth of Yemen'.140 Though to control 
the highlands of Yemen and particularly to form San’a as a capital had a strategic 
significance in the imperial competition, its wealth, too, captivated the Ottomans.141 
The Ottomans made pragmatic calculations and acted with the idea of efficiency. 
For instance, Ahmed Muhtar Pasha explains the reason behind not occupying Sa’da, 
the city between the Asir and San’a, as that “the outgoings and force to be expanded 
would not be met by the income produced by its population.”142 Considering all 
these issues which kindled the Ottomans to control Yemen, it can be best compared 
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with the first Ottoman expansion to Yemen in the sixteenth century. For the 
dynamics of imperial competition and the Ottoman paths of controlling Yemen and 
the local challenges it encountered, the early Ottoman expansion is instructive. 
 
2. Ottoman Expansion in the 16th Century 
 
When the Ottomans conquered Syria, Egypt and the Hijaz in 1517, the 
Portuguese forces had already entered the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. So, the 
Ottomans were already alerted by the Portuguese presence. According to Hulusi 
Yavuz, Sultan Selim I had ordered to build a navy while he was in Egypt in 1517, in 
order to dislodge the Portuguese from the Indian Ocean.143 The Portuguese were a 
threat to the Ottoman Empire for its new Arab frontiers; and Portuguese operations 
in order to control the entrance to the Red Sea further provoked the Ottomans. As 
pointed by Salih Özbaran, in order to bolster their presence in the Indian Ocean, the 
Portuguese aimed to control the Red Sea, and with this intention they destroyed the 
port of Jeddah near the Islamic holy lands in 1512 and burned the Mamluk fleet at 
Suez in 1513 before the Ottoman power expanded to the Arab lands.144 This news 
caused worries among the Ottoman circles when they started to consolidate their 
authority in the Arab lands.  
The conquest of Egypt in 1517 became a watershed for the Empire to further 
expand its territories in the Arab lands, and to engage in the imperial competition in 
the Red Sea and in the Indian Ocean. As emphasized by Özbaran, “with the 
overthrow of the Mamluk sultanate, it became incumbent on Selim I to maintain 
Egypt as the bastion of his extended empire against the Portuguese.”145 This was not 
just about benefiting from the lucrative trade in the Indian Ocean, but was also 
linked with providing security for the new frontiers in the Arab lands. In order to 
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protect the newly conquered lands in the Arab regions, the imperial mind warranted 
further expansion towards the southern regions, in order to construct fortresses to 
secure the Holy Lands and Egypt. In that sense, a frontier formation in Yemen 
proved to be of a high strategic value for the Ottomans. As stated in the original 
report of Selman Reis to İbrahim Pasha in 1525, “with the conquest of Yemen, the 
total destruction of the Portuguese presence would be inevitable, for one of their 
fortresses is unable to support another and they are unable to put up a united 
position.” Selman further added that “whoever controlled Yemen would be the 
master of the lands of India.”146  
Halil Inalcık shows that before 1517, the Ottomans helped their southern 
neighbor, the Mamluks by providing guns; and Rumi (Ottoman) volunteers were 
employed by the Mamluks in Yemen and at the Portuguese front.147 The reign of 
Selim I had also witnessed Ottoman strategies to deal with Portuguese forces in the 
Indian Ocean, even in the form of outright clashes. During the reign of Sultan 
Süleyman, the Ottomans were even more eager to engage into the imperial politics 
in the Indian Ocean and to achieve political superiority. In the reign of Sultan 
Suleyman, the protection of the Holy Lands became one of the most significant 
tenets of legitimacy and a crucial foundation of political prestige for the Sultan. On 
the other hand, the Portuguese navy became at that time the most powerful in the 
world, and was challenging the Ottomans. Before 1538, the Ottoman forces clashed 
with the Portuguese several times, as is known from the examples of the defenses of 
Jeddah, as well as the expedition to Yemen and Aden by the admiral Selman Reis in 
1517 and 1525.148 However the most crucial confrontation in the sixteenth century 
was Hadım Süleyman Pasha's Diu expedition of 1538. Hulusi Yavuz, in his initial 
studies on the Ottoman expedition to the Indian Ocean, presents the issue as 
pertaining to the Islamic ambitions of Sultan Süleyman. According to Yavuz, the 
Ottoman naval push to the Indian Ocean originated from the need to protect 
Muslims and the Muslim state of Gujarat against the Portuguese threat. He says that 
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Sultan Suleyman was agitated by the demand of a Gujarat envoy in 1536 for help 
against the Portuguese presence in the Ocean and South India. Upon this, the Sultan 
ordered Hadım Suleyman Paşa, who was then the governor general (beylerbeyi) of 
Egypt (from 1525 to 1535), had succeeded to regulate the administration and 
instituted Ottoman central control to a certain degree and also was in favor of action 
against Yemen and Aden, to build a navy.149  
Hulusi Yavuz continues that the Sultan also perceived that a possible success 
in the expedition would bring security to the routes of pilgrimage to Mecca.150 
Although the protection of the pilgrimage routes and the Holy Lands as well as 
assistance to the Muslims in the world would bolster the political and symbolic 
prestige of the Sultan, who presented himself as the emperor and protector of all 
Muslims, the issue was not limited to that. The military expeditions could be best 
understood within the context of the empire-making process in the Arab lands versus 
the existing threat against the imperial strengthening posed by the Portuguese forces, 
as well as with the aim to control the trade in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. 
The Ottoman navy, including 76 galleys and 20000 soldiers, had set sail from 
Suez on June 28, 1538.151 However, the Diu expedition resulted with a failure for 
the Ottomans. Yet, as stated by Özbaran, this failure overlooks the fact that it was 
immediately after this expedition that the Ottoman province of Yemen was 
established152 and this would at least contribute to secure a direct sea route from 
Egypt to the Indian Ocean, and ensure a permanent Ottoman military presence in the 
Arabian Sea.153  
 
2.1.  The First Episode of Ottoman Rule in Yemen, 1538-1571: 
On the way of his return from the Diu expedition, Hadim Süleyman Pasha 
conquered Zabid (west coast of Yemen) in February, and then established the 
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Yemen beylerbeyliği which also included the region of Aden in 1540.154 
Immediately after, until the Zaydi Rebellion of 1567, as stated by Blackburn, the 
Ottoman dominion in Yemen passed through “expansion, consolidation and 
contraction.”155 The main challenge the Ottomans faced came from the Zaydis. As in 
all its frontiers, the Ottomans used different governing methods which markedly 
departed from the practices pursued for the heartlands of the Empire. In the 
frontiers, the Ottoman rule was dependent on the local knowledge and power 
relations. In order to consolidate their power in the frontiers, the Ottomans relied on 
the gravity and know-how of local notables, hence attempted to craft alliances with 
them. In the context of early imperial strategies, by allowing a certain degree of 
autonomy to the local power-holders in the frontiers, the Ottomans aimed to 
integrate them to the imperial politics, especially in order to establish alliances 
against external imperial threats in the region. In this aspect, the peculiar situation in 
Yemen was determined by the sectarian governing practices. The Ottomans allied 
themselves with mainly non-Zaydi populations – the Sunni Shafis, and İsmailis, who 
were belonging to sub-sect of Shiis – of the region, not just for securing it against 
the Portuguese threats but also against the Zaydi claim over Yemen. This preference 
of alliances resulted in a sectarian rule in the region which kept the Zaydi imams in 
alert and paved the ground for them to consolidate their forces by using imamic 
legitimacy.  
These sectarian ruling practices generated contradictions especially after the 
conquest of Ta'iz and San'a in 1547, where the Zaydi population constituted the 
majority of the population and the imamic legitimacy could enjoy a ready audience 
among the ordinary Zaydi peasants. As stated by Robin Blackburn, the opposing 
imamic and Ottoman forces engaged in often intense hostilities for the control of the 
lands north of San'a between 1547 and 1552. This confrontation came to an end 
when Ozdemir Pasha concluded a peace treaty with the Zaydis. According to the 
treaty of 1552, Zaydi Imam al-Mutahhar accepted Sultan Suleyman as his suzerain 
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and recognized Yemen as an Ottoman province. In return, al-Mutahhar received the 
status of sancakbeyi.156  
 
2.2. The Zaydi Rebellion of 1567: 
Although, as stated by Hulusi Yavuz, the Ottoman official view towards the 
reasons of the rebellion – as reflected in the archival documents – was limited to the 
‘false beliefs’ of the population; the essential reasons are to be found in the 
malpractices of Ottoman governors, and the levels of tax rates, which resulted in 
unjust rule over the local population and made them gather to revolt under the 
leadership of Zaydi imams.  
A local uprising started in the highlands of Yemen in 1566 which became 
transformed into a major rebellion under the leadership of Zaydi imam al-Mutahhar 
in 1567; the revolt expanded through the inclusions of other local unrests to the 
whole of Yemen. In August 1567, rebel forces captured San'a.157 In the early 1568, 
al-Mutahhar had succeeded to control both the highlands and the northern coastal 
plains of Tihame. This success of the imamic forces encouraged al-Mutahhar to 
order in April 1568 the complete expulsion of the Ottoman forces from Yemen.158 
 
2.3.  Sinan Pasha's Military Expedition of 1569 – 1571: 
As a response to the rebellion, in March 1568, Yemen was reorganized under 
one beylerbeylik and Osman Pasha, the son of Ozdemir Pasha, was appointed as 
beylerbeyi of the newly organized Yemen Vilayeti and was granted a large force for 
a comprehensive military expedition to reoccupy Yemen.159 Meanwhile, the 
Ottoman forces, attenuated and prevented from getting help from the sea, remained 
confined to Zabid. At the same time, the Ottoman imperial government appointed Sinan 
Pasha as commander-in-chief (serdar) with an imperial decree to reconquer Yemen. 
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According to al- Makki, an Arab historian who wrote the history of the 
expedition upon Sinan Pasha's own request from him, Sinan Pasha left Egypt in 
January 1569 with “the army by land, mounted on horses, camels and mules.”160 In 
January 1569, Osman Pasha conquered Ta'izz, an important town southwest of 
Yemen, and with the help of Sinan Pasha's forces, reestablished Ottoman 
domination around Ta'izz in May 1569.161 Al- Makki presents Sinan Pasha's help as 
a crucial contribution and a watershed for the reconquest of Yemen since the 
mountainous tribes disturbed the supplies of Osman Pasha's army and the soldiers 
were in a state of famine.162 After this point, Sinan Pasha started a very suppressive 
expedition in order to eradicate the rebellion and then to rebuild Ottoman authority 
in the whole region. 
By employing successful allegiance strategies and with support from Egypt, 
Sinan Pasha eventually defeated the Zaydi forces; he succeeded in brutally 
vanquishing the Zaydi forces around San'a and forced them to a peace on May 16th, 
1570.163 According to the peace treaty, the khoutbe should be read and coins should 
be minted all over Yemen in the name of the Sultan, and the Ottomans would settle 
in the lands which were previously under their authority. Thereby, Yemen was 
divided into two regions: the eastern and northern parts of the province would be 
under the control of al-Mutahhar but remain loyal to the Ottoman state; the other 
parts would be ruled directly by the Ottomans.164  
The significance of Sinan Pasha's expedition lays in the question as of why the 
Ottomans needed such kind of brutal suppression of the rebellion. Similar to the 
reasons behind the Ottoman attempts of the first conquest of Yemen, the reconquest 
or the brutal suppression of Zaydi rebellion shows that Yemen stands as a crucial 
strategic gate for the Ottoman imperial politics: its empire-making in the Arab lands 
and engagement in imperial competition in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. Since 
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Yemen was a bastion for the Ottomans to achieve their imperial aims in both the 
Indian Ocean and the Arab lands, even the great rebellion could not change the 
indispensability of this region for the Ottomans. In the minds of the Ottomans, 
controlling Yemen was crucial to prevent further expansions of the Portuguese, 
which would pose a threat for the Ottoman imperial consolidation and expansion. 
The port of Aden is a good illustration of the Ottoman mind behind the imperial 
attempts. The recapture of Aden and overthrow of Zaydi control in the city, 
according to al-Makki was sought for forestalling a possible Portuguese occupation. 
According to al-Makki the Ottomans thought that if the “Frank” forces would 
occupy Aden it would be difficult to regain from them because of their improved 
knowledge of artillery and their care for ports and castles, in contrast to the Arabs; 
thus Sinan Pasha perceived the reconquest of Aden as a preemptive strike against a 
possible future Portuguese conquest which would deteriorate the Ottoman existence 
in the Red Sea, thereby the security of the Holy Lands.165  
 
2.4. The Fall of Ottoman Authority 
After the reoccupation of Yemen, tranquility dominated the region until 1598. 
Starting in 1598, the Zaydi Imam Qasım attempted several assaults to the Ottoman 
forces; however, he could not manage to overthrow the Ottoman regime in Yemen, 
which was only achieved by his son Imam Muhammed in 1636. As stated by Robin 
L. Bidwell, in addition to waging a prolonged war against Venice, the internal crisis 
of the Ottomans, which included the deposition of two sultans and a series of revolts 
in Anatolia itself, made the imperial center incapable of mounting an effective 
response to the Imam Muhammed’s rebellion beyond sending a few detachments of 
Egyptian conscripts.166 After San’a was surrendered in 1629, the Ottoman authority 
became limited to the coastline of Tihame; and finally in 1636 the Ottoman forces 
evacuated Yemen for Hijaz, while even many of the Ottomans decided to stay and 
enter the service of the Imam.167 After the victory of the Imamic forces, the Imamic 
rule was established over Greater Yemen, from Hadramawt in the south to Asir in 
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the north. However, by 1728 the Zaydi power and unity declined as Aden, Sa’da, 
Najran, Marib and Kawkaban rised as quasi-states.168 
 
3. Early 19th Century: The Return of Empires 
 
The eighteenth century was the century of the crisis, and the decline of the 
Qasimi state. Firstly, new sources of coffee in the new Dutch and French colonies 
had marginalized Yemen’s weight in the global coffee trade, which had been the 
main financial source of the Qasimi state. Territorial expansion of the Qasimi state 
was reversed and the control of the Imamate became limited to Northern Yemen that 
was followed with further losses in the early nineteenth century.  
Both economic and political crises resulted in increasing conflicts between the 
tribes, and ushered in a new period of chaos in Yemeni history.169 
Starting in the early nineteenth century, coastal areas and the islands in the 
Red Sea once more became attractive terrains for imperial positioning. The British 
government and the East India Company were alerted by Bonaparte’s invasion of 
Egypt in 1798. As a response to the French invasion, the British side, in order to 
secure its presence in India, started to search for a base in the Red Sea. Perim Island 
was chosen as the point to dispatch the troops in order to control the Straits of Bab-
el-Mendeb. Because of the lack in the provision of water, Mocha, a port town in 
south-west Yemen, was substituted as the basis of provisions; however, strong anti-
British feelings in Mocha forced the British to turn their face to Aden, as the Sultan 
of Aden welcomed the British troops. Thus, in September 1799 British forces were 
transferred to Aden and stayed there until the early months of 1800.170 
Retrospectively, this can be evaluated as a starting point of the imperial competition 
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in the Red Sea, which would be one of the main determiners of the Yemeni history 
in the nineteenth century.  
As stated by Caesar Farah, although the Ottomans had tolerated the 
establishment of trading factories in Mocha by European powers in the later part of 
the eighteenth century, the British attempts to establish close relations with the local 
chiefs and the Imam of San’a animated Ottoman suspicion.171 A document from the 
early nineteenth century shows the Ottoman insistence on not allowing British 
encroachments in the region. The document, dated around 1822-3, shows the 
Ottoman fears that the British would gradually control Yemen like they penetrated 
into India. The document reveals Ottoman aggressive stance and concrete 
projections that the British encroachments in Mocha and their attempts to make 
alliances with the hinterland tribal chiefs would not be allowed, since Mocha was 
perceived as being near to the Holy lands; and it was stated that if necessary, troops 
should be dispatched by the Egyptian vali.172  
The Ottoman willingness to prevent British encroachments coincided with the 
Egyptian governor Mehmed Ali Pasha’s mission to suppress the Wahhabi threat in 
Nejd. Mehmed Ali’s expedition towards Asir, where there were followers of 
Wahhabis, was extended to Tihame. Mehmed Ali guaranteed these areas to be left 
under the control of the Imam in return for the delivery of coffee supplies.173 From 
that time onwards, British merchants appealed to their government to take serious 
measures to secure their trade operations based in Mocha.  
At the same time, with the advent of steam navigation, the importance of the 
Red Sea as an international strait increased to a significant degree. As pointed by 
Robin Bidwell, the route through the Mediterranean and Red Sea to India would 
reduce a five-month journey down to two months, albeit by refueling at a point 
between Bombay and Suez. Regarding this, in order to increase maritime activities, 
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British representatives made arrangements to dump coal at Aden and the Sira Island 
in 1829.174 This, in fact, signifies the precursor of the permanent presence of the 
British imperial power which would instigate the Ottomans to take serious measures 
to strengthen their position in the Red Sea for the rest of the century.  
 
4. Occupation of Aden 
 
In 1833, a Circassian servant of Mehmed Ali Pasha’s Egyptian Army, 
Muhammed Ağa, alias Türkçe Bilmez, had rebelled against Mehmed Ali Pasha and 
gathered many Egyptian soldiers around him. By seizing the Egyptian state funds in 
Jeddah and allying himself with the Asiri amir Ali bin Müceşşir he targeted Hodeida 
for capture. By benefiting from the weakness of the Imam of San’a, they invaded 
Tihama of Yemen, and ruled there approximately for a year.175 Although Mehmed 
Ali Pasha did not have a military presence in Yemen until that time, the Türkçe 
Bilmez rebellion gave him an opportunity to send Egyptian troops into Yemen.176 
Mehmed Ali Pasha thus seized control over the whole of the eastern bank of the Red 
Sea from Suez to Bab-al-Mendeb by 1837.177 As stated by El-Batrik, the next step 
was to seize Ta’izz, which created suspicions among the British circles that 
Egyptian forces were aiming to take the possessions of the ‘shores at the entrance 
and at the outside of the Red Sea; and this led the reformulation of the British policy 
in the Red Sea.178 While the Egyptian forces continued their southward expansion, 
the British forces under the command of Captain Haines invaded Aden in 1838 and 
started to contemplate on drastic measures to prevent Egyptian expansion; and 
finally in conjunction with Russia, Austria and Italy Mehmed Ali Pasha was 
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pressured to evacuate Hodeida and other places in Yemen on 22 April 1840.179 As 
pointed by Paul Dresch, as a part of the Grand strategy, the British prevented the 
presence of an autonomous Middle Eastern power in the Red Sea, but they remained 
in Aden.180 
Captain Haines’s seizure of Aden was not limited to the need of a place for a 
coaling station; it marks the British imperial plan in the Red Sea. According to 
Gavin, Aden was invaded in the context of a mercantile strategy, to develop a great 
commercial entrepot or to break the Egyptian monopoly of the Yemen coffee trade 
and redirect it to Aden and India.181 More than this, the British presence in Yemen 
quickly served for geopolitical purposes, to maintain a strategic primacy in the 
imperialist competition, and to control the Red Sea against the French designs in the 
North-East Africa and Arabia.182  
The British imperial authorities quickly attempted to secure their position in 
Aden by making alliances with the hinterland tribal chiefs. By preventing the unity 
of several tribes in the hinterland, Haines succeeded to ensure loyalty of these tribes. 
A month after the invasion, Haines proceeded to make Treaties of Friendship with 
his neighbor tribes, the Abdalis of Lahej, the Fadhlis of Shuqra and the Aqrabis of 
Bir Ahmad, Sultanates of Hawshabi, Lower Yafa, and some of the Subayhi tribes.183 
By doing so, the British imperial rule spread on the southern shores of Yemen; by 
the end of 1843, the presence of British Aden had been accepted by the people of its 
hinterland.184 
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5. Ottoman Reoccupation of Yemeni Tihame 
 
After the invasion of Aden, the British had set an imperial authority in 
southern Arabia, by establishing a direct rule in Aden through the Aden Residency, 
and an indirect rule in the tribal hinterland.185 On the other side of Yemen, the 
evacuation of the Egyptian forces from the northern parts created a power vacuum, 
which could not be filled by the different tribal claims, which in turn incited the 
Ottomans to find ways to position themselves into the region. In 1843, The sharif of 
Mecca Husayn bin Ali Haydar of Abu Arish was granted the title of Pasha and 
accepted to pay an annual tribute to the Ottomans. By basing upon this treaty, the 
Ottomans led the Sharif Husayn to control Yemen in the name of the Ottomans. 
However, his rule was not popular and the Imam of San’a did not accept his 
authority. Until 1847 neither the imam nor the sharif was willing to undertake a 
military expedition against each other. In 1848, this situation came to an end by the 
Imam’s push into Tihama.186 However, neither side succeeded in defeating the other, 
which contributed to the chaos within Yemen. 
In 1848, another candidate to the Imamate, al-Mansur Hashim, had announced 
himself as Imam in Sa’dah.187 Fearing British encroachments and expansion towards 
the north, in 1849, when the political turmoil, tribal instability, and sectarian 
struggles between the Zaydis, Shafiis, and Ismailis came to the apex, the Ottomans 
decided for a direct involvement in the Yemeni affairs.188  
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The adjunct of the sharif of Mecca, Kıbrıslı Tevfik Pasha presented a report 
(layiha) to the Sublime Porte (Bab-ı Âlî) targeted to appeal to Sultan Abdülmecid. 
Eventually, the imperial authorities decided to control Yemen by undertaking an 
occupation. This task was assigned to the Sharif and Kıbrıslı Tevfik Pasha. They 
started their expedition from Jeddah and arrived on 17 Cemazziyilahir 1265 (May, 
10, 1849) to Hodeida.189 The Imam Muhammed Yahya came to Hodeida to invite 
the Ottomans for the invasion of San’a. Consequently, Muhammed Yahya and the 
Ottomans signed a treaty which ensured the symbiotic relationship for the post-
invasion period. The principal points of the treaty were as follows: the governance 
of the country would be under the jurisdiction of Imam, but as a vassal to the Porte; 
the revenues of the country would be equally divided; a thousand regular Turkish 
troops would be garrisoned in San’a.190 Eventually, the Ottoman venture to invade 
San’a ended with a complete failure due to the resentment of San’a inhabitants to the 
Imam.191 Still, this treaty shows that the Ottomans were ready to accept a vassal 
under the imperial suzerainty in the northern highlands, which, however, became 
undesirable after the opening of the Suez. 
 
6. The Paths toward the Ottoman Reoccupation of the Highlands and San’a  
 
After the reoccupation of the Yemeni western coast, the Ottomans attempted 
to reorganize the administrative divisions. Zabid became the center; and there were 
several sancaks, i.e. Hodeida, Mocha, Luhayya Abu Arish, each of them headed by 
a native kaymakam who was generally a head of a strong family. The reorganization 
of the administrative structure by granting the ranks to locally influential men aimed 
at controlling the country by pacifying the rival tribes and integrating the politically 
influential notables.192 Yet, as Ahmed Râşid notes, due to the remoteness of the 
vilayet to the imperial capital, Yemen could not be incorporated into imperial 
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control; and the Ottomans had to wait until the opening of the Suez Canal, which 
paved the way for an easy access of the Ottoman troops and governors, for the 
importance of the Arabian peninsula to became greater and thus for the crucial need 
to develop for effectively administering Yemen.193 The Ottoman authority remained 
nominal until the reoccupation of the Yemeni highlands. Especially, in the northern 
parts of the Tihama, or Asiri Tihama, from the first year of the reoccupation 
onwards, the Ottomans had to deal with the hostility and prolonged resistance of the 
Banu Mughyad tribes.194 
In fact, before the opening of the Suez Canal, the British invasion of the Perim 
Island in 1856 with the aim to prevent French ambitions raised doubts among the 
Ottoman imperial circles about the Empire’s political efficiency in the Red Sea, and 
its legitimacy over the Muslim population of the Arabian Peninsula. Provoked by 
the new imperial balance, the Ottomans hastened to set their flag over the Dahlac 
Islands as well as over the islands of Disseh, Adulis, Amphilla and Edd, which were 
either uninhabited or scarcely inhabited points along the coastline of Eritrea during 
the years 1861-62.195 By doing these symbolic acts, the Ottomans attempted to show 
their claim of sovereignty and their presence within the newly emerging imperialist 
competition in the Red Sea. 
As I mentioned before, while the opening of the Suez Channel shaped the 
prominence of the Red Sea for the imperial competition, it also shortened the 
distance for the Ottomans both in terms of immediate military dispatch as well as 
continuous imperial penetration into Yemen. In addition to that, the political, 
economic, and ecological turmoil in Yemen196 also paved the way for the Ottomans 
to establish an imperial rule and to build up the consent of most segments and 
classes of the Yemeni society, whose political and economic strength was attenuated 
during the previous years of turmoil. In this context, most segments of the society 
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perceived the Ottoman imperial rule as a chance to connect with a wider world, and 
to overcome the crisis.  
One of the main opportunities presented to the Ottomans in their endeavor to 
occupy and introduce imperial rule in Yemen was the lack of political unity in the 
whole region, but particularly in the northern highlands, i.e. the historical center of 
Zaydi Imams. As emphasized by Thomas Kuehn, by the late 1860s, two major 
power centers had emerged in the Yemeni highlands. The Sharaf al-Din family 
consolidated their authority in the northwest of San’a and set up themselves as the 
amirs of Kawkaban. Secondly, under the leadership of the Da’i, members of local 
Isma’ili community established an authority in the rich coffee growing region of 
Jabal Harraz in the central highlands. However, a large number of smaller lords also 
benefited from the disintegration of the Qasimi state.197  
Rivalries between different claims to the Imamate continued during the 
nineteenth century, which forestalled any political unity. As stated by Caesar Farah 
these rivalries became more complex since the disturbances continued among the 
Zaydi imams as well as between them and their deputies vis-à-vis the ulema of 
Yemen.198  
While the power vacuum in Yemen enabled the Ottomans to establish an 
imperial rule, and prevented a united resistance to the Ottoman invasion, economic 
and ecological crisis led the Ottomans to exploit the consent of the lower and 
merchant classes for their imperial cause. In this sense, it would not be wrong to say 
that the political alliance ensuring the reoccupation consisted of Ottoman imperial 
commanders and San’a merchants, who also played a critical role to pacify the lower 
classes by presenting the Ottoman imperial presence as a potentiality to improve the 
ruined state of economy.199  
Factors such as the decrease in the coffee trade, the loss of the trade revenues 
from Red Sea ports, from which highland rulers had extracted a great amount of 
income, and tribal attacks to the trade caravans deteriorated the wealth and 
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operations of the merchants, and hence they shifted to the Ottoman side.200 
Furthermore, the ruined state of the cities and their hinterlands also contributed to 
the emergence of a local support for the Ottoman presence. Epigrapher Joseph 
Halevy, who visited San’a in 1869, emphasizes the huge population decline, from 
200,000 down to 50,000 within twenty years (?), and the ruined buildings resulted 
from the tribal attacks.201 Both the population decline and the tribal attacks to the 
city originated from an ecological crisis, which destroyed agricultural production, 
and led to a famine. Indicated by Gavin, as for Aden as also for the whole Yemen, 
famine and disease were the main visitors of the ordinary life. Cholera, rinderpest, 
drought and locusts often struck Yemen.202 These ecological disasters led to 
significant political results. As noted by Isa Blumi, “starvation and mass migration 
became the theme of 1860s in the Yemen, where much of the population living in 
southern highland fled either to the coast or to Southern Yemen.”203 Especially those 
who remained in the highlands, found the solution in welcoming the Ottomans, or at 
least in not forming an opposition. Thus, the Ottoman imperial strategy to reoccupy 
the Yemeni highlands coincided with a very convenient conjuncture to manufacture 
the consent and maintain the support of the local population, particularly merchant 
classes.  
 
7. Ottoman Reoccupation of the Yemeni Highlands and San’a 
 
The Ottoman imperial elites pushed down their initial fear from the 
Muhammed ibn Aiz’s rebellion and decided to endeavor an imperial campaign to 
both subjugate Asiri rebellion and reoccupy the Yemeni highlands in order to set up 
an Ottoman imperial rule along the eastern shore of the Red Sea. Although he had 
been appointed as the kaymakam of Asir after the 1863 Rebellion, Muhammed ibn 
Aiz aimed to extend his area of influence towards the Yemeni coasts by attacking 
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the Ottoman garrisons and expel them.204 In response to that, and in accordance with 
the Grand Strategy of Âli and Huseyin Pashas, sixteen battalions of the Ottoman 
soldiers were assembled in Istanbul and assigned to the Commander-in-Chief 
Mehmed Redif Pasha, and Ahmed Muhtar Pasha. In 18 Ramazan 1287 (December, 
12, 1870), Ahmed Muhtar Pasha and his five battalions which had already been 
formed and gathered at the Selimiye barracks, moved from Istanbul to Hodeida. 
When the news came that Muhammed bin Aiz captured Hodeida three days after 
Ahmed Muhtar Pasha departed from Istanbul, seven battalions under the command 
of Redif Pasha were also sent to Hodeida. In addition to Ahmed Muhtar Pasha’s 
forces, the Hijaz commander Mirliva (Brigadier) Hasan Pasha also moved to 
Hodeida with a battalion and two hundred irregulars (başıbozuk). There were 
already two battalions existing in Hodeida; thereby Ahmed Muhtar Pasha had a total 
of eight battalions under his command before initiating the imperial campaign; and 
he chose Konfuda, a port town in southern Hijaz, as the center of the campaign. 
While preparing these battalions to the campaign, the Ottomans also provided the 
support of the sharif of Mecca, Şerif Abdullah, and the obedience of some tribes 
such as Ben-i Şeyb, Al Süleyman, Bil-Haris, Gavami, Bilkarn, Bilsemr Şamran, Al-
Haşimiye. Furthermore, 200 soldiers of Bişe, normally employed in Jeddah from 
Bişe tribes, were recruited for this campaign.205 On the other side the opposing force 
was made up entirely on mountaineers, who were armed with old matchlocks and 
had several cannon left by Mehmed Âli Pasha when he evacuated southern Arabia in 
1840.206 It was like a war between a modern regular army and a guerilla group. I 
wanted to give this picture to illustrate the difference between the Ottoman imperial 
army and the rebel forces; however I will not go into details of the military 
campaign.207 From the account of Ahmed Râşid, on 8 Nisan 1287 (April, 20 1871), 
Muhammed ibn Aiz and rebellious chiefs surrendered to the Ottoman forces, 
marking the final stage of the control of Asir. After securing control of Asir, the 
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Ottoman destination was San’a. However, before San’a, the Ottomans first subdued 
the Da’i Hasan bin İsmail, who had established a rule in Cebel-i Herrraz ten hours 
before arriving to San’a. Then, Ahmed Muhtar Pasha informed Istanbul on April 25, 
1872 that Sa’na was occupied.208 It might be worthy to focus on the strategies the 
Ottomans applied while crushing the Asiri rebellion and reoccupying the Yemeni 
highlands. This would give us the clues of the Ottoman imperial rule in the first 
decade after the occupation. 
In fact, both during the subjugation of the Asiri rebellion and the occupation of 
the Yemeni highlands, the Ottoman forces benefited from their military and 
technological superiority. Ottoman superior firepower made resistance, whose 
recruits had limited access to modern firearms at that date, useless.209 In this sense, it 
is worth to compare the first Ottoman occupation in the early sixteenth century, the 
second Ottoman occupation two centuries later, and the Nasserite suppression of the 
Egyptian revolutionary nationalists in the 1960s; as pointed by Serjeant, in all three 
cases, the success of the occupation initially based on possession of superior 
weapons and organization.210 
Although the Ottoman forces benefited from their technological and 
organizational superiority, the campaigns of both Asir and the Yemeni highlands 
were managed by making alliances with the local notables; and the ultimate success 
was in debt to how the Ottomans shaped the local politics. This was a significant 
factor since the Ottoman forces were alien to the geography and climate of the 
region. In this sense a long quotation from Vincent Steven would be noteworthy to 
cover the Ottoman imperial strategy, as he defines it as ‘Callwellian strategy’: 
“During the Yemeni campaign, Ahmed Muhtar Paşa sought to repeat the 
paradigm of successful conquest that had been formulated in Asir, which was 
based on three major components: firstly, the campaign was preceded by a 
period of careful planning with extensive acquisition of intelligence from local 
sources. This would involve an attempt to gain local allies in the area of 
operations, both for the intelligence they could provide and as a means of 
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subversion. Second, to employ a combination of speed, deception, surprise, and 
intimidation to achieve his objectives. As in the Asir campaign, the primary 
objectives were usually citadels or fortified towns which served as regional 
power centers. Thirdly, If stratagems and intimidation did not work, resort to 
pure force, to sieges and battles in which he would try to use his firepower to 
maximum advantage.”211 
Seeking local alliances was one of the fundamental strategies of the Empire, 
both for the military campaign and during the Ottoman rule. In order to mollify rival 
tribes, as well as their leaders, the Ottoman strategy was mainly based on 
establishing a patronage network between some of the notables and the Ottoman 
governors. The Ottomans applied a gift-giving policy and granted ranks to these 
notables to integrate them to the imperial authority. This policy was the prolongation 
of the ‘divide and rule policy’. By applying it, the Ottomans could have a chance to 
operate more efficiently. For instance, during the Asiri rebellion, in order to 
overwhelm the opposition of the Mughaydis, who opposed the Ottoman rule since 
the Ottoman reoccupation of Tihama in 1849, the Ottomans gained support from its 
rival tribe, the Rijal-al-Ma;212 this alliance made the Ottoman movement in the local 
territory easier and more efficient.  
The nature of these kinds of alliances was symbiotic, as both sides were in 
need of each other and benefited from the alliance. In the context of the rebellion of 
Muhammed ibn Aiz, especially tribes and the merchants were badly affected from 
Aiz’s militias’ raid of Tihama – since the rebels locked the routes, stopped the trade 
between Yemeni coast and highlands, and created a food shortage. This led to the 
creation of a coalition consisting of different groups supporting the Ottoman 
campaign to suppress ibn Aiz out of Tihama.213As Ahmed Muhtar Pasha himself 
points out, one of the key figures of the Asiri campaign was Şeyh Ömer, who 
persuaded a significant number of notables not to oppose the Ottoman forces and 
turned these notables and tribes into allies of Ottomans; they proved to be invaluable 
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especially in supplying transportation-camel procurement.214 In return to his aid, the 
Ottomans granted Şeyh Ömer a wage, and also appointed him to the meclis of 
Asir.215 By doing so, the Ottoman imperial governors attempted to ensure his loyalty 
and thus maintain the support for the establishment of imperial governance in the 
region. A document shows that the gratification of Seyyid Ali Harun, a notable and 
merchant of Hodeida, in response to his help in supplying military equipments 
during the occupation, led him to support the establishment of Ottoman imperial 
strategies in the following years. For the telegram line between Hodeida and San’a, 
he provided approximately five hundred poles; and in return, his trade facilities were 
supported by the imperial rulers.216 
The entering of the Ottomans to San’a reveals the Ottoman strategies of 
conciliation and integration of notables as it puts forth the local notables’ ambitions 
to benefit from the Empire. Before the occupation of San’a, the sheikh of San’a 
Muhsin Mu’ayyiz and notables like Hüseyin Çığman, came to Ahmed Muhtar Pasha 
to request freedom to exercise Zaydi rites within their community. In return they 
promised a peaceful entry of the Ottomans to the city, while trying to calm the Pasha 
about the previous violent incidents when Tevfik Pasha attempted to occupy the city 
in 1849.217 Ahmed Muhtar Pasha indicates the aim of the campaign as to establish an 
imperial rule which became essential after the opening of the Suez, rather than 
taking revenge for the old incidents.218 Indeed, he promised their liberty in religious 
matters.  
By establishing these alliances, the Ottomans found a secure operational base, 
which paved the way for further expansions towards the northern highlands and a 
chance to establish the capital of a new Yemen vilayeti.219 On the other side, by 
getting a promise from Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, the notables hoped to assuage the 
lower classes of San’a and make them familiar with the Ottoman occupation and 
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imperial authority. As asserted by Isa Blumi, “what exactly attracted locals to the 
Ottoman administration was not purely a result of the Ottomans’ ability to project 
power, conjure up sentiments of religious solidarity or offer more than the British in 
terms of stipends. Rather, the Ottoman state rewarded pliant locals seeking 
opportunities to circumvent trade networks dominated by established regional 
leaders. Not only did new trade possibilities arise with the arrival of Ottoman 
authorities – garrisons needed to be fed, roads protected, tax collected – but an 
alliance with the Ottoman administration demonstrated to many locals until then 
sitting on the sidelines or previously being subordinated by southern Yemen’s 
hierarchical society that they now could find new political and economic niches in 
the region.”220 In this aspect, both the Ottoman and Ottoman allied-notable 
discourses touched upon the same point that the introduction of the Ottoman 
imperial rule and its institutions would liberate the oppressed people, and trade and 
agriculture would increase the wealth of society, as wished by the Sultan, according 
to Ahmed Muhtar Pasha in his speech delivered in front of the people of San’a.221 
This alliance provided the occupation of San’a without a shot being fired. In order to 
guarantee the continuation of the loyalty and alliance, the Ottoman imperial 
governors granted lifelong wages to these notables and the Imam and appointed 
them to the meclis of San’a.222 
Conciliation of the local elites by granting wages and ranks was a significant 
part of the Ottoman integration strategy during the campaign, which was also the 
precursor of a strategy that the Ottomans would attempt to implement at a greater 
scale during their rule in Yemen. In some cases, after suppressing a rebellion, in 
order to guarantee the loyalty of the rebellious tribes, the Ottomans granted wages to 
the tribal leaders, too. For instance, after quelling a rebellion in Kawkaban, a kaza of 
San’a, the Ottomans granted a wage to the previous rebellious amir and allowed him 
to settle in San’a.223 In this case, the Ottomans also tried to break the ties of the amir 
with his tribe by placing him in San’a, where he would be under Ottoman 
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surveillance. However, this should not overshadow the violent methods the 
Ottomans used against the rebellious population, like killing or exiling both rebels 
and their ringleaders.224 In short, coercion against the rebellious segments of Yemen 
was accompanied with integrative strategies. 
After entering San’a, the Ottomans determined this city as the strategic capital 
to establish imperial rule and undertake further expansions in Yemen. Between April 
1872 and 1873, Ottoman governors dealt with a series of rebellions around San’a 
and attempted to integrate these rebellious kazas to the new Yemen vilayeti. It took a 
year for Ahmed Muhtar Pasha’s forces to reduce the rebellion of opponent tribes, to 
overthrow Sharaf al-Din of Kawkaban, and to suppress the al-Hadi tribe’s 
rebellion.225 All new suppressions, and the ensuing expansions of Ottoman rule were 
reported to the imperial capital as the attempt of reform (ıslahat), which indeed 
meant military incursion, pacification of the opponent tribal leaders and notables, 
and the beginning of tax collection.226 However, as Ahmed Râşid notes, the imperial 
campaign did not extend towards Sa’da, Ma’rib, Yam and Ben-i Mervan tribes.227 
  
8. Two Empires Face to Face: the British versus the Ottomans 
 
While suppressing the rebellious tribes in the hinterland of northern highlands 
was one aspect of expansion, the other aspect included Ottoman expansion toward 
the hinterland of Aden. The Ottoman reoccupation of Yemeni northern highlands 
actually meant a physical encounter with the British Empire as it was already settled 
in Aden since 1838. At first, the British welcomed the increased control of the 
Ottomans in the northern highlands, perceiving that it would be easier to deal with a 
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‘quasi civilized’ power rather than with unstable tribal or religious leaders.228 
However for the British there was an agreed reality that it was not the local 
dynamics which determined the relations of the Ottomans with the hinterland tribes, 
but the complexity of European diplomacy in which the Ottoman Empire was 
involved.229 Since the fluidity of tribal loyalty originating from the frontier character 
was the case, the British could find ways to maintain the loyalty of the hinterland 
tribes. However, in the case of the presence of another empire the task became more 
difficult. This was especially valid in the case of Ottoman attempts to expand their 
authority towards the south, which could create crisis between the two empires. 
However, such a crisis could not be solved easily since the game was not played 
merely between two empires. The local population and the tribal leaders were also 
actors since the encounter between the two empires paved the way for the locals to 
shift their loyalties and to determine the terms of the alliances. As claimed by Isa 
Blumi, the face-to-face imperial relationship was transformed in such a way that 
local figures, often as lowly as a village elder, could incite a diplomatic uproar.230 
The fear of tribes shifting their alliances turned into a major concern for the 
Ottomans. 
The encounter became much more real when the Ottomans attempted to 
expand their rule towards the south to the area of those tribes which already had 
tributary relations with the Aden Residency. Ahmed Muhtar Pasha states that the 
Ottomans sought to expand their authority towards Aden, however the loyalty of the 
sultan of Lahej to the British authorities and the British reluctance to change their 
relation with the hinterland resulted in the Ottoman withdrawal from their 
ambition.231 However, the story was actually not as straightforward as Ahmed 
Muhtar Pasha presented in his memoir. In 1872, on the western borders of Lahej the 
Ottomans set up their authority via the alliance with the Zaydi Dhu Muhammed 
tribe, an old enemy of the Abdali Sultan of Lahej; then, the Ottoman troops centered 
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in Taizz, occupied the Abdali sultan’s former Shafi allies in the Hajariya, and made 
a move to the borders of Subayhi zone. In October 1872, Ahmed Muhtar Pasha sent 
summons to the hinterland tribes to accept Ottoman suzerainty, and received a 
rejection from the Abdali while the Hawshabis accepted.232 Especially those who 
had suffered under the weight of those rivals who had earlier British patronage, 
showed an ardent support for the Ottoman invitation.233  
These expansionist attempts of the Ottoman Empire were met with anxiety and 
frustration on the British side. Now, the hinterland tribes acquired the opportunity to 
play the Ottoman card against the British. Regarding the turmoil, the Governor 
General of India, Lord Northbrook, first advised in February 1873 that a British 
protectorate should be established over ‘the nine coastal tribes’.234 In May 1873, the 
British Government announced its demand that the Ottomans respect the 
independence of the Abdali, Fadli, Awlawi, Yafi, Hawshabi, Amiri, Aqrabi, and 
Subayhi tribes.235 As follows, Ahmed Muhtar Pasha continued his expansionist 
policy. The Amir of Dhala’s submission to the Ottomans as an Ottoman official and 
Alawi sheik’s acceptance of Ottoman suzerainty, and more seriously, the sending of 
Ottoman troops on the behalf of the brother of the Lahej Sultan further provoked the 
British to take serious measures to maintain the stability of the hinterland on behalf 
of the Aden Residency. At the end of October, Brigadier-General Schneider sent 
troops to Lahej to protect the rights of the Sultan; and finally, in December 1873, 
Ottoman forces were forced to evacuate Abdali, Hawshabi, and Alawi territories.236 
In fact, this was the end of Ahmed Muhtar Pasha’s venture to penetrate into the 
Aden’s hinterland. This tension of 1872-73 led the British to seek for more formal 
relations with its hinterland rather than continuing with a tributary system in order to 
defend Aden against the Ottoman ambitions. Although there was no attempt at that 
time to delineate formal borders, the British established Aden as a protectorate with 
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its hinterland.237 The actual memory of this tension between the two empires left 
great mutual suspicion. The Ottoman governors always kept in mind the presence of 
Aden Protectorate in their south and tried to strengthen the loyalty of the frontier 
tribes and remained alarmed against British ambitions.238 
 
9. Searching for Tranquility in the Province 
 
After the occupation of San’a and the northern highlands of Yemen, the 
Ottomans attempted to establish an imperial rule and focused on the formation of 
San’a as a strategic capital. In the minds of the Ottoman imperial governors, the 
formation of a secure capital and a strong Ottoman administration would ensure the 
control of Yemen and its population; hence maintain the engagement of the Empire 
in the imperial competition in the Red Sea. Thus the Ottoman rule could be defined 
as a ‘security regime’ that perceived the state of tranquility as the initial base of the 
reforms. By establishing a security regime, the Ottoman ruling elites hoped to 
defend the Arabian Peninsula against the encroachments of other imperialist powers, 
particularly the British. With this mindset, the first target of the governors was to 
maintain tranquility in the region which would come along with a strong military 
presence as well as by controlling the population via both reforms and surveillance 
mechanisms.  
One of the first enterprises of the Ottomans was to establish a branch of the 
imperial army in the region which would secure peace within the vilayet and its 
hinterland, and also act as a defense force in the Red Sea. In 1873, the Seventh 
Imperial Army was established by gathering the former soldiers of the battalions 
located in Yemen, Mecca, and Medina.239 The establishment of a new branch of the 
imperial army in Yemen meant also urban renewal of San’a and the introduction of 
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the Ottoman architecture to the urban scene. To provide a physical infrastructure for 
the employment of imperial recruits, the Ottomans immediately constructed 
barracks, arsenal buildings, and a military hospital.240 Furthermore, for the 
surveillance of the society in order to maintain tranquility, and for prompt responses 
to incidents that could disturb peace, patrol stations were constructed at various 
points of the city. The construction projects were not limited to the military and 
security buildings; also various civic buildings like hamams and coffee houses were 
constructed and rented to merchants to run.241 As a whole, these new construction 
projects had certain impact upon the urban scene of the city which can be 
understood as a part of the Ottomanization project. Furthermore, these projects 
implied to the population that the Ottomans intended for a permanent presence in 
Yemen. In this sense Thomas Kuehn’s comparison between the years 1871-73 and 
1849 is worth to emphasize, whereby the years 1871-73 featured the arrival of a new 
order.242 
The main operations of the Ottoman ruling administration in Yemen in the 
first decade were to alleviate the resistance of the opposing tribes, integrate them to 
the Ottoman system and introduce the Ottoman institutions. However, the tactics 
were changing in accordance to the power balance as well as the vision of the valis. 
Though coercive and conciliatory tactics to establish an imperial rule went hand in 
hand, sometimes one of them was more dominant. Yet, looking retrospectively, the 
first two decades of the Ottoman rule was realized in a relatively tranquil 
atmosphere in comparison to the last two decades in which the Ottomans were faced 
with major rebellions. During the former period, there were no united rebellions 
against the Ottoman rule, although small-scale local uprisings always took place. 
Yet the Zaydi rebellions in the first period of Ottoman rule in the sixteenth century, 
leading to the evacuation of the Ottomans in 1636, as well as the San’a resistance of 
1849 were always alive in the memories of the Ottoman governors who served in 
Yemen. Thus, the Ottoman governors always treated rebellions, even the small ones, 
with a great preoccupation; henceforth they mobilized provincial military forces at 
any incident, while employing at the same time conciliatory tactics.  
                                                
240 Ahmed Râşid, Tarih-i Yemen, vol.2, 244. 
241 Ibid, 245. 
242 Thomas Kuehn, Empire, 6. 
76 
 
Starting in the late 1880s, the Zaydi resistance turned into the most significant 
challenge to Ottoman rule in Yemen. Especially, the Zaydi Imam’s and his 
supporter’s rejection of the sultan’s claim to the caliphate was a serious challenge to 
a critical element of Ottoman dynastic legitimacy.243 More importantly, what made 
the Zaydi opposition a real challenge to the Ottoman rule was their ability to 
establish a unified and organized opposition. Their own ancient institutions and 
ideological claims paved the way for channelling the discontent among the 
population into an organized political opposition against the Ottoman authority. 
Furthermore, the call for ‘jihad’ against the ‘corrupt’ Ottoman regime led to the 
population's coalescence for universal goals instead of particularist acting within the 
scope of tribal competition.244 This political unity was a nightmare for the Ottoman 
ruling administration in Yemen. While comparing the Shafii uprisings in Tihama 
and the rebellions in Zaydi northern highlands, Rüştü Pasha, who was a brigadier, 
served in Yemen between 1905 and 1909, focuses on the inability of Tihama tribes 
to establish an organized rebellion as opposed to the Zaydi unity in the northern 
highlands.245 However, Ottoman governors in their first two decades of office did 
not feel Rüştü Pasha’s fear, since they did not face any large scale and organized 
opposition. 
As Robin Bidwell points, during the first twenty years after the occupation of 
San’a, the Imam of Zaydis manifested himself as “a man of piety rather than of 
politics”; and the population, exhausted from previous ecological, economic and 
political crisis, remained quiet.246 It seems that the propaganda of introduction of the 
Ottoman rule by the merchants, notables and Ottoman governors had met with 
public support, at least did not meet with a great objection. This is also related with 
the Ottoman military performance during the occupation of the northern highlands. 
Since the Ottomans acted with an imperial army which was superior in terms of its 
technology and organization, the tribes and population in general felt themselves 
                                                
243 Thomas Kuehn, Empire, 8. 
244 Vincent Wilhite, Guerilla War, 33.  For the call for jihad by the Zaydi imams and 
their propaganda, see.  İhsan Süreyya Sırma, Osmanlı Devleti’nin Yıkılışında Yemen 
İsyanları, (İstanbul: Düşünce Yayınları, 1980), 139-147. 
245 Rüştü Paşa, Ah O Yemendir, Yemen Hatıraları, ed. Faruk Yılmaz, (İstanbul: İz 
Yayıncılık, 2013), 60. 
246 Robin Bidwell, The Two Yemens, 54. 
77 
 
weaker than the Empire’s forces; and the possibilities to own modern arms were 
limited for the population in comparison to the final two decades of the Ottoman 
rule, which coincided with an increase in arms smuggle in the Red Sea. As observed 
by Burry, “The relations between governors and governed in Yemen have 
undergone a radical change during the last decade or two, owing to Turkey’s laxity 
or inability to check the surreptitious imports of arms. This covert traffic has 
gradually undermined the pillars of Ottoman rule. Now the population is as well 
armed as the forces of the government, far more numerous, and, on their own 
ground, more formidable, man for man.”247 And the imports of arms by the tribal 
population became one of the main concerns of the Ottoman governors in the 1890s 
and 1900s.248 Thus the weakness of military power of the tribes and opposition 
forces, as well as the state of exhaustion of the population in the 1870s prevented the 
rise of an Imam as a unifying figure, as these conditions paved the way for the 
Ottomans to operate in the more tranquil province.  
In the absence of large-scale organized rebellions, the first Ottoman governors 
dealt mainly with small-scale, local tribal incidents. Especially, the Arhab and 
Hashid tribes in the northern countryside were stubborn in refusing to acknowledge 
the Ottoman imperial rule. However, the reason behind these rebellions should not 
be understood as a basic anti-Ottomanism or sectarian anti-Sunni attitudes. The 
Ottoman occupation meant ensuing bureaucratic intervention to their lands, attempts 
to tax them; and ecological reasons like famines and droughts had provoked them to 
engage into opposition.249 
Although the Ottomans surrounded and established controll over Kewkaban, 
after a long resistance in 1873, one of the tribal leaders in Kewkaban, Al-
Mutawakkil Muhsin retreated to the unoccupied parts of Northern highlands to 
organize further resistance against the Ottomans and recruited supporters from those 
two tribes. The struggle of al-Mutawakkil Muhsin continued through the 1870s and 
took the form of prolonged armed confrontations between these tribes and the 
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Ottomans.250 Especially during the tenures of Ahmed Eyüp Pasha and Mustafa Asım 
Pasha, the Arhab and Hashid tribes attempted to assault the Ottoman forces and 
army arsenals and tried to forestall further Ottoman expansions towards the north.251 
Beyond the military response the Ottomans also applied the policy of divide and 
rule. During the governorship of Mustafa Paşa, on the one hand, he exiled eighteen 
influential sheiks of these tribes, including Imam Hamid-el-Din who would become 
Imam in 1879 after being released by Ismail Hakkı Pasha, to Hodeida. On the other 
hand, Mustafa Pasha appointed some sheiks to services in the Ottoman 
administration, and attempted to divide rebellious forces by employing the men from 
these tribes in gendarmerie forces.252  
Although there was no great rebellion the Ottomans faced until 1891, as I 
mentioned, the memory of the old rebellions was strongly alive in the minds of the 
Ottoman governors; and the prolonged war with the Arhab and Hashid tribes 
continued to kept his memory alive . Thus, in order to defend the possession of the 
Arabian Peninsula in the rising imperial competition, the Ottoman imperial 
administration and its representatives in Yemen gave priority to maintaining peace 
in the region, particularly in San’a and its hinterland. The task was the 
Ottomanization of the province and its population. In the minds of the Ottoman 
governors, the Ottomanization of the province translated to the integration of the 
local elites, notables and power groups to the imperial system and the introduction 
of imperial institutions. As I mentioned before, coercive means against the 
rebellious groups were accompanied by politics of integration. For the Ottomans, if 
the tribal leaders – as well as the population at large – could be persuaded to accept 
the Ottoman system, peace within Yemen would be maintained. In order to integrate 
– i.e. Ottomanize – the provincial local leaders and the population in general to the 
Ottoman system, the Ottomans strived to both win the hearts of the notables and 
harmonize the Ottoman institutions with the local customs of the population.  
As I discussed before, regarding the Ottoman methods of dealing with the 
rebellions, one of the main tools was gift-giving policy in seeking to maintain the 
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loyalty of the local notables. In the minds of the Ottoman ruling elites, “the 
expenditure for the gifts to the sheikhs would be profitable in the long term since it 
would ensure the ıslahat (reform).”253 This is important in the sense that the 
Ottomans sought the loyalty of the notables and their integration to the Ottoman 
system in order to maintain the ıslahat in the province. They were aware that 
without the consent and the support of the local leaders, the ıslahat could be neither 
implemented nor maintained. The integration policy was accompanied with the 
tested Ottoman policy of pitting loyal tribes against the other ones. It was a 
patronage system, but in essence a part of a divide and rule policy; some groups 
were excluded from it. Beyond the gifts and the administrative ranks in the sancaks 
or kazas, the collection of taxes became the main area of the struggle between the 
Ottoman provincial government and the local notables, as it was the bedrock of the 
patronage system. The Ottomans used the re-distribution of the duty of tax 
collection as a prominent element to integrate the local notables to the Ottoman 
system, hence ensuring their loyalties while stripping the stubborn local leaders of 
their privileges. As indicated by Thomas Kuehn, the most prominent local rulers lost 
their tax collection privileges while less important leaders and allies of the Ottoman 
government were allowed to continue as tax collectors of the Ottomans.254 
The Ottomans had achieved some success in terms of creating loyal local 
elites at some point; however, the problem was how to introduce Ottoman 
administrative, military and judicial institutions. This task was much harder since 
the – particularly – highland Zaydi majority already had their own judicial and 
educational institutions, as well as distinct governing practices. Especially, the 
Qasimi state system had consolidated these institutions after the fall of first Ottoman 
rule throughout two centuries. It was a rather difficult task to substitute Tanzimat 
institutions, like conscription, nizamiye courts, centralized tax collection, with the 
incompatible institutions of the Zaydi majority. In addition to this peculiar 
circumstance, the frontier character of the province – as I discussed in the first 
chapter – made the governors seek for possible institutions and methods, which 
would be acknowledged by the locals and maintain their loyalty rather than force 
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them to accept the reforms and institutions of the Tanzimat. The possibility of the 
shifting in loyalties to other imperial powers – particularly conditioned by the 
presence of the Aden Residency – had always alerted the Ottoman governors. In 
short, it was a tug-o-war between the locals and Ottoman imperial governors on how 
to shape the local politics. Eventually, the unwillingness and resistance of the local 
population led the Ottoman governors not to apply the Tanzimat policies in the 
province. Consequently, for instance, the Ottomans did not undertake a detailed 
census, as the administration was unable to reach extensively into the around 6,000 
villages.255 Furthermore, the Yemeni young men could not be conscripted while the 
population did not prefer to apply to nizamiye courts.256 According to Thomas 
Kuehn, the governor general Mustafa Asim Pasha, who was appointed in 1875, 
realized in an early date that the Ottoman rule could not be established with the 
same institutions as was established in the provinces of Ottoman Europe, Anatolia, 
or Ottoman Syria.257 It shows that the Ottoman governors were aware of the need to 
develop another path of politics. Since the main task was to maintain tranquility by 
winning the hearts of the people, the application of different governing methods 
accustomed to the local population can be explained with the imperial ambitions of 
the Ottomans to involve the local population to the imperial project for the defense 
of the Arabian Peninsula. This will lead us to a debate on colonialism. 
 
10. Was Yemen a Müstemleke? 
 
Thomas Kuehn, in his book Politics of Difference, discusses the Ottoman rule 
in Yemen with the eponymous concept, which signifies the Ottomans' developing 
governing strategies that were different from the policies pertaining to the heartlands 
of the Empire. He defines the rule in Yemen as colonial Ottomanism, and he adds 
that this form of governance, especially in the 1870s to the late 1880s, was shaped 
                                                
255 William Ochsenwald, “The Impact of Ottoman Rule on Yemen, 1849-1914”, in 
Religion, Economy, and State in Ottoman-Arab History, ed. William Ochsenwald, 
(İstanbul: The Isis Press, 1998), 154. 
256  I will particularly discuss the conscription and judicial issue in the third chapter. 
257 Thomas Kuehn, Empire, 16. 
81 
 
by the Ottoman perceptions of the Yemeni population as “backward” and 
“uncivilized.258 However, as I discussed in the first chapter, these words are the 
reflection of the Ottoman inquietude from the failure in introducing the Ottoman 
institutions, and the acknowledgment of the resistance of the frontier people against 
them, rather than being the basis of a colonial framework that distinguishes the 
population in the colonies from the metropolitan citizens and aims to exclude the 
colonized people from the legal structure of the metropolis. Since all the relations of 
domination have been shaped by the struggle between the governing party and the 
governed people, they produce their own discourse; the discourse used by the 
Ottoman governors displays the weakness of the Ottoman control over the 
population. For instance, after stating the lack of census and property records in 
Hodeida, Rüştü Pasha says that “although the administrative organization of the 
sancak was structured like the administrative organization of Izmit, the population 
could not be resembled to the population of Izmit.”259 He means that the Ottomans 
failed to maintain the submission of the local population to the Ottoman authority 
and its institutions as successfully as in the heartlands of the Empire. The adjectives 
used for the local population in this sense tell us about the Ottoman governors’ 
diagnosis about the malady of disobedience among the local population. It was not 
accidental that Muhammed Hilal Efendi, who served in 1879, at a time of relative 
tranquility, states that the Yemeni people have propitious customs, but only since he 
happened to find the population obedient.260  
In fact, the fear of the Sublime Porte was to lose the right of possession of 
Yemen, and its domination over the Arabian Peninsula in the context of the new 
imperialism. That is why, for instance, Siverekli Nureddin Bey, who was a deputy of 
Siverek,called the imperial center to allocate more financial resources to Yemen by 
warning with the possible consequence of losing the Arabian Peninsula. But more 
interestingly, in order to bolster his argument, he gave the example that the British 
spent 200 million liras to pacify the Transvaal Rebellion even though the loss of 
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Transvaal would not have an impact in terms of the British possession of India.261 It 
was the imperial ambition to control the population even with political strategies 
which would be understood as a significant derivation from the Tanzimat. In effect, 
when the Ottoman governors realized the resistance of the local population to the 
imperial institutions and practices –like conscription – they sought any possible 
methods of governance which would maintain the obedience of the local population, 
rather than insisting on imposing upon Yemen administrative agendas of Istanbul. 
Yet the ultimate target remained to gradually accustom the local population to 
Ottoman institutions of the Tanzimat.262 But this goal was constantly postponed. 
Since the Red Sea became a terrain of colonial practices, they impacted the 
Ottoman governors in their search for ways of ruling Yemen.263 For example, in his 
conversation with Ahmed Feyzi Pasha, who was a governor of Yemen at that time, 
regarding the rebellion of 1891, Ahmed Feyzi asks Walter Harris what the British 
should do in India under similar circumstances.264 And many Ottomans, in their 
reports, stated their strong interest as to how colonies like Sudan, Aden, Sevakin 
were ruled.265 It is not a coincidence that this curiosity was concentrated when the 
Ottomans realized that the ultimate goal of introducing Ottoman institutions seemed 
to be impossible in the context of permanent rebellions in the Northern highlands, 
which challenged the Ottoman rule starting from 1891.  
This context triggered the debate on how to rule Yemen; and now 
transforming Yemen into a ‘müstemleke’ (colony) became a possibility for some. 
Cemaleddin ibn ül-Hatib was one among those who defended the idea to organize 
the Yemen administration as a müstemleke. He dedicated his book, Yemen’e 
İsticlab-ı Nazar-ı Dikkat, to this debate. Ibn ül-Hatib opens a debate about how to 
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rule Yemen in his book, whether like a regular province (vilayet-i mümtaza) or like a 
colony (müstemleke). For him, Yemen should be governed in the form of 
müstemleke but also according to local customs.266 Lütfi Bey as well, who was a 
deputy of Dersim during the Second Constitutional Era, was criticizing the rule of 
every province of the Empire with one uniform law, and proposing instead to 
administer Yemen by appointing locals to decide on how they want to be ruled. And 
he offered, in fact, a draft law to establish a local council (meclis) comprised from 
the local notables, who would decide on laws, regulations, and practices for 
Yemen.267 Those two succinct examples reveal that the müstemleke form of 
administration was perceived as a way to persuade the local Yemenis to remain in 
the realm of the Empire. Furthermore, instead of framing a colonial difference, these 
proposals aimed at the integration of the Yemenis to the Empire. Thus, as in policies 
being recommended by these explicit defenses of the müstemleke form of 
administration in the 1910s, the Ottomans’ abandonment of the judicial, military, 
financial, and political reforms of the Tanzimat in the 1870s and 1880s appear to be 
reflections of the power relations in the local scale in which the Ottomans were 
unable to impose imperial institutions easily. In this context, Ottoman imperial 
governors sought those governing strategies which were both attuned to the local 
demands and targeted the integration of the frontier people to the imperial politics, 
which in some cases resembled colonial governing methods, in order to keep the 
possession of the land in the frontier. In the next chapter, from this perspective I will 
discuss the tenure of Ismail Hakkı Paşa (1879-82) and his attempts to build a native 
army. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE TENURE OF ISMAIL HAKKI PASHA AND THE ASAKİR-İ 
HAMİDİYE 
 
 
 
 
1. The Report of Ismail Hakkı Pasha 
 
Before his appointment to the office of governorship in Yemen Vilayeti, İsmail 
Hakkı Pasha wrote a layiha (report) dated December 14, 1879 to the Palace 
describing the sources of the problems in the vilayet according to his view.268 This 
layiha can be seen as a typical one, in that it reflects the struggles among the 
bureaucrats of the vilayet. Furthermore it is possible to come up with the hypothesis 
that Ismail Hakkı sought to oust the former vali, Mustafa Asım Pasha, and substitute 
him in this office. This assumption is highly probable, since the layiha made a 
significant impact on the Ottoman ruling cadres in the Palace, and eventually led to 
the appointment of Ismail Hakkı as the governor general of Yemen. That said, I 
would rather suggest to read this layiha to discern the concerns of Ismail Hakkı 
Pasha and the key features of his regime between 1879 and 1882. 
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Ismail Hakkı Pasha finds the reasons of the anti-Ottoman opposition and 
rebellion in the province in the malpractices and corrupt administration of Ottoman 
governors, and sees them originating from an overall oppressive regime. According 
to him, although the Yemeni population has a tendency to be loyal to the Sultan, 
insufferable treatment (muamele-i takatfersadan) by the Ottoman officials provoked 
the population to rise up against the Empire. Yet what became a nightmare for 
Ismail Hakkı Pasha was the population’s potential to switch their loyalty for the 
Aden Residency. İsmail Hakkı Pasha explicitly states that the extra taxes imposed 
on the merchants could result in their shift towards the British in the south. 
Another criticism to Mustafa Asım Pasha’s governance was about his attitude 
towards the Yemeni notables. Specifically, Ismail Hakkı Pasha strongly criticized 
the imprisonment of eighteen notables in Hodeida. According to him, some of those 
notables were among the ones who originally had urged Ahmed Muhtar Pasha to 
invade San’a; hence these were people who supported the Ottomans' effort to 
establish imperial authority in the vilayet. In response, former governors had 
appointed those notables to certain positions and bestowed them with significant 
medals. Furthermore, what was more striking for İsmail Hakkı Pasha was their 
impact over the people of Yemen, and in particular on their collective memory. 
Ismail Hakkı Pasha believed that the Ottoman authority required the integration of 
these notables rather than their exclusion from the imperial system. In fact, these 
ideas constituted the keystone of İsmail Hakkı Pasha’s governance. The release of 
these notables was one of his first actions during his tenure.269 In doing so, as well as 
by his release of previously imprisoned ulema, Ismail Hakkı Pasha aimed to bridge 
the gap between the Yemenis and their new governor.270 In general, such acts 
formed a part of Ismail Hakkı’s ‘integrationist’ policies in order to consolidate the 
Ottoman authority in Yemen.  
Finally, in the layiha İsmail Hakkı Pasha emphasizes the need for a major 
military force to provide order for the vilayet. However, he states that bringing 
soldiers from other parts of the Empire to Yemen as part of the imperial army would 
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be rather expensive. Additionally, the inconvenient climate of Yemen for these 
soldiers would further weaken the efficiency of the army which in turn would 
become an ineffective financial burden for the Ottoman authority. During his tenure, 
İsmail Hakkı Pasha always underlined this concern; and it became one of the 
fundamental reasons for the Pasha to initiate the formation of a native army.  
When the Ottoman ruling cadres read this report, they were deeply surprised 
about the apparent geopolitical importance of the province. A document sent to the 
Sultan in regard to İsmail Hakkı Pasha’s layiha positioned Yemen as a strategically 
important place due to its contiguity to the Hijaz. Thus the document emphasized the 
significance of the security of Yemen. Yet, what mostly agitated the Ottoman 
bureaucrats was Ismail Hakkı Pasha’s warning on the possibility of the people to 
shift their loyalty to the British Aden Residence.271 Especially, those parts in the 
layiha emphasizing the precarious position of the Empire vis-a-vis the British due to 
the fluidity of the obedience of the population alarmed the Ottoman ruling cadres in 
the Palace. The document worryingly indicated the presence of the British as a 
problem in that they attempted to impress the Yemeni population through practicing 
a just treatment in the frontiers. In fact, this fear and concern was common in the 
reports informing the circumstances in Yemen. Muhammed Hilal Efendi also 
warned the capital in his layiha that the British presence in Aden led to the fluidity 
of loyalty among the population. He gave the example of the Katabe kazası (district) 
whose population started to withhold taxes by playing the British card.272 This fear 
convinced the Palace to dismiss Mustafa Asım Paşa from the Yemen governorate. 
The document states that “since the inclinations of the people attracted the attention 
of the imperial government, a skilled and talented person (erbab-ı dirayet ve 
istidaddan) should be appointed to Yemen” as a governor general of the province; 
and called the Meclis-i Vükela to make a decision as immediately as possible.  
As a result, Ismail Hakkı Pasha had made a major impact on the Palace with 
his layiha; and he was appointed as the new vali of Yemen in December 14, 1879 
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with the mission to change the present conditions in the region and engender the 
required reforms for the vilayet.273  
 
2. Ismail Hakkı Pasha’s Tenure, 1879-1882: Searching for Integrationist 
Policies 
 
In fact, Ismail Hakkı Pasha had first come to Yemen earlier, in June 20, 1874 
following the new military appointments for Yemen.274 During his service both in 
the Seventh Imperial Army and as the San’a mutassarıfı, he had always dealt with 
the issue of providing the security of San’a and its hinterland against rebellious 
forces, especially those from Erşad and Arhab tribes, and took part in military 
operations against those rebellious elements.275 Thus, when he became governor 
general, Ismail Hakkı Pasha gave priority to provide security and peace in the 
hinterland of San’a. There were different methods planned and used by Ismail Hakkı 
Pasha to achieve his goal.  
Firstly, Ismail Hakkı Pasha attempted to extend the Ottoman presence and 
authority to the hinterland of San’a, especially towards those rebellious cores, by 
setting Ottoman administrative institutions there. In this sense, he believed that a 
new administrative organization would gradually ensure the loyalty of potentially 
rebellious tribes. For instance, in order to “reconcile the population of Beni el-
Kadimi, Beni Avam, Arif Gaşim and Beni Edem tribes with the imperial 
government and to remove disputes”, the areas where those tribes lived were united 
and organized as a nahiye.276 At the same time, military operations always 
accompanied administrative reorganization with the aim to subjugate the rebellious 
forces in the hinterland. For example, he initiated a military campaign against the 
Havlan tribe; and when he succeeded in suppressing the rebellious forces, he 
collected the expenses of the operation from the leaders of the Havlan tribe as an 
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example to discourage other potential rebellious activity.277 In another example, 
upon the outbreak of a rebellion in the Sur Mountains north of San’a, Ismail Hakkı 
Pasha immediately sent battalions there to suppress the rebellion.278 Counter-
rebellious military operations ensured the vali's pledge to expand Ottoman imperial 
authority in the region. 
These were two – but not limited – examples of military operations in the 
hinterland of San’a initiated by İsmail Hakkı Pasha. However, Ismail Hakkı Pasha’s 
tenure coincided with only small-scale tribal rebellions which were sharing the 
character of the rebellions of the first two decades of Ottoman imperial rule in 
Yemen. Although İsmail Hakkı Pasha did not shy away from using superior military 
force against the rebels, it was the lack of organized united opposition that paved the 
way for him to consolidate Ottoman authority in the province. Within this context, 
as I noted above, Ismail Hakkı Pasha was able to initiate an integrationist policy. 
This policy may be explained in two ways. Firstly, he aimed to ally with the local 
notables to provide legitimacy for his authority both in the eyes of the local elites as 
well as to ordinary people. Secondly, İsmail Hakkı Pasha endeavored to establish an 
imperial rule which would tolerate traditional practices and customs of the Yemeni 
people. Yet, the ultimate aim was to win the loyalty of the population and made 
them acknowledge the imperial rule as well as familiarize them with imperial 
practices in the long run. In fact, this new flexible policy resulted from the weakness 
of the infrastructural power of the Ottoman state, and the refusal of the Yemeni 
population to accept Ottoman institutions. Thus, starting from the reign of Mustafa 
Asım Pasha onwards, Ottoman governors understood that they could not easily 
introduce the Tanzimat institutions to Yemen. According to Thomas Kuehn, while 
for Ahmed Muhtar Pasha in 1873 Ottoman administrative practices and institutions 
had been the model for governing the new province, towards the end of the decade 
Ismail Hakkı Pasha, as well as Mustafa Asım Pasha considered some practices of the 
British colonial rule as appropriate279 In this aspect, the tenure of Ismail Hakkı Pasha 
was an example par-excellence in searching for the institutions which would both 
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mobilize the population to participate, and at the same time instill an active loyalty 
to the Sultan and the Ottoman imperial authority. Especially in the context of the 
urgency to defend the province in the imperialist struggle, Ismail Hakkı Pasha was 
required to get the consent of the population and the support of the local elites. Thus, 
he purposefully did not force to implant Ottoman Tanzimat institutions and practices 
in the vilayet, which would engender a rebellion. In this sense, nizamiye courts and 
conscription were the most crucial Tanzimat institutions, rejected by the local 
population. Ismail Hakkı Pasha’s strategies in both the areas of law and military 
service speak volumes about the nature of his regime.  
Since the nizamiye courts had been perceived as inconvenient to the Sharia 
rule and became one of the sources of rebellion in Yemen, Ismail Hakkı Pasha 
certainly sought for a legal reform. For the Ottomans, the issue was far beyond the 
reality of the failure in setting up a modern law institution. It was not that most of 
the Yemeni population rejected to apply to nizamiye courts. The presence of 
nizamiye courts itself endangered the Caliph-Sultan image of Abdulhamid II, since 
the locals perceived the nizamiye courts as institutions which violated the Sharia. To 
forestall damage to Abdulhamid II’s image, Ismail Hakkı Pasha initiated a legal 
reform which would be in harmony with the customs and practices of the local 
population. Thus, in the provincial newspaper, The San’a gazetesi, dated July 6, 
1881, it was announced – with the title of the “Abolition of Court of Justices in 
Yemen” (Yemen mehakim-i adliyesinin lağvı) – that the Mahkeme-i İstinaf (“Court 
of Appeal”) and Mahkeme-i Bidayet (“Court of the First Instance”) were abolished 
as a response to the demands from the locals; and it stated that the organization of 
courts would be “harmonized with the requirements of the local necessities” (icabat-
i mahalliyeye tevfikan).280 Thomas Kuehn interprets this act as the first round of 
legal reforms in the province of Yemen, in which the Ottomans broadened the 
responsibilities of the sharia courts at the expense of the nizamiye tribunals; in most 
districts the staff of the sharia courts consisted of people from the local ulema.281 
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The other issue, Ismail Hakkı Pasha’s response to the inability of the Ottomans 
to conscript native men in Yemen as well as his initiative to build a native army will 
be discussed in the remaining part of this chapter.  
 
3. Later Debates on Organazing a Native Army 
 
In his article in The Mülkiye Mecmuası (“Journal on Administration”), 
published in 1909, Abdülgani Seni, the vilayet mektubcusu (“Chief Secretary of the 
Provincial Administration”) suggested to organize a native militia recruited from the 
tribal population of Yemen as a part of the grand reform project for Yemen. 
Abdulgani Seni reminded the reader about the experience of the Asakir-i Hamidiye 
(“Hamidian Soldiers”) organized by İsmail Hakkı Pasha; and stated that these 
soldiers served well in the past. By referring to the experience of the Asakir-i 
Hamidiye, he called for a re-organization of a native military force.282 In fact, this 
proposal was not limited to Abdülgani Seni, but rather the organization of a native 
army had already become a vital debate among the Ottoman ruling elites who dealt 
with the Yemeni issue. What made a ‘native army’ a part of reform agenda was the 
failure of the Ottoman imperial government in introducing Ottoman administrative, 
judicial, financial and military institutions, as well as the state of permanent 
rebellions organized by mainly Zaydi imams since the 1890s. Thus, starting in late 
1890s, the Palace expected reform proposals from the governors – sometimes it 
formed special reform committees (ıslahat heyeti) – in order to prevent the 
rebellions and reestablish Ottoman authority in the region. In this sense, organizing a 
native army/militia took a significant place among the reform proposals. 
Furthermore, as will be seen below, those who proposed to organize a native army 
always gave reference to the experience of Asakir-i Hamidiye of 1880-82 as an 
exemplary enterprise, as cited by Abdülgani Seni.  
Under the challenge of Zaydi rebellions, organizing a native army had been 
often proposed with the aim to drain the manpower available for Zaydi Imams. For 
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instance, by giving references to both the 16th century and to the reign of İsmail 
Hakkı Pasha, Rüştü Pasha asserted that competent governors had utilized the 
available manpower of the Imams by organizing an opponent force from his possible 
recruits. According to him, dividing Imam’s forces was an indispensable duty for the 
Ottomans to both disable the Imam’s power and build a good administration in the 
province.283 Siverekli Nureddin Bey was also an advocate of organizing a native 
army, and stated that “as was done in 1880, if we recruit ten thousand voluntary 
paid-men from the Yemenis, we would utilize those men, who otherwise would have 
been ordered by the Imam to assault us; and thus the power of the Imam would be 
impoverished.”284 Herein, both Rüştü Paşa and Siverekli Nureddin Bey perceived 
rebellious men as missionaries fighting just in order to receive a salary from the 
Imam. According to Rüştü Paşa, the Imam was recruiting landless peasants whose 
home towns were not suitable for agriculture.285 Nureddin Bey was also insisting 
with a same tone that those who could not satisfy their needs in their home towns 
were joining the Imam’s forces since the Imam collected taxes from the tribes with 
those same forces.286 Thus, both of them – but not limited to those two – believed 
that the manpower under the disposal of the Imam could be immediately turned to 
the Empire’s voluntary soldiers in the province, if the imperial government recruited 
them as paid local soldiers. 
As was the case in the 1870s and 80s, the Ottomans could not conscript 
Yemenis to the imperial army in the 1900s as well. Therefore, they looked for 
alternative methods to organize men as a military force. As I stated above, the 
experience of the Asakir-i Hamidiye inspired those authors of reform proposals in 
suggesting to organize a native army. Not just as an opposing force to the rebellious 
waves the Asakir-i Hamidiye’s being attuned to the customs of the Yemeni people 
also inspired the proponents. Since the imperial army seemed to be an ‘alien’ force 
for the Yemenis, the imperial governors suggested organizing military units which 
would be in harmony with the customs of the native people. In this sense, as I will 
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discuss below for the case of Asakir-i Hamidiye, the authors of reform proposals in 
the 1900s suggested to organize a local force whose voluntary recruits would wear 
their native uniforms rather than Ottoman imperial uniforms.287 In their minds it 
would be through this way that the recruits would not feel as if they were serving an 
alien force.  
This context was valid also for the 1880s. While not being able to recruit for 
conscription, Ismail Hakkı Pasha turned his attention to organizing a native army 
from the beginning. Although the Kavanin-i Umumiye-i Askeriye (“General 
Regulations Related to the Army”) required general conscription, the Ottomans 
could not introduce this measure in Yemen. However, since general peace and 
imperial defense were much more urgent for Ismail Hakkı Pasha to keep the Empire 
vital in the Red Sea region, he looked for possible ways to utilize local manpower 
for the Empire in Yemen. In this respect, the security of San’a and a general 
tranquility in its hinterland were the primary objectives for Ismail Hakkı Pasha; and 
he set forth his plan to organize a native army. 
 
4. The resistance of the Yemenis to Conscription 
 
The case of the Asakir-i Hamidiye will reveal us that Ottoman governors who 
were serving in the frontiers did pursue alternative paths for controlling the 
population. The frontier character of a province translated into a volatile loyalty 
toward the Ottoman State among the local population, which rendered political 
legitimation of the Empire in the region rather fragile. Thus, instead of enforcing the 
reform projects of the Tanzimat, the governors in such regions preferred to look for 
any possible way to integrate the local population for the imperial defense and to 
provide tranquility. In the case of Yemen conscription was a crucial issue which 
showed the limits of imperial authority in this frontier. Thus, Ismail Hakkı Pasha’s 
attempt to organize a native army signified that the Ottoman administration did 
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concede this limit; on the other hand he was still ambitious to integrate local 
population to the imperial defense. In other words, establishing this kind of a special 
military unit contradicted with the spirit of the Tanzimat which proposed a universal 
conscription system for the imperial army. However, as I discussed in the first 
chapter, this policy also reveals the peculiarity of Ottoman imperial strategies in the 
frontiers.  
As a response to the defeats against the Russian and Habsburg armies in the 
18th century, starting during the reign of Selim III with the Nizam-ı Cedit Army, the 
Ottomans attempted to modernize their military. However, most importantly with 
the establishment of the Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye (“Victorious Soldiers of 
Muhammed”) in the reign of Mahmud II, the Ottomans endeavored to institute a 
conscription system.288 Especially with the Tanzimat, military service started to be 
defined as a ‘citizenship duty’ for the entire Ottoman population.289 At the same 
time there were attempts to assimilate old militia forces within the imperial army. In 
other words the Tanzimat regime also strived to turn irregular forces into regular 
ones. For instance in the case of the Evlad-ı Fatihan (“Sons of the Conquerors”) in 
Rumelia, after certain attempts to turn them into regular soldiers, the Ottoman 
government abolished the Fatihan-forces altogether in 1845, since these Rumelian 
provinces would “enter the orbit of the Tanzimat”.290 In 1846, with the Kura 
Kanunu (“Law of Drawing Lots”), military service was defined as an obligation and 
responsibility for all of the Muslim subjects; and it was repeated in the 1871 Law 
which was prepared in accordance with the Kuvve-i Umumiye-i Askeriye 
Nizamnamesi (“Regulation of Armed Forces”) prepared by Huseyin Avni Pasha in 
August 1869. The first article of this law puts all the Muslim population in the 
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Ottoman lands under the obligation of military service.291 However, as in many 
cases of Tanzimat, there was a gap between the theory and practice in terms of the 
conscription. As stated by Zürcher, this new law was applied efficiently only in the 
heartlands of the Empire.292 In this sense, Yemen is a convenient example to show 
this discrepancy.  
After the conquest of San’a in 1872, in order to salute the occupation of this 
region and to state the strategic prominence of Yemen, Namık Kemal wrote an 
article at the İbret newspaper, which appeared on June, 20 1872. He underlined that 
this policy toward Yemen – the occupation – would have beneficial results for the 
Empire such as recruiting more than one hundred thousand men to the army. 
According to him, military service was limited to a few Muslim provinces in the 
Empire and this limitation reduced the necessary population pool for effective 
recruitment. Therefore, the occupation of Yemen would broaden the geographies of 
conscription since this region was inhabited by a Muslim population.293 However, 
contrary to Namık Kemal’s prediction, the Ottomans remained unable to introduce 
the conscription system to Yemen during the period of their presence. As claimed by 
Thomas Kuehn, local males of Yemen were excluded from compulsory military 
service because the imperial government feared that any enforcement of 
conscription service would result in serious opposition.294 The resistance of Yemenis 
to conscription resulted in the deployment of imperial army units serving in the 
province in which there were no Yemeni soldiers. Thus, the Ottomans were not 
unlike an occupying force in the eyes of the local population.295 Especially the 
military operations which were undertaken by the battalions of the Seventh Imperial 
Army against the rebellious forces strengthened this perception in the local minds.  
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5. Militia Forces in the Frontiers 
 
The gap between the theory and practice in terms of the conscription issue was 
not exclusive to Yemen. In the frontiers in general, the Ottomans could not enforce 
compulsory military service – at least it remained very limited – as its imperial 
authority was limited in the engagement of local people to the imperial institutions. 
Yet, there were several experiments where Ottoman imperial governors attempted to 
form native/local militia/battalions for particular missions originating from the 
specific contexts of the frontiers. In these examples, the Ottomans always aimed at 
applying a local hue for their imperial policy in the specific frontier provinces. The 
most familiar and most studied one are the Hamidiye Alayları (“The Hamidian 
Regiments”), which was formed in the Kurdistan region on the basis of mainly 
Kurdish tribes in 1891. With the strategic alliances with Shafi tribal leaders, the 
Ottomans organized a native force there to forestall the development of an Armenian 
revolutionary movement, to use it as a buffer force against the Russians and also for 
the civilizing mission, which meant in fact to render the local Kurdish tribal 
population obedient to the state.296 As another example worth mentioning, two 
battalions of militia soldiers were organized from the members of old timariot 
families in Bosnia. The Bosna İhtiyat Süvari Alayı was used as an assistant force to 
the imperial military units in their operations, especially against Montenegro.297 
Mithat Pasha also organized a militia force by recruiting men from the villages 
along the Danube to fight against the Bulgarian revolutionaries, who in turn received 
support from the Russians and Serbians.298 In Wadi Bisha in Asir, Ottomans used 
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the Bisha soldiers which were formed from freed slaves and blacks in the Hijaz. 
They were employed for guard duty along the caravan routes, especially those routes 
between Jidda, Mecca and Taif.299  
In fact, the Ottomans used to employ in the previous centuries local militias or 
mercenaries in the frontiers especially for the defense against incursions from 
imperial powers as well as against internal rebellions.300 In theory, this kind of 
irregular defense or security forces should have been eliminated or turned into 
regulars with the Tanzimat-era.301 However instead of pursuing top-down Tanzimat 
projects, Ottoman imperial governors found it more convenient to pursue ruling 
techniques within the contingent context of the frontiers, which was dependent on 
the relations with imperial powers, and the power relations between the local 
population and the Ottomans. In this juncture, establishing local militias became 
often much more practical for the Ottoman governors in different frontier regions 
and these took different forms. In this sense, the Asakir-i Hamidiye in Yemen was 
rather similar to its contemporary examples in terms of its specific mission to 
integrate local men for the security of San’a and its hinterland against rebellious 
forces, and for ensuring imperial defense. However, instead of having an ad hoc 
basis of operation and training, as I will discuss below, the Asakir-i Hamidiye was 
closer to modern armies with its training, organization and order as well as its aim to 
raise examples of loyal citizens. 
 
6. The Asakir-i Hamidiye, 1880-1882  
 
6.1. To Accustom the Natives to Ottoman Military Institutions 
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Since their reoccupation of Tihama, the Ottomans benefited from local 
mercenaries which had been recruited particularly from the Yam tribe in the north of 
Yemen on an ad hoc basis for specific campaigns.302 However, during the tenure of 
Ismail Hakkı Pasha, we see the formation of a rather different kind of locally 
recruited battalions. They were not recruited on ad hoc basis, but were projected as a 
part of imperial military forces, which would operate like a modern regular army. 
On April 11, 1880, four months after he was appointed to the office of governor 
general of Yemen, İsmail Hakkı Pasha informed the Palace that he organized a 
military unit recruited from the local people which would be employed in the 
province, and whose name was given in reference to the name of Sultan Abdulmaid 
II, i.e. Asakir-i Hamidiye. He states that, until that time (April, 1880) around one 
hundred men were recruited for this unit. 
Although we encounter several nizamnames prepared for different irregular 
units, which also includes the Hamidiye Alayları in Kurdistan indicating the 
conditions and roles of the tribal militias, we do not find a comparable kind of a 
nizamname for the Asakir-i Hamidiye.303 But from available documents we can 
discern that there were four main provisions which defined the conditions of the 
Asakir-i Hamidiye in Yemen. These were as follows: first, they would wear their 
local uniforms; second, they would be employed in San’a and were not to be sent 
outside of Yemen, third, they would have the freedom to quit the service, and 
finally, they would receive seven riyal per month, and the government could not 
delay the payments.304 At the first glance, these provisions tell us the peculiar 
position of the recruits of the Asakir-i Hamidiye vis-a-vis the conscripts of the 
imperial army for whom the military service was compulsory, and in most cases 
they were forced to comply with this obligation. Regular soldiers had to wear 
imperial uniforms; and they could be dispatched to serve in different continents with 
very little payment and under miserable conditions. These differences reveal İsmail 
Hakkı Pasha’s strong motivation to integrate the Yemeni men to an Ottoman 
military force.  
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In light of the previous failed attempts at conscription and the refusal of the 
population to serve for the Empire in its regular army, the vali endeavored to offer 
different conditions for the Yemenis.In the long term the vali aimed to make 
Yemenis share the military service (hidmet-i celile-i askeriyeden behredar 
edilmelerine mukaddeme teşvik olmak üzere), and make them encounter imperial 
military institutions and regulations.305 Thus, although these recruits were disbanded 
two years after their recruitment, the native army was constructed as a long term 
project to integrate the population to the modern military institution of the Empire as 
a way to engage them to the imperial defense for the holy motherland.306 In this 
sense it might be worth to treat Ismail Hakkı Pasha’s project as a part of 
integrationist Ottomanization strategy. He desired to Ottomanize the native 
population by introducing imperial institutions in locally-accepted forms. Mehmet 
Hacısalihoğlu argues that in order to integrate the Kurdish and Arab tribes to the 
center, the Ottomans enabled different strategies to integrate them to the army.307 In 
this sense, Asakir-i Hamidiye was an example par excellence in the context of the 
lack of conscription in Yemen.  
The tasks of the Asakir-i Hamidiye were defined as to protect the castles, 
government offices, arsenals, and patrol stations. They could be dispatched to any 
required district like the nizamiye soldiers.308 In order to perform these tasks, it was 
stated that they were to partake with the training and customs of the nizamiye army; 
and sometimes act together with them.309 They were expected to protect the imperial 
institutions as well as the Empire’s order in the province. 
As shown by Ceasar Farah, most of the recruits were from the San’a families 
who were deprived from a decent livelihood and found it in their interest to be loyal 
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to the imperial government.310 In a document which includes a critical report about 
the Asakir-i Hamidiye, the recruits were defined as the subclasses of the province 
who had found the battalions as a chance to overcome their poverty.311 As we have 
seen above, the latter desires for establishing a native militia in the province had 
targeted this class of the society to recruit. In this aspect, İsmail Hakkı Pasha 
succeeded in presenting the native army as a chance for them to improve their 
livelihood. In fact, this development accounted to the success of the vali, since this 
poor class of people was perceived as the potential man pool easily to be mobilized 
by rebellious imams.In other militias I referred to above, the imperial government 
established regiments through establishing alliances with local tribal leaders; and in 
most cases the tribal leaders took the responsibility to gather men from their tribes 
for the regiments. In this aspect, they were more like tribal militias. Yet, the Asakir-i 
Hamidiye did not operate in this way; the tribes were not organized at the basis of 
regiments. On the contrary, the recruitment was personal-based similar to the 
institution of modern army. However, this does not mean that İsmail Hakkı Pasha 
with his sole initiative and effort recruited these men to the battalions.  
Since the return of the Ottomans to San’a the Ottoman operations were 
realized with the help of local notables. In other words, the weakness of the Ottoman 
imperial government to enforce the imperial institutions and reforms (ıslahat) 
always required the alliance between influential notables and the Ottoman 
governors, hence their integration to the imperial policies. Ismail Hakkı Pasha was 
aware of this need of alliances before his appointment; and he engendered this 
alliance during his tenure starting with releasing the previously imprisoned notables. 
As his regime could be defined as an integrationist one, the establishment and 
functioning of the Asakir-i Hamidiye was part and parcel of this policy. While he 
was aligned with some of the local notables to establish the native battalions, he 
pursued these battalions as an apparatus to integrate the lower classes to the imperial 
policies too. 
Although the vali did not designate tribes as the basis of battalions, he worked 
with the help of tribal leaders and notables to build the Asakir-i Hamidiye, as well as 
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to recruit the men. An unsigned report from this period presented the establishment 
of this unit as the project of Ismail Hakkı Paşa with the local notables, Hüseyin 
Çığman and Ahmed el-Kıbsi in particular.312 Ismail Hakkı also recruited lieutenants 
and other high ranking officers from the members of the notable families. For 
instance Galip Efendi, one of the notables, led his servant İbrahim Efendi to serve 
for Asakir-i Hamidiye. While informing Ibrahim Efendi’s participation to the 
battalions as an officer, the provincial newspaper called for the notables (sadat ve 
eşraf-ı ekabir) to send their servants to the native army.313 
Since general peace and order had been a fundamental concern for the 
imperial governors in the vilayet both for the heartlands as well as along the 
Empire’s frontier, establishing a security regime became a prominent agenda. More 
than this, in the mind of the governors, the integration of the local people to this task 
would pave the way for a more tenable image of the imperial governance in the eyes 
of the local population. Furthermore, it would ease the functioning of the 
governance while alleviating the rebellious forces. Wyman Bury stated in 1915 after 
his journey that, “Ottoman officialdom in Yemen depends entirely for its dealing 
with the native population on Zaptieh or Arab gendarmerie. It is they who convey 
administrative orders to the people concerned, do their best to smooth the thorny 
was of the tax collector, act as intelligent agents, keep order in the bazaars, carry 
messages, and escort travelers and convoys entitled to the protection of 
government.”314 As for these tasks, subjugating rebellions and providing order to the 
province, especially in the rebellious hinterlands, the integration of the natives to the 
military force was required. Ismail Hakkı Pasha was aware of this and was stating 
that making natives accustomed to Ottoman military institution would strengthen the 
order of the province.315 While an Ottoman military force consisting totally of 
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conscripts coming from other geographies, a native appearance in the military force 
would engender the local consent. The historian al-Wasi stated that “rebellious tribes 
would submit merely on the appearance of these troops, because they were of the 
people of Yemen and the rebels feared to kill their brother Muslims.”316 In this 
sense, it functioned as a counter-rebellious apparatus for two years, formed from the 
local population, especially in the hinterland of San’a. 
The general phenomenon of lack of participation of the local population to the 
imperial institutions within the vilayet conditioned the organization of the Asakir-i 
Hamidiye. The document in April 1880 reveals that İsmail Hakkı Pasha himself 
initiated the organization this army. He was just informing the Palace and waiting 
for a decree after he had already set the Asakir-i Hamidiye forward. When he could 
not get an answer from the capital, he wrote again to inform about the unit and 
stating his expectation of an answer, and stating their numbers as three hundred.317 
This number reached 475 at the end of 1881318; and about 600 in 1882. Yet what is 
more striking here is that Ismail Hakkı Pasha, as a governor of a frontier vilayet, had 
the liberty to initiate a peculiar kind of ıslahat in the vilayet. İsmail Hakkı Pasha did 
not have a top-down agenda from the capital. Keeping in mind that İsmail Hakkı 
Pasha had been serving in Yemen for six years until his governor tenure, what he 
observed in Yemen was the strategic importance of Yemen vilayeti, hence the 
significance of imperial defense and the critical issue of the obedience of the 
population to the Ottoman imperial state. He suggested the establishment of Asakir-i 
Hamidiye as one of the solutions to the problems the Ottoman imperial rule faced in 
Yemen. Two main issues were in the mind of İsmail Hakkı Pasha while establishing 
this native military unit: strengthening the Ottoman military power in the province 
for the imperial defense and order within the province, and consolidating the 
obedience and loyalty of natives to the Ottoman imperial rule. In fact these two 
issues are interconnected. The Ottomans required the integration of the local people 
for the defense of the Empire in this frontier, and the successful defense of the 
Muslim motherland would cement Ottoman legitimacy. 
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6.2. Recruiting the Yemenis for the Sake of the Empire: 
The Ottomans reoccupied Yemen in the context of new imperialism, in order 
to keep the possession of the province, and they always needed both a buffer force 
against the encroachments of the other imperialist powers and establish a security 
regime within the province. Thus, one of the immediate aims became to increase the 
Ottoman military power in the region.319 In this sense, especially the employing and 
integrating of native population into this force was perceived as a measure to 
strengthen the imperial defense as it would consolidate the native obedience. The 
vali perceived the organizing of a native army in a province like Yemen, in which 
approximately three million Muslims inhabited, as a powerhouse for the Ottoman 
power in the entire region.320 
The defense of the province, hence of the Empire's presence in the Red Sea 
required the participation of the Yemeni people themselves due to the requirement 
of an a efficient military presence. However, as I discussed above, the Ottomans 
could not introduce the conscription system since it was not accepted by the local 
population. In order to accustom the native people with the Ottoman military 
institution, İsmail Hakkı Pasha used the method of a native army separate from 
Nizamiye army in the vilayet. The Harbiye Nezareti (Minister of War) at first also 
perceived their organization as a gradual transition for making them commingle to 
the military service until the functioning of conscription system there (“o havalicede 
kur’a-i şeriye keşidesi usul-i mehasin-i şumulünün hayr-i icraya ve havline kadar 
tedricen askerlikle i’tilaklık maksadını temin için”).321 In this aspect, Ismail Hakkı 
Pasha presented the battalions of the Asakir-i Hamidiye as a way to familiarize the 
native people with the Ottoman military institutions. It was thought that when these 
recruits of Asakir-i Hamidiye progressed in the manners and orders of the 
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established military institutions and were familiarized to the Ottoman military 
institution, the Ottoman center would exert more power in the region.322  
The vali thought that in the long term the Asakir-i Hamidiye would replace the 
need for a Nizamiye army, and would be responsible for the imperial defense in the 
province.323 In fact, what the vali was looking for was simply an efficient military 
force. Until that time the Ottomans used to dispatch recruits to Yemen from the 
imperial heartlands. However, the climate of Yemen was itself a challenge for the 
soldiers who were not familiar to it; which resulted in great casualties and even 
deaths. For the imperial mind, this was creating an unfruitful military power in the 
region. Thus, Ismail Hakkı Pasha aimed to substitute the imperial soldiers with the 
native recruits of Asakir-i Hamidiye in the long run. According to him, with an 
increased number of native recruits the Empire would save itself from a financial 
burden originating from the dispatching of soldiers to Yemen, as it would forestall 
the casualties and deaths related to the adverse climate of Yemen. Furthermore, the 
vali planned to cover the expenses of the increasing number of new native recruits 
through these savings.324 
In the new imperial age, like other imperial ruling elites in the world, the 
Ottomans were seeking an efficient domination by shaping the local balances and 
manufacturing a local consent for the Empire’s presence. In this aspect, a native 
presence in the imperial military institutions was equal to winning active loyalty of 
the population which was the bedrock for the Empire’s confidence. Furthermore, in 
the minds of Ottoman ruling elites, that meant engaging locals to the imperial 
objectives. Thus, the benefiting from the native population for the defense of the 
Empire and security of the province was defined as of great interest to the state and 
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nation.325 The task of creating a native army was depicted as a fundamental national 
requirement (kaide-i milliye-i mucib) since it would materialize the ittihad-ı İslam; 
and Ismail Hakkı Pasha’s attempt to integrate the natives to the imperial defense was 
greeted as a patriotic desire.326 Especially in the context of rising imperialism, the 
Ottomans deemed their Muslim subjects as the potential champions of the Empire 
and the Sultan. Especially after the great territorial losses resulting from the Russian 
War of 1877-78, the imperial elites further attempted to consolidate the Empire’s 
authority in the Arab lands. This became a grand strategy against the other imperial 
encroachments in the reign of Abdulhamid II. However, the crucial point in this 
strategy was to mobilize the Muslim subjects and win their active loyalty for the 
imperial defense. In this sense, engaging the native Yemenis to the imperial defense 
was greeted as accommodating the interests of the state. Regarding the winning of 
the active loyalty of the local population, the Asakir-i Hamidiye was organized and 
trained like a nizamiye army in order to keep a regular native force as an apparatus 
of imperial defense and provincial security. 
 
6.3. Yemeni Sepoys: 
Although the Asakir-i Hamidiye was organized as a separate unit from the 
Nizamiye army, in terms of its hierarchical structure and training it was like a regular 
contemporary army. In fact it was conceived as a modern regular army from the 
beginning. Ismail Hakkı Pasha was always implying with great attention and pride 
that their training and order were equal to the nizamiye drilling under the command 
of nizamiye officers.327 In this sense, the Asakir-i Hamidiye was different from the 
traditionally employed frontier militia forces. For instance, when an article was 
published in a newspaper in Istanbul on the Kuloğlu soldiers in Tripoli and the 
Asakir-i Hamidiye, The san’a gazetesi was compelled to answer it by emphasizing 
that the Asakir-i Hamidiye was a modern army.328 The article published in the 
provincial newspaper stated that there is a difference between Kuloğlus and the 
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Asakir-i Hamidiye in terms of their equipment, order and training. The article stated 
that Kuloğlus were armed with old equipment and were not trained like modern 
armies; it further exclaimed that they were not real “soldiers”. Saying that they were 
not real soldiers was a reference to their difference from the modern regular armies. 
In fact, The San’a gazetesi was trying to emphasize Kuloğlu’s traditional militia 
character while portraying the Asakir-i Hamidiye as a modern army with an 
emphasis on the use of new training methods and modernized weapons. To a 
considerable degree, Ismail Hakkı Pasha’s point of reference for the Asakir-i 
Hamidiye was the Indian Sepoys (“Hindistan’ın yerli askerine mümasil”) rather than 
the militia forces recruited from the local population operating in the frontiers of the 
Ottoman Empire.329 As we discussed in the previous chapters, when the Ottoman 
imperial governors failed to introduce Tanzimat institutions and practices, they 
looked for any possible measures to control the population and earn their loyalty. In 
this sense, in some cases the colonial governing strategies impacted the Ottomans as 
showcased in the case of the native army. In the context of an increasingly 
precarious Ottoman position in Yemen in the 1900s, the Ottoman governors, for 
example Rüştü Pasha, problematized the lack of Yemeni natives in the Ottoman 
imperial army. Rüştü Pasha asked why the Ottomans could not recruit natives while 
Italians could do it in their recent colonies or as the British had succeeded to benefit 
from the Sudanese and Egyptians.330 Similarly, when giving the Indian Sepoys as the 
example, there was the same question behind Ismail Hakkı Pasha’s argument, and 
also the same desire to recruit the native men. Yet, the more significant emphasis 
while giving the Indian army as an example for the Asakir-i Hamidiye, was that a 
native army could be trained and ordered like a nizamiye army, as in the Indian case. 
The regiments in the Indian Army were organized and trained on the same lines as 
the British imperial army and had British officers with Indian subordinates; and they 
played a great role in the conquest and the pacification of the subcontinent.331 It was 
the personal project of İsmail Hakkı Pasha to raise Yemeni sepoys in the province 
and acquire a regularly trained, modernly organized native military force like the 
                                                
329 BOA/ Y. MTV 8/26, 12 Safer 1299/3 January 1880. 
330 Rüştü Paşa, Yemen Hatıraları, 151. 
331 Nadzan Haron, “Colonial Defense and British Approach to the Problems in 
Malaya, 1874-1918” Modern Asian Studies 24 (1990), 277. 
106 
 
Nizamiye army, which would strengthen the Empire’s presence in the province and 
in the Red Sea. 
 
6.4. With their local costumes: A Policy of Differentiation or Integration? 
After voicing the above-mentioned concern, Rüştü Pasha suggests that in order 
to successfully recruit the natives, their own tribal customs should be pursued and 
they should be employed with their native manners.332 In effect, Ismail Hakkı Pasha 
aimed to integrate the natives to the Ottoman military force by abiding to their local 
customs. That is reason for letting them don their regional apparel.333 In the above-
mentioned article comparing the Asakir-i Hamidiye with the Kuloğlus, it was stated 
that the only difference of the Asakir-i Hamidiye from the Nizamiye army was their 
local costumes.334  
In his prominent article on the costumes of the Asakir-i Hamidiye, Thomas 
Kuehn sees the local costumes of the Hamidian recruits as the practice of 
differentiation. According to Kuehn, the “native uniform for locally recruited 
soldiers was part of a broader effort on the part of the representatives of the Ottoman 
government to create and reproduce difference between the local population and the 
soldiers and administrators from outside provinces.”335 However, rather than 
pursuing a differentiation, the Ottomans aimed to eventually integrate them to the 
Empire. For Ismail Hakkı Pasha the Asakir-i Hamidiye was a tool to familiarize the 
natives, who had refused the conscription, to the imperial practices. It was the failure 
of the Ottomans that made the vali search for integration strategies which would 
open a ground for the Yemenis to practice their local customs, albeit within the 
imperial institutions. Ismail Hakkı Pasha pursued the Ottomanization of the natives, 
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which meant to make them pledge “Padişahım çok yaşa” (Long live my sulan) while 
wearing their local costumes but keeping the firearms of the Empire in their hands. 
In this sense, rather than colonial differentiation as Thomas Kuehn argued, the 
Ottomans were aiming for the integration of the population, by winning their hearts 
and making them loyal to the Empire and the Sultan. The vali set a long term 
project, at the end of which the Yemenis would be compliant to conscription. 
Furthermore, Thomas Kuehn draws similarity between the Indian army and 
the Asakir-i Hamidiye by stating that “the rhetoric about the Ottomans’ civilizing 
mission together with the reference to British India suggests that grouping these 
local recruits into separate units and distinguishing them visually from the regular 
Ottoman troops through specific inferior to their commanding officers and fellow 
soldiers from other parts of the Empire. In other words, the uncivilized, to whom the 
civilizing efforts of the state were to be directed, had to be dressed differently.”336 
However, the Ottomans could not conscript Yemenis to the imperial army; hence 
they offered them to join the Asakir-i Hamidiye with provisions different from the 
Nizamiye army as I stated above. Moreover, the British did not pursue to conscript 
Indians to the British army while the Ottomans did, but could not succeed. In a 
similar case, when the Bosnians refused to wear Ottoman uniforms, the Ottomans 
were forced to accept their local costumes.337 Thus, it was the resistance of the 
Yemeni natives to the conscription practice that forced the Ottomans to search for 
alternative strategies rather than this being a deliberate differentiation strategy, 
originating from a colonial mindset of the Empire. Instead of reproducing the 
difference, in the long term the Yemeni population was envisioned to share the 
imperial practices, like conscription. In this sense, the Asakir-i Hamidiye can be 
treated as part of a grand strategy of Ottomanization rather than an insantce of 
systematizing the cultural and traditional differences and excluding the frontier 
subjects from the imperial practices pursued for the imperial heartlands.  
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6.5. A ‘School of Civilization’: 
An article by Hamid Vehbi in The san’a gazetesi presented the establishment 
of the Asakir-i Hamidiye as a significant passage of ıslahat in Yemen. He adds that 
this reform project should be continued with the opening of high schools (idadi 
mektebler). According to him both institutions would make the people and the 
children of the vilayet meet with civilization.338 For the frontiers where the Ottoman 
institutions were lacking and the power of the state was limited, the ıslahat was 
projected to win the obedience of the population, integrate them to the imperial 
politics, and hence make them loyal Ottoman subjects. Especially in the reign of 
Abdulhamid II, education became an important institution to achieve this end. In 
other words, education was projected as a substantial apparatus to indoctrinate 
imperial ideologies as well as to produce loyal subjects of the Empire and the 
Sultan-Caliph. 
Military service was another apparatus to meet these goals, to raise loyal 
subjects who were defending the Empire and providing order by exercising imperial 
targets and ideologies. However, as was mentioned above, in frontiers like Yemen, 
there was a disparity between the goals of the imperial government and the actual 
degree of obedience of the local population, which resulted in weakness for the 
Ottoman imperial institutions. This distance was supposed to be spanned with a 
mission civilisatrice, which meant in this context the setting up of possible ıslahat 
projects to raise loyal subjects, even if these projects led to institutions that differed 
from the essence of the Tanzimat. As in our case, forming a native army was 
perceived as a part of this civilizing mission. This context also differentiates it from 
the traditional frontier militia forces. As in its organization and training, the Asakir-i 
Hamidiye was more like a modern army by which the civilizing mission was 
enacted. Ismail Hakkı Pasha imagined the Asakir-i Hamidiye as –with Hamilton’s 
words – an engine for the manufacture of a particular type of human intellect and 
body.339 Training and order aimed to create loyal subjects of the Sultan rather than 
providing merely the benefit of a frontier guard. Like the role of the French army in 
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France as stated by Eugene Weber,340 the Asakir-i Hamidiye was projected as the 
school of civilizing mission where the education of citizenship would be given in the 
school of nurture (“San’a’nın mekteb-i ereb ve terbiyesi”).341 Ismail Hakkı Pasha 
thought that by means of the Asakir-i Hamidiye the level of civilization in the 
province would increase.342 The Asakir-i Hamidiye would fulfill this role by 
strengthening the loyalty and linking the population to the imperial government 
(“ahalisinin canib-i hilafet-i menakıb saltanat-ı seniyeye olan irtibat-ı tabiyelerinin 
bir kat daha teyid ve teşyidi”).343 Ismail Hakkı Pasha indicates that by an 
organization and regulation like the nizamiye army, the Asakir-i Hamidiye would 
engage people to the military institution of the Ottoman civilization.344 They were 
trained by Turkish officers and İsmail Hakkı Pasha was proud of his sons,345 who 
were learning the chain of commands in Turkish.346  
Both the provincial newspaper and the imperial parades were used for 
propaganda to visualize İsmail Hakkı Pasha’s sons as the loyal, patriot subjects of 
the Sultan to the population of the province. İsmail Hakkı Pasha informs that the 
inhabitants of San’a and outside provinces came to watch their drills.347 The army 
was constructed as a school of Ottoman civilization, which raised ‘civilized’ loyal 
and obedient subjects speaking Turkish and praising the Chaliph-Sultan, and who 
would be the models for the entire population. As in the cases of parades organized 
in San’a, the manifestation to the citizens of San’a of their loyal character as soldiers 
of the Sultan became a significant and most frequently used repertoire of the vali. 
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For instance, while sending thirteen soldiers of Asakir-i Hamidiye to Istanbul in 
order to present this military unit to the Sultan, the vali organized a departure 
ceremony by inviting the inhabitants and notables of the province; and it is reported 
that the Hamidian soldiers made a parade in this ceremony to show their obedience 
to the Sultan.348 This was how their loyalty to the Empire was visualized to the 
San’a population. The vali deliberately preferred the recruits of the Asakir-i 
Hamidiye to march in the front ranks rather than the nizamiye soldiers. At the end of 
the parade, the imperial enthusiasm was demonstrated as they were chanting 
“Padişahım Çok Yaşa”. 349 
In two years, they had attended many military operations to subjugate the 
rebellions and to provide a tranquil hinterland as desired by the provincial 
governors. The san’a gazetesi was proud to announce their engagement to these 
campaigns. The newspaper informed the readers of their success with a valiant tone. 
For instance when they were sent to the Elhudda district to subjugate a small-scale 
rebellion, although the nizamiye battalions were also sent along with them, the 
newspaper wrote that “If god allows it, the Hamidians will return with glory; and 
prove their heroism and benefits to the motherland (“hamidiyeler inşallah kariben 
kemal-ı şan ile avdet ederler de kahramanlıklarını ve vatana yararlarını bir kat 
daha ispat ederler.”)350 When one soldier died in a military operation against a 
rebellion in Zemar district in the south of San’a, the newspaper treated it as the 
evidence of their valor (“delil-i hamaset-i kahramaneleri”).351  
 
7. Dismissal of Ismail Hakkı Pasha and Disbanding the Asakir-i Hamidiye 
 
Both the appointment of Ismail Hakkı Pasha and the organization of the 
Asakir-i Hamidiye were projects to strengthen the imperial defense in the frontier by 
                                                
348 The San’a Gazetesi, 17 Kanun-i Evvel 1296/29 December 1880. 
349 The San’a Gazetesi, 7 Mayıs 1296/19 May 1880; The San’a Gazetesi, 25 Şubat 
1296/9 March 1881; The San’a Gazetesi, 8 Temmuz 1297/20 July 1881. 
350 The San’a Gazetesi, 6 Mayıs 1297/18 May 1881. 
351 The San’a Gazetesi, 4 Teşrin-i Sani 1297/ 16 November 1881. 
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creating order and raising an obedient population via ıslahat projects. In fact, the 
dismissal of the vali and the disbanding the native army were based on the same 
concerns. Regarding the strategical prominence of the Yemen province, the imperial 
government decided that Ismail Hakkı Pasha could not fulfill the mission, and İzzet 
Pasha took Ismail Hakkı Pasha’s office with a memorandum dated in January 17, 
1882.352 In the first months of Izzet Pasha’s tenure, the Asakir-i Hamidiye were 
disbanded with a mandate from the Harbiye Nezareti. Regarding the needs of the 
Seventh Imperial Army exacerbated from the dispatchment of three battalions to 
Tripoli, the decision addressed the rendering of these recruits to nizamiye askeri and 
emphasized the adaption of their recruitment and training to the regulations of the 
nizamiye army, namely not formulating a special military unit.353 After the decision 
of the Harbiye Nezareti, the recruits of the Asakir-i Hamidiye were gathered in the 
presence of governors and officers of the vilayet and were disarmed. Izzet Pasha 
offered them to join the nizamiye battalions or the gendarmerie forces of zabtiye. 
After the offer, fifty of those recruits did join the nizamiye and one hundred ten of 
them the zabtiye forces. The provincial newspaper presented it as a great reform 
(ıslahat) initiated by İzzet Pasha.354 It is striking that both the organization and the 
disbandment of the Asakir-i Hamidiye were greeted as an attempt to reform the 
province. Yet there is indeed a similarity in the sense that both celebrated their 
participation to the military service, whether in an Asakir-i Hamidiye or Nizamiye 
army.  
Beyond the financial weakness of the Empire, it seems that the fear of 
rebellion preoccupied Izzet Pasha and the Harbiye Nezareti and explains the 
disbandment of the Asakir-i Hamidiye. Since the conditions of the native recruits 
were better than the conscripts of the Seventh Imperial Army, it created a 
disturbance among the soldiers. This led Izzet Pasha to contemplate on the 
efficiency of the Ottoman military force in the province. Although it did not lead to 
                                                
352 BOA/ İ. DH 843/67742, 26 Safer 1299/17 January 1882. 
353 BOA/ Y. MTV 8/101, 20 Cemayiizevvel 1299/ 9 April 1882. This reveals 
different perspectives between the ruling cadres of the Capital and those serving in 
the province. Those in Istanbul were more rigorous with enforcing a unique law valid 
for the whole of the empire while governors in the provinces were seeking any 
possible strategies. However, this would be a discussion for another study. 
354 The San’a Gazatesi, 1 Temmuz 1298/13 July 1882. 
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a massive uprising, there were telling instances of desertion that reveal the sort of 
resistance among the conscripts against their hard circumstances vis-a-vis the native 
recruits.355 Thus both the imperial government and its representatives in Yemen 
were alarmed. The ruling cadres thought that a possible uprising of the imperial 
conscripts would endanger the Ottoman presence in the province, as well as in the 
Red Sea. Therefore, Izzet Pasha saw the disbandment of the battalions as a 
preemptive action against this possibility.356  
Petitions (arzuhal) came from Yemen that complained about the malpractices 
of the Asakir-i Hamidiye and its officers against some tribes. In a petition that came 
from a member of the family of Sheikh Muhsin Ali, who was allied with Ahmed 
Muhtar Pasha during the occupation of San’a and its hinterland, the ruling cadres in 
the Palace were distressed, since it emphasized that those Arabs who faced the 
violence of the Asakir-i Hamidiye started to turn their faces to the British 
neighboring the region.357 Furthermore, the assassination attempt against members 
of the Asakir-i Hamidiye shows that there was an active opposition against the 
Asakir-i Hamidiye from the local people.358 All these caused great suspicion within 
the imperial circles about the Empire’s presence in the Arabian Peninsula against the 
British encroachments.359 This was the fundamental concern since the return of the 
Ottomans, and it opened the way for the disbandment of the Asakir-i Hamidiye and 
the dismissal of Ismail Hakkı Pasha.  
When these fears combined with the suspicion of a massive rebellion and an 
opposition to the claim of Abdulhamid’s Caliphate by the Zaydis, which had been an 
Achilles's heel of Abdulhamid II in the Arabian Peninsula, the imperial government 
became even more skeptical about the native army. I discussed the later ambitions in 
the 1900s to organize a native militia above. However, there had always been a 
counter-faction, opposed to the armament of the natives in a local militia. They 
                                                
355 BOA/ Y. A. HUS. 167-74, unsigned and undated. 
356 Rüştü Pasha, Yemen Hatıraları, 49. 
357 BOA/ Y. PRK. AZJ 4/102, 29 Zilhicce 1298/22 November 1881. 
358 The San’a Gazetesi, 19 Teşrin-i Sani 1296/1 December 1880. 
359 BOA/ Y. PRK. AZJ 4/102, 29 Zilhicce 1298/22 November 1881. 
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feared their turning of the barrels against the Ottomans.360 There emerged a faction 
against the Asakir-i Hamidiye due to the same fear that these recruits would align 
with the counter-Caliph opposition, and would constitute its military arm. Although 
he could not assemble a large scale rebellion, the Zaydi Imam Hamid el-Din, who 
was released in 1879 with the aforementioned eighteen ulemas, claimed an Imamate 
and initiated an opposition to the title of Caliphate of Abdulhamid II, galvanizing 
Abdulhamid II’s suspicions, which were first triggered by the Emir Hussain issue 
and were consolidated with the emergence of the Mahdist claim in Sudan in 1881. 
Especially the report presenting the Asakir-i Hamidiye as a potential force to 
strengthen the opposition of Caliphate (müdd-i el hilafe) augmented the pathological 
suspicion of Abdulhamid II.361 Although Ismail Hakkı Pasha’s integrationist policies 
and his attempt to promote the Sultan’s charisma and his title in the province would 
reflect the soul of Abdulhamid II’s Arab policy, these fears predominated 
Abdulhamid II's reasoning, and he thus came up with the decision to dismiss Ismail 
Hakkı Pasha, and disband the Asakir-i Hamidiye. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
360 For example, Ali Emiri defines the highland Yemenis as unreliable; plus, he was 
an opponent of establishing a native force. See. Yahya Yeşilyurt, “Ali Emiri’nin 
Yemen Islahına Dair Görüşleri” Turkish Studies 4 (2009), 2311.  
361 BOA/ Y. A. HUS. 167-74, unsigned and undated. I borrowed the term 
pathological suspicion from Vincent Steven Wilhite, Guerilla War, 133. 
114 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has made three key arguments. Firstly, by reevaluating the secondary 
literature written on the Ottoman frontiers in the last three decades, this study reveals 
the imperialist ambitions of the Ottomans in the course of the nineteenth century. As in 
the case of Ottoman expansion towards Yemen, the Ottomans had extended their 
frontiers in the nineteenth century by imperial military expeditions. This expansionary 
policy was projected as a response to the Western imperial encroachments. Thus, this 
thesis indicates that instead of remaining a passive audience of imperial competition, the 
Ottoman ruling elites were engaged in imperialist measures, and used an imperialist 
repertoire as well. Imperial defense became a crucial task for the Ottoman governors in 
the context of rising imperialism. One of the crucial strategies projected in the imperial 
circles was the policy of territorial expansion. In this sense, this study argues that 
extending Ottoman authority from Libyan territories to Kurdistan and Yemen was not 
an accidental response but a deliberate attempt of the Ottomans as a response to the 
rising imperial competition. In short, with the same mindset and repertoire as the other 
imperial powers, by applying military expeditions, and enabling expansionist policies, 
Ottoman authorities were engaged into the imperial struggle in the course of the 
nineteenth century. 
The second main argument of this thesis is about the Ottoman governing strategies 
in the frontiers. By focusing on the Ottoman rule in Yemen, after the reoccupation of its 
highlands and San’a in 1871, this study demonstrates that Ottoman governors had 
pursued diverging governing strategies than the administrative policies maintained for 
the heartlands of the Empire, as they realized that the financial, military and judicial 
115 
 
institutions of Tanzimat-era could not be introduced to these remote frontier regions. 
The resistance of the local populations and their refusal to accept these institutions 
paved the way for Ottoman governors to search for other possible governing strategies 
in order to control the population and gain their obedience. Thus, instead of being 
persistent to set up the top-down Tanzimat institutions and practices, Ottoman 
governors sought institutions and practices that would be adoptable to the local 
practices. In this sense, this study demonstrates that the urgent need of imperial defense 
in the Red Sea led Ottoman governors to win the loyalties of the Yemenis and engage 
them to the task of imperial defense. Therefore, Ottoman governors looked for 
adoptable institutions and practices to their customs. In other words, it was the imperial 
ambitions of Ottoman governors to enforce governing strategies that diverged from the 
institutions and practices pursued in the core regions of the Empire.  
Related to the second argument, the third main argument of this thesis is that the 
Ottoman governors were inspired to a major extent from colonial governing strategies, 
and colonial institutions. In particular, using the organization of the native army in the 
region (Asakir-i Hamidiye) as a case study, I have tried to show that Ismail Hakkı Pasha 
was inspired from the Indian Army of the British Empire; and initiated to build a native 
army for the task of the imperial defense and provincial tranquility. In this sense, this 
study demonstrates that it was not the perceptions of the Ottoman ruling elites, that was 
considering local populations as ‘uncivilized’ ‘backward’ or ‘savage’, that drove the 
Ottoman governors to search for colonial institutions. However, the resistance of the 
local people and their refusal of Ottoman imperial institutions motivated Ottoman 
governors to introduce similar institutions and practices of colonial regimes. Yet, this 
thesis demonstrates the existence of a nuance between the way that Ottoman authorities 
applied these colonial institutions and the colonial rule per se. Instead of deliberately 
producing differentiation and enforcing a colonial exclusionary policy, Ottoman 
governors –as in the case of Ismail Hakkı Pasha’s native army– sought the integration 
of the local people to the imperial practices. In this sense, I have shown that, Ismail 
Hakkı Pasha organized a native army and recruited Yemenis to accustom them to the 
imperial military institutions. Herein, as I have mentioned before, the order, 
organization and training of the Asakir-i Hamidiye were designed like the Nizamiye 
army; and in this aspect it was distinct from local militias in other frontiers, which were 
operating on ad-hoc basis. In short, as the Ottomans could not conscript Yemeni people, 
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a British colonial institution had inspired Ismail Hakkı Pasha to realize perhaps limited 
degree of mobilization among the Yemeni population. Yet, it should be kept in mind 
that the British deliberately recruited Indians into a different unit of army as part of 
colonial differentiation policy, while they did not seek for conscription of the natives to 
the British imperial army. 
Finally, as I noticed during the research, the Ottoman perception towards Yemeni 
people have become more of a pejorative nature in the last decade of Ottoman rule in 
comparison to the first two decades. Starting with 1890s, the Ottoman rule had been 
seriously challenged by the large-scale, organized Zaydi rebellions. These rebellions 
made the Ottoman rule fragile and its legitimacy precarious in the province. While the 
Ottomans were persistent to stay in Yemen, the pertinacious nature of the rebellious 
forces and their constant refusal of Ottoman institutions, made the Ottoman ruling elites 
apply a much heavier pejorative discourse. In the first two decades, due to the lack of 
great scale organized rebellions, it seems that Ottoman governors applied a more 
balanced language towards the Yemenis. This remains just a hypothetical assumption. 
On the other hand, the following factor also might have impacted the Ottoman 
governors to apply a more pejorative perception towards the Yemeni population: rising 
influence of nationalism among the Ottoman bureaucrats and generals, their perceptions 
of Turkishness as the core identity, and of Anatolia as the core region of the Empire. 
However, a comparison between the languages used by Ottoman ruling cadres in these 
different decades of Ottoman rule in Yemen requires an in-depth research, which awaits 
its researchers.  
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